What Are the Chinese After When They Talk About the "Global South"?

Zha Daojiong traces China's long-standing interest in the "Global South"

I've encountered numerous theories attempting to describe China's relationship with the "Global South," ranging from accusations of "neocolonialism" to claims of "debt trap diplomacy" (mostly negative) I don’t want to prove how wrong those theories are, but looking at the bases of those argument, most of these theories tend to view China's approach as a newcomer strategy that can only be traced back to the 1990s.

Dr. Zha Daojiong (查道炯) argues that China's focus on the developing world has deep historical roots that trace back to the early years of the People's Republic. The Bandung Conference holds a special place in Chinese diplomatic history (it’s in Chinese textbooks and is required learning for every high school student), not only because it marked the PRC's debut on the international stage, but also because it initiated China's economic engagement with developing countries.

Professor Zha Daojiong

Even during the period of the Cultural Revolution, the frequent appearance of the term “亚非拉“ (Ya Fei La) (Asia, Africa, Latin America) in Chinese domestic posters also carries the implied meaning that "There is a broader world out there waiting to connect with us." Following Reform and Opening Up, China drew upon its experience as an aid recipient, abandoned politically oriented assistance to Asia and Africa, and refocused economic cooperation on trade fundamentals.

Professor Zha is a prominent scholar at Peking University, specializing in international political economy and China’s external relations. His research focuses on non-traditional security issues, including energy, food, and drug safety, with a particular emphasis on how these issues impact China’s interactions with other countries.

After reading it, particularly his concluding questions, I think that while the "Global South" has become a buzzword in Chinese political discourse, it mirrors many of China's directional policies in that the concept itself remains incomplete—from institutional designs to its relationship with the current international order, as well as how to benefit the masses rather than just a few people—with many gaps yet to be filled. For now, the concept is more like political slogans; however, it’s NOT empty or rhetorical, but rather a call for serious intellectual contribution and concrete policy development. It also serves as a gauge for assessing international support to China’s direction.

For now, we’ve seen promising developments that China announced to remove all tariffs on African exports. Ultimately, how administrative bureaucrats translate this framework (提法 ti fa) into specific policies through their daily implementation will fundamentally shape China's relationships with other Global South nations.

Thanks to Professor Zha’s kind permission, I was able to translate his speech into English.

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Below is his full speech:

https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/NkcdpEL6CyVHaKPjagQ6aA

"The Global South" is an extremely difficult topic to discuss. As I mentioned earlier, while the concept of the "Global South" has become quite popular in China recently, it often appears in parentheses in Chinese documents. This suggests we don't have what you might call an "authoritative position" on it.

At today's seminar, the moderator asked: "What are China's expectations for Global South development?" My first reaction was that we need to figure out "who we are and who they are," which is no easy task. Moreover, when discussing Global South issues, we face multiple challenges stemming from inconsistencies between our choice of words and our intended meaning.

As with problems encountered in many other areas of practice, when we discuss international relations and directly mention the concept of the "Global South," it produces two effects. The first is that it unconsciously leads the other party to steer the conversation toward specific issues—like the Palestinian question and other topics we mentioned today—to demonstrate that these problems are not isolated from one another. But at the same time, mentioning the "Global South" might also signal that you oppose certain people's statements and draw unnecessary attention.

We actually have multiple definitions of the "South" or "Global South," as well as definitions of the "North" or "Global North." I can accept this conceptual ambiguity, but at the same time, the "Global South" is not everyday language, nor is it merely a linguistic habit. Such ambiguity brings direct consequences, especially at the policy level.

Let me give an example. In 2007, Indiana University Press launched an academic journal called "The Global South," which hardly anyone paid much attention to at the time. An editor invited me to join the journal's editorial board, but I didn't take it seriously. Why? Because their editorial team consisted of a group of experts and sociologists who would say things like, "Look at what's happening in Louisiana," or "North America's hurricane crisis should draw global attention." From this perspective, these views are very much like what we call Trump's calls for attention to US-Mexico border issues—a knowledge framework constructed by combining various stories and documents.

Therefore, this kind of "global" discussion is no child's play, but very serious academic research.

Before I elaborate further, let me be frank: I'm a straightforward person, I don't represent anyone, and I speak only for myself. We're now in Indonesia, where people are generally very polite to foreigners. Let's imagine this scenario:

An Indonesian asks me: "Why are the Chinese suddenly interested in the concept of the 'Global South'? Why do Chinese people talk about this concept? What are you really after? You must have interests at stake, right?" This Indonesian might also ask: "How should we Southeast Asian countries view China's positioning?"—just as we in China think about how to position China's relationship with Southeast Asian countries.

So what should I do? I hope you'll be interested in reviewing history with me. Although "Global South" is a very novel term in the Chinese context, if we review China's diplomatic practice, China has long been concerned with the content covered by the term "Global South." I'd like to give four examples to illustrate this point.

The first is the Bandung Conference.

Looking back at China's diplomatic practice and corresponding domestic publicity, the significance of the Bandung Conference for Chinese diplomacy went far beyond just having New China appear at an international meeting, and far beyond simply joining the Cold War competition. More importantly, the Bandung Conference can be seen as the beginning of China's economic diplomacy.

Before the Bandung Conference, in 1952, China and the then Dominion of Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) signed the "Ceylon-China Trade Agreement," which stipulated that China would provide rice in exchange for rubber, effective for thirty years. After the Bandung Conference, New China's government institutions and companies began establishing connections with Bandung Conference participants and a broader range of people, launching economic diplomacy.

These trivial details are often overlooked because they don't involve high-level leadership. But looking back at history, these details were precisely one of the key steps for China to bridge differences and begin building connecting "bridges."

The second example is 亚非拉 "Asia, Africa, and Latin America."

From the late 1950s to the 1970s, China constructed a very important publicity concept: "亚非拉." This term became China's collective reference to Asian, African, and Latin American countries, a concept that even permeated our textbook writing and Chinese-foreign poetry translation. Back then, we would translate songs and dances from Indonesia, Malaysia, Southeast Asia, or other so-called Third World countries into Chinese and compile them into Asia-Africa-Latin America song collections. You would also see academic conference organizers incorporating the Asia-Africa-Latin America concept into academic conferences.

Of course, in those years, the purpose of some of these activities was to show people at home that China had friends all over the world. Although China was generally in a relatively isolated state due to diplomatic and political reasons at the time, through these domestic cultural and ideological constructions, a message could be conveyed to domestic political elites and the masses: "Look, there is a broader world out there waiting to connect with us."

In other words, the purpose of China's foreign affairs activities at that time was not only to show China to the world, but also, like many countries, to prove to domestic audiences what China's diplomatic actions meant to the Chinese people and to consider how we should respond to the world.

The third example is the proposal of the 大经贸 "big economy and trade" concept.

In the early 1990s, as China's reform and opening-up deepened, we successively established multiple special economic zones, formed development banks and commercial banks, and converted several government functional departments into enterprises to undertake construction tasks including infrastructure. In this practical process, the term "大经贸big economy and trade" gradually formed domestically to summarize "comprehensive foreign economic and trade relations."

The experience for this approach came from China's early experience as an aid recipient, which was then applied in reverse to design and construct a foreign aid framework for Asia and Africa. This reform aimed to break away from the past aid model that was mainly based on revolutionary or political solidarity, and return economic and trade cooperation with the Third World to trade itself: using trade to guide investment, and then using investment to promote larger-scale trade. This was also an adjustment China made based on its own experience as an aid recipient.

Finally, I want to discuss the concept of 综合安全 "comprehensive security."

It concerns not only material interests or education, but also the organic connection between national governance methods and thinking systems. Today, "comprehensive security" has been written into domestic policy documents and has become an important component of national governance.

Regarding the two issues of "why Chinese people are suddenly interested in the 'Global South'" and "how Southeast Asian scholars should approach China studies," I'd like to raise four to five key questions for everyone to think about together:

First, whether in domestic governance or international governance, what is the fundamental goal? Is there room for cooperation and dialogue between China and Southeast Asian countries on this point?

Second, how do we really view the existing international order? Have the various existing international organizations really achieved their original purposes? The term "Global South" emerged in English academia precisely because these institutions failed to deliver on the Western founding intentions and instead viewed the rise of "Global South" countries as a threat. Do we agree with this critical perspective?

Third, what is the institutional foundation of the "Global South"? Is it based on existing multilateral mechanisms like BRICS, the BRIC countries, G77, etc., or do we need to construct new frameworks?

Fourth, undoubtedly, we hope these organizations can more effectively serve broader groups rather than a few elites. What are the feasible options for reforming international organizations?

Finally, I believe that before advancing the "Global South" agenda, we need to answer a major question: in the face of deep globalization trends, is interdependence between countries a value worth preserving or even cherishing?

These are some of my thoughts, and I hope they can provide some inspiration and reference for everyone.

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