Diao Daming: How the Iran War Will Reshape the Midterms and 2028

A leading Chinese America-watcher on why the war is an amplifier, not a kingmaker, and what it means for both parties

For today’s piece, I’m featuring Professor Diao Daming’s analysis of how the ongoing Iran war is reshaping the 2026 midterms. Diao serves as Professor at the School of International Studies and Deputy Director of the American Studies Center at Renmin University. He is also one of the top “America Watchers” in China.

Professor Diao Daming

His core argument is that the war is more like an amplifier than a kingmaker, intensifying trends already running against Republicans, mainly through rising gas prices, compounding the affordability crisis voters already feel. He draws on a deep bench of American electoral history, reaching back past the 2002 post-9/11 midterms all the way to the 1898 Spanish-American War to show that even decisive foreign military victories rarely rescue the president's party when domestic economic pain is the real issue.

Where it gets especially interesting to me is the longer-term analysis. The widening rift between Trump and the MAGA base over the war, with Vance caught in between. The rapid shift in American attitudes toward Israel, particularly among young voters and Democrats. The emerging fault line within the Democratic Party is between AIPAC-backed traditionalists and union-backed progressives sympathetic to the Muslim community. These dynamics could reshape both parties well beyond 2026.

As always, the article provides a window into how China’s strategic community is reading American domestic politics in real time. The original article was published on April 1, 2026, in The Paper (澎湃新闻), and thanks to Professor Diao’s authorization, I can provide the English ver of the article:

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How Will the Iran War Affect the Midterms and 2028?

On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched a joint military operation against Iran, killing multiple senior Iranian officials, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The strike provoked Iranian retaliation, and the Strait of Hormuz was promptly closed. The conflict has now dragged on for over a month, far exceeding what Trump initially claimed would be a matter of days, and the risk of a protracted war cannot be ruled out. Global oil prices have surged and fluctuated in response. The prolonged fighting, rising oil prices, growing likelihood of American military casualties, and the pressure of being sucked into yet another quagmire have all deepened anxiety among the American public. Since 2026 is a midterm election year, the Iran conflict has been repeatedly linked to the midterms in both American and international commentary, with the prevailing view that the war is likely to hurt Republican prospects.

To Capitol Hill, via Tehran?

Iran is no stranger to American electoral politics. Forty-six years ago, Republican Ronald Reagan was able to end Democratic President Jimmy Carter’s bid for reelection. Beyond the stagflation dragging down the American economy and deep disunity within the Democratic Party, the 444-day Iran hostage crisis is widely regarded as having provided the crucial backdrop that constantly reminded voters of the sitting president’s “incompetence.” After the failure of the so-called “Operation Eagle Claw” in late April 1980, Reagan’s polling numbers pulled ahead and stayed there until his victory in November. On January 20, 1981, Reagan was formally sworn in as president, and just minutes before his inauguration, the hostages were released, bringing the crisis to an end.

Could such a dramatic arc replay itself in the 2026 midterms? If the conflict does become protracted, this possibility cannot be entirely ruled out, though its effect would likely not be that of a “kingmaker” that fundamentally alters the electoral landscape, but rather an “amplifier” of trends that are already largely set.

On one hand, unlike the incumbency advantage a sitting president enjoys when seeking reelection, midterm elections carry a so-called “curse” that works against the president’s party. In other words, 2026 was already shaping up poorly for Trump’s Republicans. If we consult the historical record, in the 20 midterm elections from 1946 to 2022, when presidential approval exceeded 50%, the president’s party still lost an average of 14 House seats. When approval fell between 40% and 50%, the average loss rose to 34.5 seats. Below 40%, the average jumped to 38 seats. By these historical numbers, even the mildest average loss of 14 seats would be more than enough for Democrats to reclaim the House majority, and Trump’s current approval sits at just 36%.

On the other hand, inflation, healthcare, housing, employment, and other domestic issues that typically dominate midterm elections are in 2026 being framed and consolidated into a single new pain point for the American public: the “affordability” problem. This structural issue is clearly not something the Trump administration can effectively address in the short term. It is a burden of public resentment that the sitting president and his party simply cannot shirk. In fact, even the Democrats, who stand to retake the House majority on the strength of this discontent, would most likely prove equally helpless against it. The Iran war’s effect is obvious: the constantly climbing numbers on gas station price signs are compounding the public’s anxiety over affordability.

With Republicans almost certain to lose their House majority, various analyses currently predict seat losses ranging from 20 to 70. The Iran factor, particularly the prospect of deploying ground troops, is the variable that pushes the number toward the higher end of that range.

Compared to the rigid trend in the House, the Senate presents a more limited battlefield with only 35 seats up for election. Public dissatisfaction with the Republicans as the president’s party, filtered through a cycle in which only slightly more than a third of seats are contested, is not sufficient to simultaneously strip Republicans of their Senate majority. The only scenario in which that happens is if Democrats sweep the competitive seats in Maine, North Carolina, and Michigan, and also perform exceptionally well in Ohio and Alaska, two seats Republicans are fighting hard to defend, flipping the chamber 51 to 49. The specifics in each state, especially these swing states, probably won’t become clear until after the summer. By then, we’ll know whether the Iran factor is still festering.

Was the War Launched for the Midterms?

While the Iran factor has objectively worsened Republican prospects, could Trump’s subjective motivation in launching the strike, or even his fantasy of a “quick and decisive victory,” have actually been aimed at boosting the party’s midterm chances?

This motive is hard to dismiss entirely. The logic runs as follows: if the war could be quick and decisive, a rapid decapitation strike followed by disengagement might bolster a sense of pride among voters, particularly Republican voters, in the spirit of “Making America Great Again.” This could make certain groups feel that the affordability burdens they bear in daily life are somehow “worth it,” potentially helping to consolidate Republican voters and certain conservative-leaning independents. But now, with the war dragging on and the possibility of prolonged conflict, whatever pride the “greatness” narrative once generated has evaporated, replaced by a growing collective unease that extends well beyond the MAGA wing of the Republican camp.

The 2026 strikes on Iran simply cannot be compared to the War on Terror in 2002. Back then, a spirit of national unity still pervaded the country. In the aftermath of 9/11, “crisis president” George W. Bush and his Republican Party managed to gain seats in both chambers of Congress, delivering the best midterm performance for a president’s party since 1934. Today, a majority of Americans (65%) do not believe military action against Iran serves American interests. Most (75%) think the U.S. is too involved in Iran. Only 35% support the strikes. While a majority of Republicans (73%) and even MAGA supporters have continued to stand with Trump since the war began, these same groups within the party still oppose the risky move of deploying ground troops. This twisted, even self-contradictory state of public opinion means that the Iran war was, from the very start, a partisan affair. In contrast to the old adage that “politics stops at the water’s edge,” this conflict has crossed the water with partisanship fully intact. There will be no rally-around-the-flag effect capable of reaching across party lines, or at least of mobilizing swing voters.

Historical comparisons make the extreme exceptionalism of Bush’s post-war midterm victory even more apparent. In the 1950 midterms, Harry Truman and his Democrats lost 5 Senate seats and 28 House seats, barely clinging to their majorities only because they had entered with such large pre-election margins. They then lost both chambers entirely in 1952. The Democratic losses in 1950 had two main causes: fierce conservative opposition to the Truman administration’s “Fair Deal” agenda on education and social welfare, and public discontent with the administration’s decision to send troops into the Korean War in June and July of that year.

Going even further back, 1898 was also a midterm election year. The Spanish-American War, often called the “Hundred Days’ War,” was not only quick and decisive but vaulted the United States into the ranks of a transpacific and Caribbean power, placing it on the stage of global competition. Yet this victory, which can be seen as the starting point of American hegemony, did not deliver a similarly resounding midterm triumph for William McKinley’s Republicans. The party gained 8 Senate seats but lost 19 in the House, while Democrats gained 37 House seats. The reason was that Democrats picked up seats in agriculture-dependent regions across thirteen states along the Atlantic coast, the South, and the West. This was clearly tied to the electoral strategy of Democratic leader William Jennings Bryan, who attracted populist constituencies and amplified agricultural economic issues. In a sense, the Democrats of 1898 were previewing Bill Clinton’s 1992 playbook of “It’s the economy, stupid,” siphoning away from McKinley and his Republicans the glory they had hoped to monopolize through the Spanish-American War.

Impact Beyond 2026

While the Iran war’s likely impact on the 2026 midterms is more a matter of degree than direction, whether this military action’s effects on America’s political ecosystem extend beyond 2026 is worth watching over the long term.

For instance, many commentators have suggested that MAGA supporters, particularly the most deeply disillusioned among them, may have no recourse against the sitting President Trump himself but could redirect their frustration toward Vance. Vance is seen as having been quite passive on the Iran question, and there is a real possibility that he could lose further support within the Republican Party, forfeiting his shot at 2028 and yielding the opening to figures like Rubio. There is no doubt that the Iran strikes have exposed the growing divergence and fracture between Trump and the MAGA base, leaving Vance, who serves as the bridge between them, in an impossible position. But this does not necessarily provide a reliable guide to what will happen in 2028. Faced with the potential quagmire created by Trump’s personal decision-making, Vance may not be able to shape events, but he can still participate in them. On questions like how to end the war, he still has room and opportunity to respond to the MAGA base.

Meanwhile, polling since the war began shows that the share of Americans holding negative views of Israel has risen from 24% in 2023 to 39% in 2026. Among Democrats, this figure jumped from 36% to 57%, while among Republicans it increased only modestly, from 12% to 18%. More specifically, just 17% of Democrats sympathize with Israel, while roughly two-thirds sympathize with Palestine and the broader Arab world. Among Republicans, these figures are nearly a mirror image: 69% and 14%. Among young Americans aged 18 to 34, roughly two-thirds hold negative views of Israel, with only 13% viewing it positively. These attitudinal patterns reveal that Democratic voters, particularly younger ones, are increasingly critical of Israel and more sympathetic to the Arab world, while Republicans are embracing Israel more firmly.

Following this trend, the Iran war could produce mixed consequences for the Democratic Party as well. First, the drift of Muslim voters away from Democrats, driven by dissatisfaction with the Biden administration’s Middle East policy and visible in the 2024 election, may now face a reversal, or at least a pause. This would help Democratic prospects in Midwestern states, particularly the Rust Belt, where Muslim communities are concentrated.

Second, with pro-Israel forces continuing to place long-term bets on both parties by funneling money and shaping elections, the question of how pro-Israel and anti-Israel factions coexist within the Democratic Party will inevitably reshape its internal ecology to some degree. On March 17, in the Illinois Democratic primaries, AIPAC (the American Israel Public Affairs Committee) poured at least twenty million dollars into four House primary races. In the Illinois Senate Democratic primary, some candidates faced attacks for having visited Israel, others publicly distanced themselves from AIPAC despite long-standing partnerships, and still others, normally active on foreign affairs, refused to take any clear position on Israel-related issues. In the AIPAC-targeted House primaries, some races were won by the traditional establishment-leaning Democrats that AIPAC backed, while in others, progressive Democratic candidates defeated AIPAC-supported opponents.

Does this suggest that the long-standing conflict between traditional establishment Democrats and radical progressives is gaining a new dimension because of the Iran war? Wall Street and pro-Israel forces backing traditional Democrats on one side, unions backing pro-Muslim, identity-politics-focused progressive Democrats on the other, both competing for control of the party’s future direction.

It must be recognized that, facing the accelerating transformation of America’s demographic composition, the Democratic Party, which has traditionally excelled at integrating the interests of diverse groups, will inevitably face even greater challenges. Particularly given the reality that America’s Muslim population is projected to surpass its Jewish population around 2035, the reverberations of Middle Eastern affairs on American domestic politics are becoming increasingly unpredictable. How both parties, and especially the Democrats, adapt to these demographic and constituency shifts, and how this in turn shapes the evolution of their Middle East policies, are fascinating questions indeed.

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