Diao Daming on the Political Legacy of US 2024 Presidential Race

Deputy Director of Renmin University's American Studies Center Discusses the US Election's Impact on American Political Landscape

I couldn't resist joining in on the current trend of the US election. So for today’s piece, I bring a translation of a lecture by Professor Diao Daming, at the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies. Professor Diao is the Deputy Director of the American Studies Center at Renmin University. The transcript was first published on the Institute’s webpage, titled “刁大明：2024美国大选影响四年还是四十年？” It’s very interesting and easy to read, especially when talking about how Vance’s beard reflects the generational shift of the Republicans.

Professor Diao Daming

Last week, I also brought Professor Da Wei’s analysis on China-US relations, Please Check:

Below is the translation:

A Battle Between Two Americas, A Contest of Base Voters

The significance of this election's legacy stems from its unique characteristics. Initially, many viewed it as a contest between two presidents - the incumbent and the former. From September last year through July this year, this dynamic persisted, essentially representing a clash between two distinct visions of America. Both candidates have spent approximately four years demonstrating to the world what their presidencies would mean in terms of domestic and foreign policy. Unlike the 2008 election, where Obama's potential actions remained uncertain, this election offers remarkable clarity about both candidates' likely courses of action.

Before the 2016 election, most predicted Hillary Clinton's victory. However, at a private think tank meeting, I suggested that regardless of who won, America would enter the "Trump era" - a prediction that proved accurate but left significant uncertainties worth examining. The underlying reason is that America's once-in-a-century transformation has manifested itself comprehensively. As a nation deeply embedded in the global order, America's fundamental transformation inevitably influences worldwide changes. Consequently, the convergence of various political ecosystems at this electoral juncture becomes more pronounced. The contest between two presidents represents a clash between two Americas - two completely different paths and directions, leaving no room for alternative interpretations. Even if Harris were to step in, it would still represent a confrontation between two distinctly different versions of America.

This remains, in my view, a contest between two Americas - essentially a battle of base voters. Harris's opportunity to step forward on July 21st represents the only significant change for the Democratic Party. Even with this change, it remains fundamentally a contest between two base constituencies. Isn't Harris's primary role simply to mobilize the Democratic base more effectively? Current support below 49.5% is noteworthy, as this figure is historically insufficient for victory. Looking at presidential elections from 1932 to 2020, Democrats won 13 out of 23 elections, averaging 52.6% of the popular vote. What does 49.5% really mean? The gap between 49.5% and the historical benchmark exceeds statistical error margins. During the same period, in the ten elections won by Republicans, their average vote share was 48.9% - actually closer to Trump's current support levels.

The Historical Curse Facing Trump

This election evokes a sense of historical déjà vu. Everyone's familiar with Cleveland, perhaps even more so because of Trump. If Trump returns to the White House, he'll become the second person in American history to achieve this distinction. The first was Cleveland, who won in 1884, lost his reelection bid in 1888, but returned to win again in 1892. However, Cleveland left behind a curse that might pose a significant challenge to Trump's attempted comeback.

Cleveland won the popular vote in all three of his elections, losing only the electoral college in his sole defeat. In other words, throughout his eight years of federal political prominence, Cleveland consistently maintained broader popular support, with his one defeat merely reflecting institutional distortion. This gave him the courage to try again after his 1888 loss.

Based on this historical precedent, consider the pressure on Trump. He lost the popular vote in his first election despite winning and lost both popular and electoral votes in his second, so what evidence suggests he could win the popular vote in his third attempt? Has he shown any significant growth in popular support over the past eight years? If not, how can he win? Through another electoral college distortion? The 2016 election marked the fifth such distortion in U.S. history - would 2024 mark the sixth? While this possibility can't be ruled out, it's difficult to predict rationally. So how could Trump win? While we typically gauge a president's governance through polls, elections ultimately come down to the opponent. We may have no evidence of Trump's popular vote growth over eight years, but this doesn't necessarily determine the outcome. A scenario could emerge where despite his lack of growth, his opponent performs even worse. If that opponent fails to secure their expected votes, Trump could still win - a case of the less unpopular candidate prevailing over the more unpopular one. Frankly, Biden faces this situation during the election period, struggling to secure his expected voter base. While minorities, women, and young voters might not support Trump, they might not turn out for Biden either. Harris's emergence has altered this dynamic, but whether it's enough to secure victory remains uncertain.

A Barometer for America's Political Direction

This election will serve as a barometer for America's future trajectory, indicating the direction of its political, economic, and social structures. This significance primarily stems from the concept of political cycles. While economists generally accept cyclical patterns in their field, political scientists are more divided - about half believe in political cycles, half don't. I remain convinced of their existence.

Cycles need defining moments. What happened in 2016 was essentially a social movement manifesting as an election, with Trump riding this movement to power. His election marked the movement's success. If this interpretation holds meaning, what was 2020? If 2016 represented a bottom-up, populist social movement against Wall Street and Washington elites, wasn't 2020 a top-down elite correction of Trump's extreme domestic and foreign policies amid the pandemic? It certainly feels that way. If we interpret the past eight years' elections this way, what does 2024 represent? Particularly in terms of this "rematch" or "quasi-rematch"? It appears to be a final showdown or reckoning between these two forces that have dominated American politics for the past eight years. The outcome could become a pivotal moment indicating American political logic for the foreseeable future.

What is this logic? While Trump's election was somewhat unexpected, it likely marked the end of an old cycle - the moderate liberal cycle that began in the 1990s. Nobody in 2017 definitively declared 2016 as a cycle's end; we needed subsequent elections or significant events to accumulate evidence. We waited for 2020, but instead of getting clarity about 2016's meaning, we got a pandemic-influenced election. In 2020, I extensively searched Chinese and English databases and academic papers for studies on how major epidemics affect competitive Western elections and voting behavior. I found very little literature on this - after all, 1918 wasn't an election year.

Now I'm hoping the 2024 election results will provide answers. If Trump wins, I might conclude that 2016 initiated a moderate conservative cycle that could continue through the 2030s or 2040s, with Republicans maintaining relative dominance. If Harris wins, it might mean the cycle that could have begun in 2016 gets delayed again, and we'll have to wait to see what 2028 brings. If Democrats win in 2028, it could mean that the 12 years from 2016 to 2028 represent a sub-cycle or half-cycle without clear political themes - similar to the "Chaotic Era" in "The Three-Body Problem," breaking the fundamental rhythm.

The Judicial Politicization: A Shared Madness of Both Parties

When the election began, we witnessed four criminal indictments against Trump, not to mention numerous civil cases. Initially, many of us debated whether these criminal prosecutions would influence the election. The result? None of these cases will reach a definitive conclusion before the election. Even the 34-count hush-money case, if resulting in conviction, won't see sentencing until November 26th, three weeks after voting. It has no irreversible direct impact on the election itself. The judge's gavel hasn't replaced the ballot, unlike the Supreme Court's role in the 2000 election. Then, judicial intervention came after voters had completed the voting process. Now, with voters yet to decide, judicial bodies naturally avoid taking such enormous political risks. This situation reveals three key issues.

First, American judicial institutions still maintain a basic sense of self-preservation. They absolutely won't substitute for other interests or political factors in decision-making, as the political risk is too great. They'll delay until the very end. I don't believe Trump's lawyers, however skilled, are solely responsible for these delays - the judicial institutions themselves clearly prefer postponement.

Second, the American judiciary has undoubtedly become politicized and instrumentalized. Some argue that Trump's prosecution represents "judicial fairness," claiming that even former presidents must be held accountable. This is clearly not the case! Would these indictments exist if Trump weren't running? Obviously not! These matters would likely be dismissed. This clearly demonstrates the severe politicization of judicial power.

Third, there's the complete deterioration of American politics. While not affecting the election outcome, the 34 felony counts still face sentencing. If the punishment extends beyond fines to restrictions on personal freedom, even if just wearing an electronic ankle monitor or a few months' confinement, what does this mean for American politics? With sentencing on November 25th, Trump might appeal, but if penalties stand, a sitting President Trump could temporarily avoid state penalties but couldn't pardon himself - no president has ever pardoned themselves. While Trump could avoid criminal responsibility during his presidency, what happens after? We might see a scene on January 20, 2029, where the new ex-president faces immediate arrest. What does this mean for Americans?

When Ford pardoned Nixon, Americans were outraged, seeing it as naked political dealing. Yet years later, people realized this action maintained basic stability in the presidential system. What does Trump's potential situation signify? During Trump's four years, while watching his extreme behavior, what did Democrats do? Beyond criticizing Trump, their responses essentially mimicked his methods - fighting fire with fire. Democrats never maintained a principled response while criticizing Trump. In confronting Trump, they accepted his negative transformation of them, breaking the same order he did. While Trump's violations were personal, the Democrats' systemic response threatened the entire order.

Therefore, this isn't extremism of any single party but rather a shared madness of both parties.

The Drama and Complete Failure of the Primary System

Before the "Biden replacement" discussions, we often asked about the Democratic Party's Plan B mechanisms. While no one expected Biden or Trump to voluntarily withdraw, it's worth noting that in 2019-2020, when Biden was preparing his campaign, he discussed with his team the possibility of pledging to serve just one term. He wasn't the first to consider this - McCain had similar thoughts. So Biden's potential withdrawal wouldn't be entirely surprising. Conversely, if future elderly presidential candidates promise single terms, they could become virtually unstoppable, freed from political constraints. What institutional constraints would remain? Was Trump constrained? Isn't the political-ecological constraint primarily about reelection? Without reelection pressure, wouldn't this create an "eternally uncontested" or pressure-free "imperial presidency"? If Trump returns, he'd effectively be such a president, limited to one term even without promising it.

In fact, mechanisms exist to handle Biden's potential withdrawal at any point. Though historically unprecedented, a complete solution can be pieced together from the federal constitution, state laws, and party rules. This comprehensive solution has a certain beauty to it, though some might not understand why I say this. It's elegant: the closer to the election when problems arise, the more primitive and traditional the solutions become. Early issues trigger new elections, then national convention decisions, then party committee selections, and finally, constitutional provisions. This reverse sequence mirrors the historical evolution of the primary system. The response methods at different stages present a panoramic institutional retrospective.

Undoubtedly, the 2024 presidential election marks the complete failure of the primary system, with Harris becoming the first "victory without contest" candidate since both parties adopted primaries for presidential nominations in the 1970s. Her candidacy signifies the system's failure to effectively select a candidate who both satisfies voters and convinces party elites of electability. Consequently, I believe that by 2028, especially if Harris loses, both parties will likely continue adjusting or even reforming the primary system. The implications of such reforms for both parties and the political ecosystem deserve careful attention.

The Effective Collapse of the Primary System Began with "Replacing Biden." The "Biden replacement" was undoubtedly dramatic. On Sunday, July 21st, Biden suddenly announced his withdrawal, despite maintaining his stance just the day before. We later learned that his inner circle had been urging him to step down. Even Blinken had asked Biden, "Do you think you can handle another four years?" Biden acknowledged this was a concern. While I recognize the drama of the 2024 "Biden replacement," we should also recall the equally dramatic Democratic primary that "selected Biden" four years earlier.

In the 2020 Democratic primaries, Buttigieg won Iowa, Sanders won New Hampshire and Nevada, until Biden finally won South Carolina due to African American support. Biden's late victory gave Democrats hope. This hope emerged through comparison: if Buttigieg had won the nomination, it would have been a victory for gender politics rather than the Democratic Party; if Sanders had won, it would have represented extreme progressives rather than the party. Finally, they saw a moderate candidate who best represented mainstream Democratic values - Biden. So what if he was 78? After his South Carolina victory on the 29th, other candidates, including Buttigieg and Klobuchar, inexplicably withdrew before Super Tuesday. These candidates dropped out like dumplings in soup, clearly orchestrated by Democratic Party operations seeking rapid consolidation. Warren and Sanders later followed suit.

Biden won South Carolina partly because he was Obama's vice president and partly because he promised to choose an African American running mate. Interestingly, in 2019, to compensate for Hillary's unfulfilled attempt to break the glass ceiling, Biden had also promised to choose a female vice president. These dual commitments led to one solution - a female African American vice president! Historically, presidential running mates typically come from governorships or the Senate, occasionally from the House or Cabinet (though the latter is rare). America had never had a female African American governor, and when Biden was choosing his running mate, there were only two female African American senators ever: Carol Moseley Braun from Illinois (Obama's former seat), who was slightly younger than Biden but long retired from politics by 2020, and Harris. Unexpectedly, this candidate who fit both commitments has now been selected again.

Consider how the 2020 Democratic primary drama parallels 2024. In both cases, Democrats harbored intense fear of Trump, perhaps even stronger now. This fear led party elites to distrust voter choice, instead manipulating the process to select whoever they believed could best defeat Trump. This dangerous tendency prioritizes winning elections over governing ability. In 2020, their chosen savior, Biden, at least, had substantial domestic and foreign policy experience, enabling him to steadily advance policies over four years. But what about Harris now?

Vance's Beard and the Republican Party's Generational Shift

While 82-year-old Biden's replacement by 60-year-old Harris represents a relative generational refresh for Democrats, this renewal appears insignificant or slow compared to Vance.

Notably, Vance is the first person in U.S. history to participate in presidential or vice-presidential TV debates with a beard. The last bearded vice president was Charles Curtis under Hoover in the 1920s-30s, and the last bearded presidential candidate was Dewey in the 1940s. Facial hair has been an interesting factor in American politics. Since Gillette invented efficient razors, clean-shaven faces became standard for modern professional American men, with clean-shaven presidential candidates viewed as more approachable and efficient. Why did Vance choose the opposite? I believe it expresses his complete rebellion against traditional elite culture - a MAGA manifestation targeting political establishment rather than traditional culture. Additionally, he practically needs the beard - just look at his baby face without it.

I increasingly think Trump's choice of Vance wasn't so wrong, despite initial controversy. Before the Civil War in 1856, Buchanan and Vice President Breckinridge won. Buchanan should thank Trump - before Trump's presidency, Buchanan consistently ranked bottom among presidents for failing to effectively prevent the Civil War. Then, 66-year-old Buchanan and 36-year-old Breckinridge (still America's youngest vice president) served together. Now, Trump's selection of 40-year-old Vance, while not breaking the youngest VP record, sets a new record for the largest age gap (38 years) between a president and vice president.

What does this signify? It represents two distinct generations, enabling the Republican Party's rapid generational transition. Meanwhile, Democrats chose two 60-year-olds, reminiscent of the Clinton-Gore era. So who's really passing Biden's torch? It's hard to say.

Since 1992, both parties have experienced interesting generational dynamics. The supposedly younger Democratic Party has nominated mostly candidates born in the 1940s, except Obama and Harris. Even Harris merely returns to 2008 levels - someone born in the 1960s who seemed young then, like Obama and Clinton, but not so much now. Conversely, the Republican Party, regardless of 2028's outcome, has steadily updated generations since 1992 - candidates from the 1920s, 30s, 40s, and so on. Why this pattern?

We certainly view Obama as relatively dynamic in American politics, bringing a sense of historical renewal. He emerged during the 2008 financial crisis. Notice that after Clinton, other Democrats born in the 1940s, like Gore and Kerry, failed to win. Logically, candidates born in the 1950s should have followed, but instead, Obama, born in 1961, emerged during the financial crisis. Not only was he young but also a minority - this kind of historical refresh, perfectly matching Democratic Party aesthetics, was irresistible. Consequently, during Obama's eight years, the Democratic camp focused on recruiting younger candidates with strong identity politics credentials across all levels. Consider this: if someone born in '61 of African American descent could become president, how could a white person born in the 50s represent the Democratic Party? By 2016, as Obama's term ended, the hastily cultivated generation born in the 60s and 70s couldn't seamlessly take over, leading to a return to eager candidates born in the 40s. Both Hillary and Biden wanted their chance. This wasn't Obama's fault, but it was an objective outcome.

Why, in contrast, did the Republican Party achieve rapid generational change? I believe it's connected to Trump. Though elderly himself, after entering politics, he continuously pushed the party's "Trumpification" or "MAGA-fiction" - populist economically and conservative culturally. Within the Trump-dominated Republican Party, established elites born in the 40s and 50s found it difficult to quickly align with him; few could pivot so rapidly. Who more easily became Trump's new force? The new generation entering American politics after 2016-2017, those born in the 60s and 70s. These individuals unhesitatingly aligned with Trump, leveraging the opportunity for quick advancement, gradually driving the Republican Party's generational shift. Thus, Trump, seemingly opposite to Obama, had precisely the opposite effect on his party's generational ecology. However, if Trump and Vance win, would Vance, born in the 80s, become the strongest Republican contender for 2028? What would this mean for the Republican Party? Wouldn't this mirror the Obama effect? What becomes of Republican politicians born in the 60s and 70s?

Harris's "Identity Politics"

Fairly speaking, Harris lacks sufficient time and space to fully articulate her policies. The time constraint comes from the brief transition - taking over in late July leaves just 105 days until the election, insufficient for policy preparation. The space limitation stems from her inability, as vice president, to separate herself from the Biden administration completely. For Trump, the best strategy against Harris would be forcing her to explain policies and justify why things not done in the past three years would suddenly be accomplished. However, Trump himself isn't particularly suited to or skilled at policy discussions, which explains why we see Vance speaking extensively everywhere.

Conversely, Harris's attacks on Trump prove highly effective, at least in consolidating her base. Have you noticed what she's been saying? Remember her response in Michigan, a state with a significant North American Muslim population, when protesters interrupted her speech over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? Harris immediately paused and addressed the protesters: "I'm speaking. Do you want Trump to come back?" The subtext is clear: any attack on her helps Trump return; she might not be perfect, but she's better than Trump.

"Preventing Trump's return" appears to be a highly effective mobilization strategy, more relatable than Hillary's "breaking the glass ceiling" message. From a campaign messaging perspective, Harris responds to voters' concerns, while Hillary assigned voters a mission. The former touches on tangible interests that resonate with voters; the latter doesn't. In other words, Harris never actively emphasizes her potential historical significance as the first African American female president - she focuses on "keeping Trump out." However, this isn't necessarily due to Harris's political acumen; it's because she comes from California, where nearly every politician has broken some glass ceiling or represents diverse characteristics with renewal appeal. Conversely, Trump's attacks on Harris seem ineffective, instead highlighting his own issues with "white supremacy" and "misogyny," creating a notably negative backlash.

This raises a crucial question: if Harris wins for these reasons, what kind of victory would it represent? It would signal identity politics completely superseding meritocracy. Winning an election because identity politics correctness shields one from criticism represents another manifestation of American politics' complete deterioration. What does this mean for the Democratic Party going forward? Would future white male candidates become unelectable due to identity politics? Would non-white female candidates become invincible due to their identity politics "shield"? This suggests identity politics would no longer be just "politics" for Democrats, but rather "identity" - a mandatory prerequisite for Democratic Party elites. Without the right identity, one couldn't be elected or become a Democratic candidate. While this speculation might seem extreme, could this trend or hidden concern materialize?

If Americans chose Trump eight years ago out of blindness, ignorance, or protest against the establishment elite, surely the whole world would now understand what Trump represents and what policy changes his governance would bring after eight years. What would it mean if Americans still choose Trump under these circumstances? Isn't there only one interpretation - that more Americans, while perhaps personally disagreeing with him, believe he represents the right national direction they desire? This suggests America is changing tracks, with Trump as the switchman.

What about Harris? Obama initiated the Democratic Party's embrace of identity politics, which stimulated extreme Republican reactions, ultimately leading to Trump's rise after groundwork laid by movements like the Tea Party. Would today's Harris spawn her own "Trump"? If Trump wins, Republican "Trumpification" will be completed in the next four years. The mutual shaping of two-party politics since Obama through Trump would temporarily end in mutual extremism, entering a relatively stable partisan political state. If Harris wins, wouldn't it mean Republicans, further stimulated, might react even more extremely, plunging both parties into a new round of more intense mutual shaping before the current cycle ends? This cycle's Trump focused inward on the international stage, withdrew from groups, and continued strategic competition with China; what would Harris's Trump do? Would they be more extreme? Since Harris appears more radical than Obama, or at least more significant to conservatives and populists in terms of image and identity politics, how would she affect Trumpism? We've already seen Vance. I believe this would result in America's political ecosystem falling into another round of turbulence before even entering a brief period of stability.

Will the Election Impact the Next Four Years or Forty Years?

Will this election create new turning points and beginnings for U.S.-China relations? Since neither party would change the current strategic direction, there won't be new turning points or beginnings, but it will affect the style and rhythm of interactions over the next four years. This means the election won't significantly impact the next four years, but if, as I suggested, it leads to an even more frenzied state in American politics, it would affect America's entire political ecosystem and international role, including its China policy. Therefore, while this election may not bring major changes to U.S.-China relations in the next four years, it could impact America for the next ten, fourteen, or even forty years, consequently affecting long-term U.S.-China relations and the global order.