Yu Liang on Contemporary Youth, From “Involution” to Expedition
Yu Liang on Contemporary Youth, From “Involution” to Expedition
How do leading left-wing scholars at Fudan University view the possibility of new Chinese narratives through grassroots youth online movements?
Yu Liang is currently assistant director and associate researcher of the Institute of China Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai. Most of his works are on contemporary Chinese youth studies, especially in the area of thoughts and culture. I’ve translated his work on “little pink“ groups; check it out at:
This Feb, he published his new work on the current dilemma among Chinese youth. It discusses two major trends in Chinese youth online thought: "involution" and "expedition." The author argues that these two trends reflect the Chinese younger generation's dilemmas and breakthroughs when facing the times' challenges.
Yu Liang, assistant director and associate researcher of the Institute of China Studies at Fudan University
"Involution" refers to intense internal competition and self-consumption. It is reflected not only in the socio-economic field but also in the field of humanistic spirit and knowledge production. The author criticizes various ideological theories (mostly Liberalism) and discourses for falling into a state of "involution" and idle spinning.
"Expedition," on the other hand, represents the efforts to break through "involution" and move towards the world, especially the Global South. Taking the experience of young scholar Cao Fengze in Africa as an example, the author discusses how young intellectuals can re-understand and construct Chinese discourse from a global perspective. The author reviews three waves of youth patriotic thought since the reform.
He believes that there are various trends of thought and narratives among the youth, whether it be Westernized ones, "Chinese path" trends of thought, "involution" consciousness, or expedition consciousness, etc., they are all the organic beats of this ecology. More importantly, these seemingly unprofessional and unserious new discourses contain a new knowledge system and narrative system that resonates with the practices of China today.
Here, I attacked the translation of the pieces; the original text contained various Chinese internet jargon, and I tried my best to translate. Press the Like button if it's helpful.
Source:https://new.qq.com/rain/a/20240206A04XRU00
The Double Beat of Youth Online Trends: "Involution" and Expedition
No word has captured China's developmental dilemmas and anxieties from top to bottom like "involution" Involution"-style competition implies intense competition at the threshold of upward mobility channels and that large numbers of educated people have the ability to participate in the competition. This group with the ability to compete can roughly be called the "new middle class"” They have hopes for future development, but also inevitable anxieties, and have great interest in things that may break through "involution” In this context, Cao Fengze's speech "When a Tsinghua Undergraduate, Masters and PhD Gives Up Being 'Beijing Middle Class' and Goes to Africa" has been widely disseminated.
For serious thinkers, the question to ask is, now that the young Cao Fengze has turned the possibility of going to Africa into his personal reality, can this individual case inspire a broader imagination and translate into a kind of universal reality rather than becoming just another "poetry and distance" that the middle class invests their feelings in? This leads to the further question of what the knowledge support and emotional drive behind Cao Fengze's action is, and whether it has broader agency.
The "Involution" of the Contemporary Humanistic Spirit
Most readers of this speech may not know that the word "involution", which has been widely circulated in recent years, was unexpectedly activated by Cao Fengze and his peers. The word is a byproduct of a set of online political discourses that they participated in creating. The core of this discourse, if we use international academic norms to refer to it, might be called the "Shanhai Pass Dilemma": using the history of the Ming-Qing transition as a metaphor to discuss the dilemma that arises when an emerging power is comprehensively suppressed by a hegemonic power. Representative figures, Zhihu users "Shangao", "Cao Fengze", and "Crown of Tokamak" are all young people of the "pink" generation born around 1990.
Cao Fengze's core view is to "go to Africa", thus proposing a methodology to break through the "Shanhai Pass": "counter-involution". It is precisely because of oppression and containment by the U.S. and the West that the Chinese people are forced to repeatedly compete in low dimensions, resulting in "involution"; to counter "involution", the Chinese people should go help the African people with development, and in helping others, transcend themselves. Before Cao Fengze really went to Africa, his ideas were ridiculed, but the word "involution" struck a chord with everyone.
Today's "involution" occurs not only at the economic and social level but also at the level of the humanistic spirit and knowledge production—especially among scholars, the intellectual middle class, and the youth and students who form the middle-class reserve, regardless of left or right. In terms of the relationship between knowledge and action, today's humanities academic production has entered a state of "intransitivity" similar to two-dimensional culture, with systems of symbolic concepts circulating in a self-referential manner, lacking practical agency. Western neoliberalism, as a false ideological consciousness that conceals actual relations of production, falls into hysterical idling in the face of crisis. On the opposite side, left-wing critical theories developed in the West after the 1960s, having lost the possibility of overall political practice, have become a set of values that have been refined and developed within theory. Correspondingly, in China, countless liberals facing dilemmas repeatedly call for a return to the "New Enlightenment" and the 1980s. Many academic leftists are full of purism and fastidiousness about real practice, gazing at the stars but unable to keep their feet on the ground, repeatedly talking emptily about opening up new possibilities but unable to recognize the possibilities that have already emerged. Liberals talk grandly about the level of ideas, academic leftists are entangled in theoretical correctness, ideological and political education falls into a state of chanting scriptures, and quantitative research in the social sciences is unable to generate qualitative insights... Refined but useless, this is also one of the definitions of "involution"
In the realm of life and mass emotions, various "pursuits of refined living" appearing in the guise of quality-of-life knowledge are increasingly proliferating, which is no different from the self-discipline of the middle class; the online feminist movement is mired in the meticulous and adamant shaping of various rules and boundaries between men and women, turning "rights" into a new "Confucian ethics"; the proliferation of depression knowledge is no different from a magic trick conspired by pharmaceutical capital and media traffic; all kinds of knowledge payment schemes with expenses exceeding income are the market form of knowledge "involution"”
Among youth, two-dimensional living itself is "involuted." The other side of the highly developed online symbols is the lack of offline experience. In a sense, the proliferation of two-dimensional Marxism and online "feminist"/gender discourse is both "involution" of discourse under the pressure of anxious emotions, expressing the desire to strive for real interests with a resentful temperament. The thriving youth patriotic positive energy discourse falls into traffic "involution," manifesting in fighting over the stock and internal struggles, such as the criticism triggered by "Hu Xijin and company" and the widespread and meticulous policing of "anti-national" behavior.
But "involution" on the eve of breaking through the bottleneck is, after all, different from "involution" in decline. New practices and knowledge are germinating and developing with difficulty. China's great practice today calls for a corresponding system of knowledge and narratives. The new system must come from the masses and go to the masses, relying on the benign interaction of the discourse of the party, the discourse of the intellectual circles, and the discourse of the people.
Youth New Knowledge Production and Its Bottlenecks
With the development of Internet channels, the rise of youth online politics outside the discourse of the party and the intellectual circles has been eye-catching. This discourse is full of the vitality and opportunities of knowledge production, but its combative posture often obscures the aspect of knowledge production. If we temporarily suspend the differences between various youth trends of thought and discourses and view them as a symbiotic body of different planes and tensions in the overall ideological ecology of an era, then whether it be Westernized trends of thought, Chinese path trends of thought, "involution" consciousness or expedition consciousness, etc., they are all the organic beats of this ecology. We need to consider where the positive lines of contradiction and hope lie in this ecology.
Previously, I discussed the three waves of the new youth patriotism, and here I will further discuss it from the perspective of knowledge production.
The first wave coincided with the rise of portal websites, with the main subjects being international students and science and engineering youth. Its discursive form was "forum strong nation-ism," and its discursive temperament manifested as "arguing and negation," with fringe online forums (BBS) as the base. International students' understanding of the Western world went from symbolic myths to experiential reality, gaining an on-the-ground sense of the huge problems in the contemporary Western world. The practical cognition of the country's strategy and engineering construction by science and engineering youth was difficult to find publication opportunities in the era of marketized print media, but achieved a "return of the repressed" through the Internet. The 2005 book "Washing Dishes or Reading?—Reflecting on the Path to a Strong China and Japan," compiled and officially published by online political youth themselves, is representative of this trend. The book is a compilation of online writings by science and engineering youth debating the country's development path on Xixihe, Qiangguo Forum, and Tianya Forum, with the main point being to start from the laws of natural science, criticize Western economics, especially the "comparative advantage" development route, and emphasize the importance of developing an independent and complete industrial system, using data and information rather than conceptual ideals to substantiate points. The first wave contained affirmative descriptions of China's experience, but its discourse mainly appeared in a negative form, constantly criticizing the myths about the U.S. and the West that had previously circulated.
The second wave occurred after the 2010 "Twitter Revolution," with the driving force coming from the combination of some neo-institutionalist elites and online youth groups. Its discursive form manifested as "column" pieces, and its discursive temperament manifested as "steady affirmation." On the front end, it manifested as the rise of columnists for neo-patriotic media such as Guancha.cn and Global Times, and on the back end, it was the development of new institutionalized knowledge organizations, such as the Xiuyuan Foundation (2009), the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at Renmin University of China (2013), the Chunqiu Development Strategy Institute (2014), the China Institute at Fudan University (2015), and other institutions. The founders of these institutions are all relatively emerging/marginal senior figures in traditional academia, business, and media, representing the new institutional forces created by "reform and opening up." These elite groups generally have specific life and work experience in both China and the West, parting ways with the Westernized faction in comparison, taking "cultural reconstruction" and "Chinese model" as their banner, writing serious and cutting-edge political commentaries in response to major political, economic, and diplomatic issues, positively summing up the achievements and experiences of socialism with Chinese characteristics, publishing columns on various websites, and communicating with each other across the sea, with an air reminiscent of the "Federalists" of the rising United States era opening up newspaper columns to point the way.
What is important is that they have certain political, economic, and social institutional resources, introducing mature media and business experience, and beginning to attempt regular ideological and public opinion organizational work, building an exchange and production mechanism for the "Chinese path" intellectual circles through seminars, research projects, journal publications, media construction, and other means, while recruiting talents from the relatively marginal neo-patriotic youth, so that the latter begin to gain resource support, while gaining from the latter a new Internet consciousness and vitality, as well as practical knowledge of specific subdivided industries.
The third wave is closely related to social media, with the driving force coming from Generation Z and their consumption and communication media. Its discursive temperament manifests as the "expedition" of the “little pinks,” and its discursive form manifests as "fandom (social media) patriotism." Generation Z is embedded in the global consumer society and social media, and their patriotic discourse practice is similar to fandom practice, relying on digital media on the Internet, centering on brands, idols, symbols, and identities to express opinions, and engaging in cross-circle dissemination when necessary.
The opinion leaders of the third wave are no longer mainly intellectual elites, unlike the ideological and political commentary characteristics of the previous two waves, but have a strong emotional and identity community color, possessing rich consumerist and daily life knowledge. For example, there is a personnel overlap between fandom support and Dibar expeditions, not only mastering entertainment industry "knowledge," but also being well-versed in "climbing the wall" knowledge. Many little pink actions do not directly participate in politics, but because they are embedded in the universal market economy and daily cultural life, they produce the effect of a "new cultural" movement. These emotionally driven discursive actions that seem theoretically unprofessional are able to elevate identity struggles to the higher political level of aesthetics, such as the Hanfu movement and the intense debate surrounding "slanted eye makeup."
The third wave reached its peak after the 2020 pandemic crisis was overcome. The new coronavirus pandemic exposed the comprehensive crisis of the U.S. and Western countries. Just as the 14th-century Black Death exposed the fragility of the traditional Western religious order, the long-published but obscure book "The Collapse of the American Empire" by John Galtung suddenly became popular. At this time, self-theorizing also began to emerge among Generation Z, and the narrative discourse of the "Shanhai Pass Dilemma" (colloquially known as "Ruguanxue") stood out in the political circle. This narrative has been criticized for its geopolitical appearance, but many critics do not understand the playful and ironic nature behind this unique discourse. More importantly, the essence of this narrative is a cultural attitude toward different knowledge systems and value hierarchies. To put it briefly:
The "universal values" held by the United States are like the Confucianism held by the Ming dynasty, self-styled as civilized, but essentially a soft power hegemony. The Jurchens were regarded as barbarians by the Ming, and today, China, not accepting "Western universal values," is also regarded by the U.S. and Western countries as a barbarian-like existence. No matter how well China actually works, it will not be recognized by the West and will only be repeatedly smeared. "Ruguanxue" negates the futile idea of China's Westernized faction wanting to prove to the West that they are in line with the West, that "tonight we are all Americans," and advocates that the Chinese people might as well not bother to "debate the scriptures" with the Western public opinion circles. Since debating the scriptures cannot convince the other side, it is better to be like King Xiang of Chu and say to the Emperor, "I’m the barbarian," and put down this psychological burden, no longer accept the Western ideology, and single-mindedly seek development. After China's political and economic strength fully surpasses the West and updates the world situation, China will be recognized by Western intellectual circles—"After entering the Pass, there will naturally be 'great Confucians' to debate the scriptures for me."
"Ruguanxue" seems to ignore ideology, but it fundamentally changes the situation at the level of ideology and discourse, gaining a kind of identity confidence with the playfulness of self-styled barbarians. Just as when young people today are too lazy to listen to lectures, they say, "Yes, yes, you're right about everything."
However, overall, Generation Z's identity recognition is still based on everyday knowledge and emotions, and although it appears mighty and aggressive in online patriotic movements, it is essentially a passive movement. The struggle for self-identity at the symbolic level is always "involuted," and the active subject needs to be generated in the fields of production, interaction, and creation, otherwise its energy may be manifested in the form of negative internal consumption. "Expedition" as a movement at the online symbolic level lacks the foundation of subjective practicality. Less practical experience and tempering, too much two-dimensional character, and the rights expectation gap imply the fragility of adolescents in the consumer age, accustomed to favorable conditions and unaccustomed to adversity. As the global economic downturn caused by the new coronavirus pandemic and the social constraints brought by epidemic prevention spread, its dual mechanism became evident: young people are full of confidence when talking about national development but full of anxiety when talking about personal development, hence the popularity of discourses such as "985 waste" and "crispy college students."
How can a spiritual expedition gain solid support from practical experience? The exploration of Cao Fengze and others can be said to simultaneously transcend the "involution" of knowledge and the "involution" of the Internet, expanding outward and exploring breakthroughs in the "Shanhai Pass" of thought. More and more youth participating in the production of youth trends of thought through non-research ordinary work experience may promote the younger generation to move toward maturity generation by generation.
The Ideological Maturation of China's Generation Z?
From the international students of Xixihe to the "Ruguan" people of Zhihu, there are at least the following positive ideological threads and inspirations.
Pursuing a real global perspective and concern for China
International students perceive the West through personal experience, while Generation Z, through developed media, sees the world of globalization and market economy as soon as they are born. Although Generation Z's world cognition begins at the symbolic level, the diversity of symbols also dismantles the narrative monopoly of Western countries. If we make a positive interpretation of Huntington, globalization brings not unity, but more exchanges that make people despise each other because they understand each other, then globalization allows Generation Z to gain a level gaze at the West and no longer easily worship Western narratives. Among them, the advanced elements are constantly seeking a "non-dependent" self-subjective consciousness. Shangao County himself explained to me, "Cao Fengze was born in the Northeast, Hat Girl @Crown of Tokamak lives in Yunnan, and I myself live in the Central Plains. These places were all core international nodes of Chinese civilization in history, embodying the construction of an international order with China as the main body and a non-Western system." The recent actions of the Yunnan provincial government in cooperation with Myanmar to combat telecommunications fraud once again reflect the emergence of this new international order that is both classical and modern. This kind of organic new globalization practice that focuses on solving local problems is different from the American-style capitalist globalization narrative of "the world is flat" and is better able to respond to the demands of most people in the world.
The Chinese people need to take on the responsibility of leading and creating a new globalization narrative actively. To borrow Mayfair Yang's statement, in the 17th century, the British philosophy that promoted the capitalist narrative swept across the continental Catholic civilization, completing a knowledge "passage." The post-war American "social sciences," especially modernization theory, seized the banner of developmentalism, which was another cultural "passage." However, today's global capitalist system and narrative have fallen into crisis. In China's intellectual circles, from Qiang Shigong's 2013 speech "The New 'Odyssey' of Chinese Legal Professionals" to Wang Weijia et al.'s 2023 proposal for new globalization knowledge production in the media field, they all call for the reconstruction of globalized knowledge in specific humanities and social science.
Renovating humanism with "technological practical rationality"
Whether it be "Industrial Party"-style social commentary or the professional answers of Zhihu Influencers and Huxiu authors on various industry issues, they are already a kind of humanities knowledge but are often excluded by the popular definition of humanism, considered to be utilitarian and non-humanistic.
In the origin stage of modernity, science, engineering, and the humanities were not separated. The development of capitalism brought about an imbalance between the humanities and science and engineering, as well as an imbalance between the market and society, but the problem was distortedly identified by thinkers as caused by "instrumental rationality." The imbalance between the humanities and technology was understood as the opposition between the humanities and technology and triggered the so-called opposition between aesthetic modernity and social modernity.
The division of specialties in academia deepened the potential opposition between the humanities and science and engineering knowledge circles. Typified by Western general education, humanists often believe that science and engineering personnel, especially engineers, lack a humanistic spirit. There are many works that have argued against this, such as "Engineering: An Endless Frontier" by Sunny Y. Auyang and "Philosophy of Engineering" by Li Bocong, Yin Ruiyu, and Wang Yingluo, the latter of which uses bridge-building as an example, pointing out that it contains a large amount of practical humanities and social considerations. Because engineers are always dealing with projects that go beyond the individual, they have to actually solve problems and thus place more emphasis on considering organizations and real society. This set of knowledge emphasizes practical application and operation, with less abstraction and ideological components, it may differ from the "inward-turning" contemporary individualistic humanism, but it is not without humanistic connotations.
The separation at the level of ideas and culture has not eliminated practical rationality at the level of action. For example, Cao Fengze himself and Shangao County are both from science and engineering backgrounds and are practitioners. Like the "Industrial Party," they represent a kind of "class" tendency in the political circle, namely, taking grassroots science and engineering youth as the main body and maintaining a distance from technocracy. In thought, they tend toward the spirit of grassroots artisanship and professionalism, matching the lower elite consciousness of the middle class. They produce and disseminate knowledge from grand industries to subtle tools and attempt to elevate it into a kind of humanistic consciousness, shaping a pragmatic personality with a sense of strategy and practicality rather than being lofty and empty. This reflects a kind of "big science" thinking that solves major human problems; that is, science and technology are not objects of aesthetic worship, or objects of criticism, or health and life guides related to personal well-being (i.e., "small science" thinking), but a methodology for thinking about macro issues from the perspective of strategy and real trial and error, avoiding using a priori dogma to nitpick practitioners, whether this a priori dogma is left or right.
This folk discourse has already had positive interactions with academic discourse, yielding fruits of academic reform. For example, Yan Peng's series of studies on industrial history, Liang Mingde's research on the history of railways in global regions and countries based on field investigations, and the re-emphasis on Luo Rongqu's "New Theory of Modernization," Zhang Guobao's "Pilu Lanlu: A Record of the Decision-Making and Construction of Century Projects," etc. are all like this. When the U.S. and the West launch a stranglehold to kill China with small courtyards and high walls, this kind of humanistic thinking and personality tendency should become a kind of foundational personality and general education. Humanities majors are not equivalent to the humanities themselves and also need to be constantly transformed and progressed. Rather than putting energy into debating the question of "whether the humanities are useful," it is better to actively absorb the spirit of the science and engineering field and upgrade humanistic thinking.
The potential Statecraft School of Thought tradition and epic narrative ability
Typified by Shangao, the inventor of "Ruguanxue," behind their gamified language, there is a kind of Chinese classical parable-style political discourse in which literature, history, and philosophy are inseparable, and they are good at discussing issues through historical story analogies to produce "understanding." The principles unfold realistically in specific cases rather than turning empty in the principles themselves through "debating scriptures." Shangao County claims to have read "Zizhi Tongjian" throughout and enjoys reading the Twenty-Four Histories. Regarding his way of speaking, Fu Zheng's evaluation is: "Compared to the Western academic tradition, ancient Chinese people preferred to use historical allusions to discuss real issues rather than invent new concepts. For example, we can see that in the late Qing political and academic circles, there was a large amount of use of examples from the 'Spring and Autumn' and 'Warring States' periods to metaphorize the international relations of the time."
The essence of the methodology of the "ancients" here points to an important branch of Chinese learning, namely the tradition of practical rationality of the Statecraft School that combines classics and history. The most important of these is classical history, which is written with real historical flesh and blood and its methodology. Shangao County likes the early Qing "great Confucians" such as Wang Chuanshan and Gu Yanwu. For these "great Confucians," the world and the mandate of heaven are not a kind of conceit but a sense of responsibility. Politicians and thinkers stand in the rain of blood in history, eschewing pure talk, focusing on getting things done, facing cruelty, and striving to balance.
Behind the gamified discourse of Ruguanxue, there is an almost mature and sober quality that exceeds the age range of the representative figures. This maturity partly comes from their own emphasis on pragmatic professionalism and also because they are not within the humanities disciplines disciplined by abstract Western social science narratives; that is, after the separation of classics and history, philosophy, history, and political science each became academic "sciences," and even fell into the game of professional title promotion. Precisely because of this, they are not like academics who are lofty and empty, evade big questions, and cover up the real lessons of history and practice.
In this context, the thinking of the "Industrial Party" is similar to the Statecraft School thinking in the engineering version ; the narrative of the Chinese model, such as the popular political commentary program "China Now," also talks less about theory and more about elaborating principles through specific historical events/story details. In a certain potential sense, they have jointly revived the practical rationality discourse tradition that combines classics (philosophy), history (practice), and literature (narration).
The reason why this discourse is able to gain the favor of youth is, on the one hand, that its "affirmative nature" is able to fill the gaps between the two critical discourses of liberalism and the left and is different from the generalities of official discourse, able to respond to specific issues of contemporary China and Sino-Western gaming and accept the perceptual experiences of non-humanities youth. On the other hand, its classical history narrative tradition has preserved the logical ability to tell long stories in today's world. When people listen to anchors reciting poetry to experience the humanities in live broadcast rooms and kill time on short video apps, their systematic reading, thinking, and practical skills are rapidly degenerating, but Cao Fengze and others still retain the ability to read and write at length.
Online and offline melting pot
China changes in a r. By the new century, overlaid with the intertwining of various trends of thought in the Internet era, it presents a "tropical rainforest"-style ecology of competition, symbiosis, and mutation of all things. Various trends of thought and discourses constantly collide, rub against each other, steal, appropriate, combine, iterate, turn, textually poach, cognitively mutate, and survive in a suitable manner, and no single trend of thought can absolutely plan the public opinion field. The main theme still exists but often exerts influence in an indirect way. Even the official Internet governance itself is only one of the participants in the ecological field: it puts pressure on evolution but cannot dictate evolution. For example, the discourse of “Ruguanxue” was invented under the pressure of platforms constantly censoring anti-American statements. Therefore, the craziness and maturity of Internet trends of thought go hand in hand, with a model of "going back and forth, seeing tricks and dismantling them, and memes popping up."
Various social practices also open up their own paths （like biological evolution.) “Little pinks” go on expeditions in a “two-dimensional” way, and the Westernized faction completes their own connection with the West in an imaginary way, but both fall into a symbolic "involution." In contrast, a group of grassroots "run people" ("run" is the Chinese homophone of the English word "run," meaning to escape from one's own country) "walk the line" to the U.S. and the West in a physical practice way, such as the alternative Internet celebrities "Lecturer," "Chen Wang," "Ding Yiduo," "Donut," etc., livestreaming begging in the U.S., livestreaming wilderness survival, subjectively hating the country and worshipping the foreign, but objectively completing a kind of expedition in a self-negating and ridiculed way, providing new practical perspectives and knowledge. Just like the "Mayflower" crews who were exiled from England to America five hundred years ago, they may be able to open up a new continent.
Cao Fengze, on the other hand, strives to practice the ideal of building Africa in a positive way, stepping out of his comfort zone, transforming himself, and transforming the world in practical interaction with the world and in criticism and self-criticism, thus elevating political maturity to the practical level. Practical exploration does not have to be concerned with the purity of theory, but should take advantage of the situation and use all available means. "Relying solely on ideals is not enough; you have to have money." (Cao Fengze) Don't indulge in the posture of idealism, don't care too much about any political correctness, recognize the difficulties, and focus on solutions. In this process, various traditions may be able to achieve organic combination and innovation. Just like Cao Fengze and others who grew up between socialist main theme education and market economy workplace education, they have both continued the socialist and Third World ideals and accepted the worldliness of the market economy, know how to calculate, but reject excessive calculation "精算." For Chinese people to go out, they also need to speak out, generate cultural imagination and narratives in the process of going out, and create a spiritual home for a new type of globalization. In this sense, the epic "Belt and Road" is the "New Journey to the West" of contemporary Chinese people.
Conclusion: The Belt and Road of Youth Thought
Can Cao Fengze's personal actions be transformed into a universality and have a driving effect among youth?
Students in civil engineering departments still like to watch "Damengzi's Exhortation to Study" on Bilibili—this ordinary first-tier college civil engineering graduate who films videos on construction sites, exhorting people not to go into this industry, but to take the civil service exam. Cao Fengze's speech did not make much of a splash on Bilibili. When I asked some young engineers on Bilibili platform, they said they were reluctant to go to Africa because it was too far from home, but many were considering going to Xinjiang.
Cao Fengze's Africa is a metaphor, representing all "marginal" regions or the "global South" that are neglected and disparaged by the old world order. Starting from Xinjiang, China, to Central Asia, to the Middle East, and then to Africa... there may be a "belt and road" of thought, emotion, and cognition being formed here, connecting the global South. On this road, many flowers have already blossomed. Young explorers are vigorous, such as Mao Keji and his alliance of South Asian research enthusiasts, Shen Dianqi's global travel and documentation of overseas Chinese stories, Wang Dinnan's silent research in the Middle East, the Indian and Middle East research and narrative work carried out by businessmen such as Wang Tao and Yaxin Liu, Bilibili Internet celebrity Wang Xiao's public declaration to go to the UK to study African materials collected by the British Empire, etc., all combining practical investigation with new media narratives, reflecting a new orientation.
In terms of action, the mechanisms we know of that promote youth to go to the "global South" require a whole set of supporting mechanisms. “Down to the Countryside Movement” 50 years ago had the cooperation of idealism and a social system, which is not something that can be supported by contemporary, refined education and consumer society. The other is the way in which Western imperialist countries colonized and expanded territories, as described in "Robinson Crusoe" and "Lawrence of Arabia." We still need the spirit of “Down to the Countryside Movement,” but we can't take the old path of the past, nor can we take the evil path of Western imperialists. In today's world, is it possible to create a new path that balances idealism and realism? How do we cooperate with the "Belt and Road" of thought and emotion in terms of mechanisms, open up the space for imagination, and create more channels for the "Global South" for youth? This requires the joint action and narration of the pragmatic party, intellectuals, and the masses to jointly activate a new "unity of knowledge and action" and strive to synthesize a new cosmopolitanism or community of shared future for mankind.
The new system of thought discourse is not accomplished overnight, just as the European Renaissance was first the "involution," "lying flat," and indulgence of the Black Death era, the dirty jokes that filled "The Decameron" and "Gargantua and Pantagruel," but at the same time, the Great Navigation and the "Dual Revolution" were already casting a striking shadow on the horizon. Expedition and "involution" are the internal knowledge and emotional contradiction of the youth of the new era, as well as the double beat of creating a new world.