Yan Xuetong's Outlook of China-U.S. Competition in 2035
Leading Chinese realist scholar forecasts a new era of intense but managed strategic competition, where power parity fosters stability, not war
For today’s episode, I want to introduce this analysis by Professor Yan Xuetong 阎学通, one of China’s most influential international relations scholars and a leading voice in realist thought. Yan is a Distinguished Professor and Honorary President of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University. He received his PhD in political science from the University of California, Berkeley, in 1992. He is the author of numerous books, including Leadership and the Rise of Great Powers, and Inertia of History: China and the World in the Next Ten Years. His theoretical work on “moral realism”道义现实主义 has sparked considerable debate both within China and internationally.
In this book, Professor Yan forecasted the China-US competition scenario for 2035. He argues that intense competition does not necessarily mean war. As the power gap narrows, he suggests, both sides may develop greater caution, clearer mutual understanding of each other’s strategies, and more robust mechanisms for managing their rivalry.
Professor Yan does not predict Chinese triumph or American collapse. Instead, he envisions a world where American credibility has eroded—not because of China’s actions, but because of America’s own political volatility. The spectre of “America First” (or “America Alone”) returning every four to eight years, he argues, will fundamentally alter how allies calculate their bets.
Equally noteworthy is his assessment of middle powers. Brazil drifting firmly toward Beijing, Russia becoming a dependent partner rather than a competitor, Japan hedging more carefully, and European powers seeking neutrality—these shifts, if they materialise, would represent a profound restructuring of the post-Cold War order.
Whether one agrees with Yan’s projections or not, his framework deserves serious engagement. In an era when much commentary oscillates between triumphalism and alarmism, his insight offers a measured attempt to think through how great-power competition might stabilise rather than spiral out of control.
Below is the full piece:
https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/yWZc3iwSyU00xDDzlMNM7w
Strategic competition between China and the US will likely be highly intense, though effective mechanisms to manage it may already be in place, eliminating the risk of direct war. The US will have lost its clear advantage over China in great power strategic relations. China’s strategic relationships with Brazil and Russia will be stronger than America’s relationships with these two countries. Germany and France will adopt relatively neutral hedging strategies in the Sino-American competition. India, Japan, and the United Kingdom will maintain stronger strategic ties with the US than with China, though their willingness to actively participate in American containment of China will have diminished. By then, the US will likely have lost its position of international dominance.
Even if post-Trump American administrations adjust the unilateralist strategy, America’s advantage over China in global strategic competition may not recover to 2022 levels—the strategic advantage the Russia-Ukraine conflict conferred upon the US. Sino-American strategic competition may remain intense after Trump’s second term concludes, but the two countries may establish new mechanisms to manage competition, creating a long-term, stable, and war-free competitive dynamic.
1. A New Sino-American Strategic Balance
By 2035, America’s international strategic credibility will be inferior to China’s. Trump’s isolationist and protectionist policies will have undermined not only other major powers’ trust in his administration but also their trust in the American government for the decade that follows. Should Trump alter American political norms and remain in power beyond his current term, other major powers will have no choice but to guard against his capriciousness, potentially shifting toward China and adopting more explicit hedging strategies. Even if he completes his term on schedule, a new American leader may reduce other powers’ suspicions but will struggle to restore America’s strategic credibility to Biden-era levels. During the Biden administration, American allies and strategic partners viewed the first Trump administration as an aberration, believing that America would return to being reliable after Trump. Trump’s reelection made these countries realize that political figures of his type gaining power in America would no longer be a low-probability event over the coming decade. The American political system has no mechanism to prevent such leaders from emerging. If such leaders recur, American foreign policy cannot maintain continuity—a change in leadership could produce a 180-degree shift. By 2035, regardless of which party holds power in the US, American allies and strategic partners may be unable to trust that American foreign policy will remain consistent beyond four years. By contrast, whatever their relationship with China, all countries will recognize that China’s foreign policy is more consistent than America’s, and that cooperation with China is more sustainable and reliable than cooperation with the US.
By 2035, China’s international political and economic influence may rival America’s. The unilateralist diplomatic philosophy of “America First” may still influence American decision-makers. The “America First” unilateralist foreign policy is grounded in populist thinking. Though populist currents may begin to wane by 2035, the inertial thinking they created may still influence some within American decision-making circles. During Trump’s second term, the power gap between the US and China will likely narrow, which may make subsequent American administrations even less willing to shoulder international responsibilities and more inclined to continue unilateralist diplomatic principles.
By 2035, whether Republicans or Democrats are in power, American decision-makers will more likely continue “de-globalization” strategies than restore a globalization-oriented foreign policy. Trump’s first term initiated de-globalization policies; after Biden took office, official American government documents gradually downplayed the term “globalization.” Trump’s second term will reinforce de-globalization policies for another four years, making it difficult for subsequent American administrations to restore globalization as a strategic principle. In contrast to the US, Chinese decision-makers believe China’s rise has benefited from economic globalization, so over the next decade, the Chinese government will likely continue promoting economic globalization as a diplomatic principle. If China persists with economic globalization for another decade while America persists with de-globalization for another decade, by 2035 other major powers may all adopt strategies of economic cooperation with China to ride the wave of China’s rapidly growing digital economy. Their trade volumes with China may exceed those with the US.
By 2035, America’s international political appeal may no longer hold a clear advantage over China’s. Mutual imitation of competitors’ strategies is a common phenomenon in great power competition, as people typically believe that mimicking an opponent’s successful methods can yield similar results for themselves. For example, amid China’s steadily narrowing gap with the US in digital technology, the Biden administration adopted a research strategy modeled on China’s new whole-of-nation system—a strategy combining government support with market incentives. The American government introduced policies to support American technology innovation enterprises, passing the CHIPS and Science Act to provide policy subsidies to the semiconductor industry. After Trump returned to power, the American government began imitating China in certain areas of social governance as well. Following the pattern of great powers emulating each other, the more the comprehensive national power gap between China and the US narrows over the next decade, the more American decision-makers will imitate Chinese government practices. By 2035, the domestic policies of the Chinese and American governments may be more similar than they are today—some call this “homogeneous development.” Compared with China, the US may no longer have a clear advantage in international political appeal.
By 2035, the US may still have more military partners than China, but the closeness of their cooperation with America will likely be looser than in 2024, with perhaps only a handful of countries actively cooperating with American military containment of China. After the Russia-Ukraine conflict erupted in 2022, America’s military allies actively cooperated with American containment of China because China did not condemn Russia. By 2035, even if the Russia-Ukraine conflict has not formally ended, it may have subsided to small-scale clashes. At that point, America’s military allies may have grown weary of the protracted war and adjusted their overall foreign policies to place greater emphasis on economic cooperation with China. By 2035, the scale of China’s imports of goods and services from American allies may be far larger than today. Out of economic self-interest, these countries may be less willing to involve themselves in Sino-American strategic conflicts in East Asia. By 2035, China will likely continue to adhere to its non-alignment principle and, lacking strategic allies, may still have less influence on international security affairs than America.
2. Intense Sino-American Strategic Competition but Low War Risk
By 2035, the Sino-American arms race may be quite intense, but the two sides will likely maintain a state of no war. Over the next decade, the gap between Chinese and American military equipment in both scale and quality may narrow further, strengthening mutual deterrence and thus potentially reinforcing both sides’ caution about preventing war. In theory, the closer the military capabilities between competitors, the stronger both sides’ desire to improve their own military advantage, and the more intense the arms race becomes. The intelligentization of weapons is a fundamental trend of the digital age; as military equipment becomes more intelligent, new demands for military reform will inevitably emerge. By 2035, the Sino-American arms race will likely focus not only on upgrading the intelligence of military equipment but may also include major reforms to military organizational structures. The more intense the arms race, the greater both sides’ fears of war, to the point where they may make preventing direct war and preventing escalation the core of their military dialogue. However, military dialogue at that time may have been limited to high-levels, with both sides still lacking multilevel military exchanges.
By 2035, intense Sino-American competition in cyberspace will likely have become normalized, with certain bilateral norms for managing cyberspace competition having taken shape. Currently, there are relatively few international norms constraining behavior in cyberspace. Over the next decade, Sino-American strategic competition in cyberspace will become increasingly intense, potentially surpassing their competition in physical space. To prevent cyberattacks from escalating into military conflict in physical space, by 2035, China and the US may have established some norms for managing cyberspace competition. Both sides may compete for dominance in cyberspace while jointly preventing competition from spiraling out of control and causing global catastrophe.
Today, AI is developing toward AGI (Artificial General Intelligence), and there is a real possibility that AGI could act against human will and cause a global catastrophe. Researchers believe AGI’s negative impacts include misuse, misalignment, accidents, and structural risks. The catastrophic consequences of AGI risks could rival nuclear winter. By 2035, China and the US may have reached international norms for AI and AGI technology innovation and application, including applications in cyberspace and the physical world. Chinese and American digital technology capabilities may far exceed those of other countries, and the two may adopt a primarily bilateral, secondarily multilateral approach to establishing norms for cyberspace, AI, and AGI—using the results of bilateral negotiations as blueprints to promote globally and seek multilateral support. This may resemble the path by which the US and Soviet Union introduced nuclear non-proliferation norms.
By 2035, Sino-American strategic competition strategies may be highly similar, with both sides focused on preventing direct war. Competitors with larger power gaps adopt more divergent strategies: the stronger party favors strategies of rapid victory, while the weaker party prefers protracted war to overcome strength through weakness; competitors of comparable strength tend toward reciprocity—using the other’s methods against them. When Trump launched the trade war against China in 2018, China adopted proportionate countermeasures. In 2025, when Trump launched another trade war against China, he did not expect that this time China would adopt resolute reciprocal countermeasures. By 2035, the gap in comprehensive national power between China and the US may be far smaller than today, and the similarity of their competitive strategies may increase. Strategic similarity means both sides share a common understanding of a given strategy’s objectives, its underlying logic, and its specific tactics. The risk of direct war arising from misunderstanding the other’s strategic intentions may be relatively low. Historical experience shows that the risk of U.S.-Soviet strategic competition leading to war was higher in the early Cold War period than in the later period—in the early period, both sides feared the outbreak of World War III, while in the later period, they worried less. Indeed, the risk of U.S.-Soviet strategic competition leading to war was far lower after both sides achieved a relative strategic equilibrium. This is not to say that Sino-American strategic competition will become less intense by 2035, but rather that, while the competition will remain intense, it will be more certain, more predictable, and less likely to escalate into war.
By 2035, neither China nor the US may continue to cite ideological differences as justification for strategic competition. Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, periods of serious Sino-American ideological conflict have included the 1950s, the 1960s, the early 1990s, and 2015–2024. This indicates that, given unchanged ideological differences, China and the US can engage in ideological confrontation or disregard these differences. The experience of great power competition since World War II shows that ideological differences do not automatically lead to ideological confrontation—the key lies in whether decision-makers choose to exploit them for confrontational purposes. By 2035, pragmatism may influence Chinese and American decision-makers more than political ideology; they may prefer achieving significant national interests at low cost rather than expending enormous national resources for ideological principles. Sino-American strategic competition will be more realistic in character and less ideological.
By 2035, the dynamics of Sino-American economic competition may resemble 2024 more than 2025, being more rational. The mafia-style extortion tactics Trump adopted in his second term carried the risk of escalating Sino-American economic competition into military conflict. His willingness to employ such dangerous methods stemmed from the still-substantial gap in comprehensive national power between China and the US. By 2035, the gap in Sino-American comprehensive national power, particularly in military equipment capabilities, may have narrowed significantly. At that point, the American government will likely not dare to adopt Trump’s dangerous competition policies and will return to a managed track of economic competition, potentially reducing the risk of Sino-American economic competition escalating to military conflict. Sino-American competition is comprehensive—separating politics from economics is impossible—but preventing economic conflict from escalating to military conflict is achievable.
3. Strategic Alignment Between China and the United States
Over the next decade, the vast majority of countries will likely face the long-term challenge of choosing sides between China and the US. By 2035, choosing sides between China and the US on specific issues will likely have become a normalized international phenomenon. However, in terms of overall strategic relationships, Brazil and Russia will likely be China’s strategic partners, France and Germany may adopt relatively neutral hedging strategies, and India, Japan, and the United Kingdom may choose hedging strategies tilted toward the US.
Brazil
By 2035, the Brazilian government will likely firmly side with China rather than hedge between China and the US, making Sino-Brazilian cooperation at that time more solid and reliable than in 2024. China and Brazil are geographically distant, have no strategic contradictions, and both face strategic pressure in responding to American hegemony—current strategic cooperation may continue through 2035. By 2035, Brazil’s greatest cybersecurity threat will very likely come from the US. In both cybersecurity protection and digital economy development, Brazil will need Chinese technological support and will very likely adopt China’s technical standards system. Economic and technological cooperation between Brazil and China will likely far exceed that between Brazil and the US. Sino-Brazilian cooperation in cyberspace may also promote greater bilateral cooperation in multilateral international affairs. By 2035, BRICS member economies’ share of the global economy will likely be larger than in 2024, and Brazil may place greater emphasis on cooperation with China within the BRICS framework. By 2035, Brazil will very likely be China’s most steadfast supporter among major Global South nations. Simultaneously, China may become Brazil’s most important strategic partner.
Brazil’s strategic relationship with the US may be worse in 2035 than in 2024. Regardless of which American party is in power, the decline of America’s global leadership position will likely lead American decision-makers to adopt retrenchment strategies by 2035. American retrenchment from global to continental scope may intensify strategic contradictions with Brazil in Latin America. For America to increase its dominance over South America, it must inevitably squeeze Brazil’s regional leadership position. America’s cybersecurity threats to Brazil will likely escalate further—cybersecurity concerns not only affect national security but also directly affect regime security for those in power. The Brazilian government has long been wary of American interference in Brazilian domestic affairs. By 2035, hostility between Brazil and the US may be greater than in 2024.
Russia
By 2035, Russia will likely stand on China’s side, though the degree of strategic confrontation with the US may be weaker than in 2024. Having learned from the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the Russian government may become more cautious about involvement in wars and shift its national strategic focus toward economic development. In an era when the digital economy has become the world’s primary source of wealth, the Russian government needs international assistance to improve its significantly lagging digital economy. However, due to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, by 2035, Russia may still find it difficult to engage in substantive technological cooperation with the US, Germany, and Japan. Although Russia may also worry about excessive dependence on Chinese digital technology, it has no more beneficial option than technological cooperation with China. To accelerate wealth growth and enhance cybersecurity capabilities, Russia may make China its most important strategic partner.
Russia’s strategic relationship with the US in 2035 will likely be one of mutual wariness rather than strategic competition or confrontation. By 2035, the gap in comprehensive national power between Russia and the US will have widened further; Russia’s strongest component of national power—military strength—may no longer be in the same league as America’s. This means Russia lacks the foundational strength for competing with the US, and America may pay even less attention to its strategic relationship with Russia. Learning from the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Russia needs to focus on advancing digital technology, while the US will be unwilling to see Russia improve the intelligence of its military equipment and may continue to constrain Russian technological progress. By 2035, neither Russia nor the US may have the desire to develop strategic cooperation or the motivation to further deteriorate bilateral relations—both may be strategically wary of each other rather than in full confrontation. Because bilateral relations will not be zero-sum strategic competition and the influence of the Russia-Ukraine conflict will have diminished, the degree of strategic confrontation between them will likely be lower than in 2024.
Japan
Japan’s strategic relationship with China in 2035 will likely still be inferior to its relationship with the US, though Japan may adopt a more balanced hedging strategy of “economic reliance on China, security reliance on the US.” Because military security interests take priority over economic interests, Japan’s strategic relationship with the US will likely remain far closer than its relationship with China. In military cooperation, Japan’s closeness with the US at that time may exceed that of France and Germany with the US. Due to its heavy dependence on American military protection, Japan will likely choose American technical standards in the Sino-American digital technology competition. Technical standards are closely linked to economic transactions—shared digital technology standards mean Japanese-American digital economy transaction volumes will likely exceed Sino-Japanese digital economy transaction volumes. Japan may be heavily dependent on the US in both cybersecurity and the digital economy, and tilting toward America will likely remain Japan’s fundamental national policy.
However, to guard against sudden changes that might result from American government transitions, Japan’s willingness to actively participate in American containment of China will likely be lower than in 2024. Although the Japanese-American strategic relationship in 2035 will still be primarily cooperative, its reliability will likely be lower than in 2024. By 2035, Japan’s economic scale will have fallen not only further behind China but may also be smaller than India’s. This means Japan’s economic importance to the US will decline. The more the Japanese-American economic relationship tilts asymmetrically toward America, the more unequal America’s attitude toward Japan will become, increasingly viewing Japan as an unimportant follower. This will inevitably affect Japanese public perceptions of America, potentially generating resentment. In the 1970s, when Sino-American relations shifted from confrontation to strategic cooperation, the Japanese diplomatic community viewed it as American “over-the-head diplomacy” that bypassed Japan, casting a long political shadow over Japan. By 2035, Japan’s hedging strategy between China and the US will have moved closer to the middle than in 2024, handling relations with China and the US more evenhandedly.