Wu Xinbo: China-U.S. Relations Will Start Low, Rise High Within Two Years—But the Clock Is Ticking
Phoenix Exclusive with China's Leading America Expert and Dean of Fudan University's Institute of International Studies
Broke my promise again, but I came across this interview Phoenix conducted with Professor Wu Xinbo(吴心伯), and think it’s worth sharing.
Professor Wu Xinbo is Dean of the Institute of International Studies and Director of the Center for American Studies at Fudan University. In addition to his academic research, he actively participates in government policy consultation, undertakes research projects commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, attends expert meetings at the ministry's invitation, and leads Ministry of Foreign Affairs expert delegations on overseas research visits.
Key Takeaways
Wu Xinbo argues that the current international order is failing on multiple fronts. The ongoing Russia-Ukraine war and Middle East crises demonstrate that today's system cannot maintain global stability. This U.S.-dominated framework has marginalized developing nations and the Global South, prompting rising economies to demand greater influence in international affairs.
The United States faces three converging crises: political dysfunction, unsustainable debt, and deepening social divisions. Trump's reliance on executive orders and judicial pressure undermines America's constitutional framework. His ambitious legislative agenda threatens to balloon the national debt to crisis levels. Meanwhile, demographic shifts and intensifying social tensions could ultimately fracture the nation.
Wu sees America's global retreat as ultimately beneficial for the international system. As the U.S. pulls back, Europe faces three options: reconciliation with Russia, continued American dependence, or pursuit of strategic autonomy. The world is gradually adjusting to a post-hegemonic reality, with China, Russia, India, Europe, and Brazil collaborating to establish alternative governance mechanisms and reshape the global order.
On China-U.S. relations, Wu predicts initial improvements over the next two years, though America's designation of China as its primary strategic rival remains unchanged. The Madrid negotiations signal both nations' willingness to address economic disputes. Trump needs stable bilateral ties for the 2026 midterm elections and G20 summit, but renewed containment efforts likely await thereafter. Wu emphasizes that China's future vis-à-vis America depends not on hoping for American goodwill, but on China's continued development becoming an undeniable reality that reshapes the relationship.
Thanks to the Phoenix’s and Professor Wu’s authorization, I can translate the interview into English
Chinese ver: https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/G-qtHpnbez9SqAsVIjxMgw?scene=1&click_id=19
Wu Xinbo: Current International Order Is Neither Effective Nor Reasonable, and Creates New Contradictions
Phoenix: Director Wu, thank you very much for accepting this exclusive interview with Phoenix. The theme of this Xiangshan Forum is "jointly safeguarding the international order and promoting peaceful development." How do you think we should understand the "international order" in this theme?
Wu Xinbo: I think from an academic perspective, international order refers to a state of operation in international relations – whether it's orderly or disorderly, and how this state manifests. The current "international order" refers to an orderly state that supports the operation of international relations, including the balance and distribution of international power, international rules, international norms, and international organizational mechanisms that manage and regulate relations between countries. It includes several levels: tangible elements like international organizations and mechanisms, intangible ones like international norms, rules, and ethics, and the distribution of power reflected by international actors. All of these constitute the international order.
Phoenix: What problems do you think exist in the current international order?
Wu Xinbo: The existing order mainly has two problems. First, the current order isn't effective enough to truly ensure the orderly operation of international relations. Second, the current order itself has many unfair and unjust aspects.
Looking at the first problem, the current international order is very inefficient and fails to ensure that international relations operate normally and positively. Many hot-button issues like the Russia-Ukraine conflict and Middle East conflicts are like illnesses indicating the body isn't healthy – these conflicts show that this order can't effectively solve problems. Moreover, the existing order not only fails to ensure orderly international relations but is also likely to create new contradictions, even conflicts between major powers. Take the Russia-Ukraine conflict – Ukraine is just a strategic pawn for the West, with the U.S. and the West behind it, so the Russia-Ukraine conflict represents a conflict between Russia and the U.S.-led West. Similarly, the rise in China-U.S. tensions in recent years and the so-called intensification of strategic competition also reflect the existing order's inability to ensure smooth relations between major powers.
Looking at the second problem, the existing international order was established under U.S. leadership after World War II. It's Western-centric and U.S.-dominated, primarily maintaining Western interests and values, especially America's. Many developing countries and Global South nations had no voice in establishing institutions and making rules – they were forced or had no choice but to accept these arrangements. Take the UN Security Council permanent members – the other four are all white countries, with only China representing Asia as a non-white Southern country. This is definitely unfair and unreasonable. As developing countries, the Global South, and emerging economies have risen, the international balance of power has changed, and these countries hope for a greater voice in the existing order, more say – specifically, more voting power within certain institutions.
"A Fourth America" Will Form? Wu Xinbo: Three Crises Will Determine America's Future
Phoenix: On September 10, renowned American conservative Charlie Kirk was shot dead during a speech. You previously mentioned the concept of "three Americas," with the division and confrontation in the "third America" escalating again. How do you think the "third America" will continue to develop? Will we see a "fourth America" emerge?
Wu Xinbo: I think the "third America" is going through a major historical cycle, and a "fourth America" will emerge in the process, though it's not yet clear what this "fourth America" will look like. The "third America" is actually facing three major crises. (Editor's note: Wu Xinbo proposed the concept of "three Americas" to describe the three characteristics America has displayed over the past 30-plus years. The "first America" appeared after the Cold War ended, characterized by an optimistic and confident America; the "second America" appeared after 9/11, characterized by a frustrated, disappointed, and angry America; the "third America" appeared from Obama's presidency to the present, characterized by a divided and confrontational America.)
The first crisis is America's political crisis. With Trump's return as a representative example, can America's existing political framework and institutions withstand the impact of Trump 2.0? This is a question many Americans are concerned about. Will Trump step down after four years? Will he be willing to step down? Can America successfully hold presidential elections? Additionally, problems have emerged in the rule of law that America has long been proud of: Trump governs through executive orders after taking office, bypassing Congressional legislation; and the conservatives Trump nominated hold a majority in the Supreme Court, so its rulings are likely to favor Trump. So Americans originally believed that no matter how strong a president was, he'd be constrained by Congress, and no matter how divided Congress was, they could still balance things through the Supreme Court. But now even the judicial system is under great pressure. Many Americans are dissatisfied with Trump and want to file lawsuits, but many law firms that represent cases against Trump face pressure from Trump naming them and losing major clients. Over time, these firms will avoid taking such cases, and ultimately the rule of law can't function.
So what does Charlie Kirk's assassination reflect? Has America entered a new cycle of political violence? Looking back 20 years, America didn't have obvious political violence, so why has political violence suddenly sprouted now? Some Americans may believe that traditional institutional arrangements can no longer resolve political differences and contradictions, and people no longer trust these institutions, leading to street politics, mainly manifested as social movements. We're familiar with the Occupy Wall Street movement, the Tea Party movement, and violent shooting incidents – all reflecting that the "third America" now faces a political crisis.
The second crisis is America's debt crisis. If federal debt continues at its current pace, by around 2035, one-third of the annual federal budget will need to be used to pay interest on national debt. This means America's military spending, social welfare, healthcare, etc. will all have to be drastically cut, potentially leading vulnerable groups to protest in the streets. This forms what Ray Dalio calls America's "fifth cycle" in its internal cycle – a financial crisis occurs, leading to social conflict and even revolution. There's currently no sign of any solution to this problem. In fact, the Trump administration's passage of "big and beautiful" bills will accelerate the growth of America's national debt. Initially, Elon Musk's "slimming down" of the federal government was thought to potentially reduce some debt, but now it seems completely impossible. America's system determines that presidents after being elected only think about using money to solve their immediate concerns – namely borrowing, with little concern for consequences. Historically, many countries have collapsed due to financial unsustainability leading to economic collapse. This is a major problem for America.
The third crisis concerns society and race. According to current U.S. demographic trends, whites will become a minority before around 2040. This is unacceptable to many whites because it means positions like president, cabinet members, congressmen, and governors may increasingly be held by non-white ethnicities in the future. For America to transform from a white-dominated country since its founding to a non-white-dominated country is hard for them to accept. There are currently some trends where whites supporting Republicans move to red states, while those supporting Democrats move to blue states, objectively forming a "white America" and "non-white America." If they can't agree on major policies, they might split into two countries – peaceful separation is possible, separation through war is also possible. So the "third America" has actually entered a crisis cycle, and how these three crises are resolved will determine what kind of country the "fourth America" will be.
Wu Xinbo: Trump's Strategic "Inward Turn" Has More Benefits Than Drawbacks, U.S. Policies Push Opponents to Band Together
Phoenix: Trump has launched a series of strategic contraction measures since his second term, continuously creating imbalances with or even "decoupling" from allies like Europe, Japan, and South Korea. How do you think these countries or regions will plan their strategic layouts in the future?
Wu Xinbo: Taking Europe as an example, Europe has been hit the hardest. It relied on America's "protective umbrella" during the Cold War for decades and enjoyed the most peace dividends. Europe basically hasn't faced direct, serious security threats, but this situation is ending. If America substantially reduces its security commitments and investments in Europe after the Russia-Ukraine conflict ends, European countries will roughly fall into three categories: some countries may adopt a more pragmatic attitude and improve relations with Russia, including Hungary and others; some countries will continue clinging to America, hoping to use American protection while continuing to confront Russia, like the UK and Baltic states; and others like France, Germany, and Italy will try to achieve strategic autonomy, increase security investments, and rebuild European military forces, which will be a long-term process.
Regarding Europe's strategic autonomy, in the decades after World War II, their strategic autonomy capabilities have atrophied due to long-term reliance on America. Additionally, the peaceful state after the Cold War ended has also meant they've lost strategic capability in a sense. Current European politicians no longer have the courage of historical European powers, plus Europe's current poor economic situation makes increasing military spending, revitalizing defense, and increasing military recruitment unreliable. So I think Europe's strategic autonomy isn't followed by a period, nor an exclamation mark, but a big question mark.
Phoenix: What impact do you think America's strategic "inward turn" will have on the future international situation?
Wu Xinbo: When America's "inward turn" reaches a certain point, its position and role on the international stage will shrink significantly, its ability to dominate and influence international affairs will continue to decline, and the international community will slowly adapt to a "post-American hegemony" world. The results will be both positive and negative.
From the positive side, if America is no longer so dominant and overbearing in international affairs, many countries will feel international affairs might become fairer because they'll face less political and security pressure from America. This is a positive influence on international relations. From the negative side, if there's rapid contraction, it might lead to a shortage of public goods in the short term. For example, Europe has long relied on security public goods provided by America. If Trump decides to substantially withdraw troops from Europe and reduce security commitments, Europe might feel nervous, regional contradictions might rise, and conflicts might increase.
But overall, the positive impacts of America's strategic contraction outweigh the negative, because if America doesn't pursue hegemony internationally, other countries like China, Russia, India, Europe, and Brazil will cooperate to build new international governance mechanisms and improve the international governance order. Looking at human history, I believe other countries including China have both the will and ability to play a greater role in promoting the reconstruction of the international system, reform of the international order, and supply of international public goods, so it should be a positive trend overall. American hegemony, like any hegemony in history such as the British Empire, can only be a brief historical phenomenon – it can't be long-term.
Phoenix: During the September 3rd military parade, the leaders of China, Russia, and North Korea met in Beijing. Trump claimed "China, Russia, and North Korea are conspiring against the United States" while saying America wouldn't feel pressure. What characteristics do you think America's current strategy toward China and Russia displays?
Wu Xinbo: Trump's statement is very interesting and sounds familiar. Whenever leaders of countries with tense U.S. relations like Russian President Putin visit China, American media reports they're coming to China to discuss how to deal with America. As a powerful country, America always worries that other countries will conspire against it because they have guilty consciences – America knows it has done many bad things and that there's deep resentment, so they suspect other countries will conspire against them.
Frankly speaking, countries like North Korea and Iran are now close to China, but this is actually caused by American policies. In the 1990s, Brzezinski warned in "The Grand Chessboard" that America should prevent these countries from banding together, but American policies have done exactly that – containing and suppressing these countries, causing them to band together for warmth. These countries joining forces to deal with threats from America is precisely caused by American policies, yet America rarely reflects on its policy mistakes and lacks a spirit of strategic introspection.
Fundamentally, I think America lacks Kissinger's concept of balance of power. Kissinger believed the better state of international relations is equilibrium – don't let any country dominate, and you can ensure stability. But after World War II, America has continuously pursued absolute power superiority and absolute position rather than mutual balancing among several major powers, which leads other major powers to unite to balance America. So I believe America's pursuit of international political goals – absolute power superiority and promoting hegemony in international relations – is the main reason it faces many challenges worldwide.
Wu Xinbo: America Must Understand the Cost of the "Taiwan Card," China-U.S. Relations Will Start Low and Rise High Within Two Years
Phoenix: Trump has stated he "doesn't want any potential war with China," yet frequently interferes in Taiwan Strait affairs, using it as a strategic bargaining chip. Is this long-term inconsistency between words and actions simply strategic gamesmanship? What changes in the Taiwan Strait situation during Trump's term deserve attention?
Wu Xinbo: I think Trump is sincere when he says he doesn't want conflict with China. As a businessman, getting into conflict with a military power like China doesn't make sense economically. But America's China policy, especially its Taiwan policy, has strong inertia. America has long played the "Taiwan card" – whether Trump, Biden, or Bush Jr., they all play the "Taiwan card." They believe they can profit this way, like strategically or tactically constraining China, having an extra bargaining chip in negotiations, making Taiwan buy weapons from America, or moving TSMC to America for profit.
The question is how well he controls the degree – will it cross red lines and create risk of conflict with China? Neither the Biden nor Trump administrations have a very clear understanding of this. After Biden took office, the Pelosi Taiwan visit incident occurred, which was a mistake for them. If the Trump administration plays the "Taiwan card" in upcoming economic or other negotiations with China, elevating so-called "U.S.-Taiwan relations" and strengthening military ties – especially since some U.S. military trainers are already in Taiwan, and anti-missile systems are being deployed in the Philippines and Japan – this has already touched our red lines and reached a dangerous point. This situation could easily lead to escalating tensions and increasingly intense friction between the two sides.
What should be done next? China should urge the U.S. to stop all arms sales to Taiwan during Trump's visit to China, demanding the U.S. explicitly oppose "Taiwan independence" and support China's peaceful reunification. China has consistently raised this during Biden's term, but the Biden administration didn't comply and didn't accept China's position, only stating it doesn't support "Taiwan independence." Now the Trump administration has even removed "not supporting Taiwan independence" from the State Department website, so China must seize every opportunity, especially during Trump's visit to China, to pressure the U.S. and express concerns about Taiwan, this core interest. If the U.S. can't do this, then don't expect benefits from China, and the risk of China-U.S. conflict will rise. Therefore, we need to warn Trump and, when necessary, take action to make him understand the cost of such actions.
Phoenix: How do you view the results of the China-U.S. economic and trade negotiations in Madrid? Compared to "Trade War 1.0," what different characteristics does the current China-U.S. economic relationship display?
Wu Xinbo: Before the Madrid negotiations, China and the U.S. had already had three rounds of negotiations, which mainly focused on tariff issues. But this negotiation began involving things beyond tariffs, like TikTok, U.S. technology suppression of China, and U.S. entity list restrictions on China. The negotiation agenda has expanded to investment, technology, entity sanctions, etc. This means China and the U.S. are moving toward resolving a broader range of economic and trade differences, which is a good sign. The two sides can't keep going in circles on tariff issues because there are many more China-U.S. economic and trade problems to solve. This means the China-U.S. summit needs to reach some consensus, which should also include other areas like trade, investment, technology, etc. This is my basic judgment on the Madrid negotiations.
During Trump 1.0, the tariff war against China escalated gradually, starting from $50 billion and slowly escalating. China-U.S. negotiations also went through many twists and turns over a long period, finally reaching the Phase One agreement. So China-U.S. relations were first impacted by the tariff war and trade war, then came the technology war with companies like ZTE and Huawei, then the diplomatic war with both sides closing consulates, affecting people-to-people exchanges and other areas. Finally, by summer 2020, China and the U.S. had moved toward strategic confrontation to some degree – a very dangerous situation. So during Trump 1.0, China-U.S. relations started high and went low – starting high meaning Trump achieved a China-U.S. summit three months after taking office, but after his visit to China, bilateral relations went downhill, eventually reaching the cliff's edge.
But this year, China-U.S. relations might follow a pattern of starting low and rising high. After Trump took office, China-U.S. confrontation was intense, from fighting a trade war to bilateral negotiations to the upcoming summit – in the short term, bilateral relations are improving. But what the situation will be like in the next three years is hard to say. Trump faces two major events next year: first, the midterm elections, where he must stabilize economic and trade relations with China to ensure China continues buying American agricultural products, which is important for winning votes in agricultural states; second, the G20 summit, where Trump must invite Chinese leaders or the summit won't be exciting. Both mean he needs to stabilize China-U.S. relations.
If China-U.S. relations end this year well and maintain overall stability next year through both sides' efforts, the following two years are hard to predict. If Democrats control the House after the midterms and settle scores with Trump, creating internal strife, both parties will play the China card. Additionally, the current U.S. economic outlook isn't optimistic, and Americans are best at attributing their problems to external factors, so they'll blame China again and start new economic conflicts with China. There's also the 2028 presidential election, plus Trump's own capricious personality and possible third-party impacts, which determine that China-U.S. relations will be hard to predict in the two years after next year.
Wu Xinbo: U.S. May Subsequently Strengthen Containment of China, China's Strength Is Key to Improving Relations
Phoenix: From your perspective, how do you think current China-U.S. relations will develop?
Wu Xinbo: In the short term, my view involves "major trends" and "minor cycles." The "major trend" refers to America viewing China as its main strategic competitor, because America believes only China meets the criteria – having both the capability and willingness to challenge America's dominant position. So it engages in so-called strategic competition with China, which is essentially containment and suppression. This is a long-term trend that won't change in the short term, whether Democrats or Republicans are in power – both have moved in this direction over the past few years. But within the "major trend" there will be some "minor cycles." During Biden's presidency, in his last two years, due to domestic political and diplomatic needs – like the APEC meeting, needing to stabilize relations with China during the election year, and economic difficulties requiring China's help – he sought moderate détente and improvement in relations with China in the short term. So while the major trend involves intense competition, the minor cycle sees moderated competition and improved relations.
After Trump took office, we're also experiencing such a "minor cycle." Initially, Trump was tough on China, imposing unprecedented 145% tariffs and trying to immediately defeat China, but after failing, he sought negotiations with China, hoping to reach a new agreement. So China-U.S. relations show prospects for short-term détente and improvement, but this isn't sustainable. Subsequently, due to domestic political and strategic needs, containment and suppression of China may intensify, so this is just a "minor cycle." Such "minor cycles" might last a year, two years at most, then China and the U.S. continue competing. This is my summary of the development pattern of China-U.S. relations at this historical stage.
Phoenix: You previously stated that "China and the U.S. are not destined to be opponents." Looking long-term, can you predict and analyze the opportunities and possibilities for future improvement in bilateral relations?
Wu Xinbo: Looking at China-U.S. relations long-term, I believe the future of China-U.S. relations depends on China's development. When China surpasses the U.S. economically and achieves breakthroughs in important technological fields including chips and lithography machines, then whether America likes it or not, America will recognize that years of competition, containment, and suppression policies against China haven't succeeded and will need to adjust. For example, America blockaded and contained China for 20 years after the Cold War until Nixon opened the door to China-U.S. relations after failing, adjusting America's China policy. America might change course, might treat China as a major partner, needing to actively cooperate with China economically and even diplomatically to achieve America's interests. Then the opportunity for substantial improvement in China-U.S. relations will come.
In the decades after Nixon's visit to China, cooperation between China and the U.S. was greater than struggle. America saw China as both a partner and opponent, but mainly as a partner. History is cyclical in a sense. So at some future stage, America will see China as a very important economic opponent and partner. America will need China's market, investment, technologies like new energy, and critical supply chains. Similar situations have happened before – during the 2008 financial crisis, the Bush Jr. administration found it difficult to get help from Western countries including the G7, and only China had the ability to help, so America needed the G20, bringing China in and improving China-U.S. relations, increasing cooperation.
In the long run, this day will definitely come, but when? We can't simply hope for Americans to have a change of heart or show goodwill and come forward voluntarily. Rather, China's development and strength need to become the new reality, forcing Americans to face this new reality. International relations are very realistic, and Americans are especially realistic. If a country's capabilities haven't reached a certain level, America won't give it treatment beyond that level. They must also have a thorough internal debate on China policy, recognizing that the policy goals pursued since Trump's first term have neither been achieved nor are achievable, and continuing such policies isn't in America's national interest, so they must pragmatically adjust their China policy. Then China-U.S. relations will enter a new phase.