Wang Jisi on Current China-US Relations and Its Roots
Renowned Chinese Scholar at Peking University Identifies Four Key Variables Shaping the Bilateral Ties
Wang Jisi is a Chinese scholar and expert on international relations, particularly China-U.S. relations. He is currently a professor in the School of International Studies and the president of the Institute of International and Strategic Studies at Peking University. He served as the dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University from 2005 to 2013.
Wang has published numerous books and articles on international relations theory, US foreign policy, and China-US relations and is considered one of China's foremost experts in these fields.
Wang's insights have made him a highly respected figure in the field of international relations, and his views are often sought by policymakers, media, and academics both within China and internationally.
Key takeaways:
Wang suggests there are four interrelated variables to observe the changes in China-U.S. relations:
Shifting balance of power between the two countries: This one alone is not sufficient to explain the deterioration of China-US relations, as historical examples show that the rise of a "number two" power does not necessarily lead to confrontation with the "number one" power.
The opposition between the two countries' ideologies and political systems, as well as differences in civilizations and cultures, has been constant since 1949 and cannot fully account for the recent decline in bilateral relations.
Changes in the international environment, such as the rise of populism, nationalism, and global challenges, have contributed to the decline in China-U.S. relations.
Domestic politics in both countries, particularly the political polarization and social division in the US, constitute the most influential variable affecting bilateral relations.
Wang emphasized that the political polarization and social division in the US, stemming from changes in the economic structure and imbalances in income distribution, have led to a distortion of political struggles and a shift in the battlefield. The right-wing in the US seeks to revitalize the nation by opposing multiculturalism and resisting immigrants, while the left focuses on promoting the interests of various "marginalized groups." The political elites of both parties in the US are exaggerating external threats, particularly from China, to restore domestic cohesion.
Wang concludes that the interplay of these four variables has led to the current difficult period in China-U.S. relations, and while the two countries must avoid war and maintain some level of cooperation, the relationship is unlikely to return to the depth of exchanges and cooperation seen in the early 21st century.
Full Text:
In the past decade, particularly since the U.S.-China trade war initiated by President Donald Trump in 2017, China-U.S. relations have been on a continuous downward trajectory. In November 2022, the leaders of China and the United States met in Bali, Indonesia, engaging in deep and candid communication and reaching important consensus. In February 2023, a Chinese civilian unmanned airship inadvertently entered US airspace due to force majeure and was shot down by the US government, causing a diplomatic crisis and dealing a heavy blow to bilateral relations. Starting from May 2023, based on the consensus reached by the leaders of China and the US at the Bali meeting, the two governments resumed high-level contacts. In November 2023, President Xi Jinping, at the invitation of US President Joseph R. Biden, traveled to San Francisco for a China-U.S. summit. After the meeting between the two heads of state, China-U.S. relations showed signs of stabilizing and arresting the decline. However, judging from the development trends, China-U.S. relations are still far from having emerged from the trough. The reasons for China-U.S. relations entering a long-term difficult period can be analyzed from four interrelated variables or perspectives.
The first variable is the shifting balance of power between the two countries. Many international observers believe that the main reason for the deterioration of China-U.S. relations in the past decade is that China's comprehensive national strength has rapidly approached that of the United States, causing fear and anxiety in the US, which has thus tried every means to suppress China. Harvard University professor Graham Allison proposed the concept of the "Thucydides Trap," attempting to use the history of the Peloponnesian War in ancient Greece to illustrate that confrontation and even war between the "ruling power" and the "rising power" is difficult to avoid. Based on the historical experience of great power relations, Allison inferred that the probability of war breaking out between China and the US is higher than the probability of avoiding war.
However, the history of U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold War is hardly proof that relations between the two countries will inevitably become more tense when the strength of the "number two" rapidly approaches that of the "number one." In the mid-1970s, then US President Richard M. Nixon stepped down due to the Watergate scandal, and the global oil crisis dealt a heavy blow to Western economies. Faced with internal and external troubles, the US had to end the Vietnam War. The whole world saw that the US was no longer a superpower, and its international status was in decline. At the same time, the other superpower, the Soviet Union, was expanding vigorously around the world, its strategic nuclear forces had surpassed those of the United States, and its nominal economic growth rate was also higher than that of the US. Under Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet Union's domestic politics appeared very stable. At that time, the trend of "the East rising and the West falling" and "the Soviet Union on the offensive and the US on the defensive" was rarely questioned. However, U.S.-Soviet relations eased during this period. It was not until the late 1970s and early 1980s, when the Soviet Union became mired in the Afghanistan war and the US "regained its vigor" during the Reagan administration, that U.S.-Soviet relations became tense again.
Some Chinese scholars do not agree with the assertion that "China and the US are bound to fight," but believe that only when China far surpasses the US in terms of national strength (such as economic strength measured by GDP per capita) will the US concede defeat and China-U.S. contradictions ease. However, the history of great power relations is also hardly proof of this inference. For example, in 2010, China's economic aggregate surpassed that of Japan, and currently, China's GDP is more than four times that of Japan. Japan does not have nuclear weapons, and its conventional military strength is also far inferior to China's. However, Japan has not "bowed its head" to China in recent years, and the friendliness of China-Japan relations is far less than before 2010.
In the past two or three years, due to factors such as the COVID-19 pandemic, China's economic growth rate has slowed down, while the US economy has shown a clear recovery trend. Some US observers have thus clamored that China's economic development has "peaked" and that it will be difficult for China's economic aggregate to surpass that of the US in the foreseeable future. However, it can be questioned: if the Americans believe that the comparison of strength between China and the US will no longer change in favor of China from now on, will the US change its policy and behavior of containing China? Most observers would probably give a negative answer.
Therefore, it is unfounded to say that the "East rising and West falling" or "China rising and US falling" trend in the international balance of power is the main reason for the decline in China-U.S. relations.
The second perspective for observing changes in China-U.S. relations is the opposition between the two countries' ideologies and political systems, as well as differences in civilizations and cultures. However, contradictions and frictions in this regard have existed since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, and are generally a constant, with only the intensity of the struggle fluctuating. Therefore, it is also difficult to use the opposition of ideologies and political systems to explain the recent deterioration of relations between China and the United States.
If the two perspectives of changing power balance and ideological opposition are combined, it seems to provide a more powerful explanation for the potential confrontation between China and the US: the US cannot tolerate a country with opposing political values rapidly rising and thus challenging the US's power status and cultural hegemony, so it must do its utmost to suppress China. However, even considering the two factors of power balance and ideology together, it is still not possible to explain the entire course of the evolution of China-U.S. relations. For example, from the early 1950s to the late 1970s, the power balance between China and the US did not change much, with China's national strength far behind that of the US, and the ideological opposition was constant, but bilateral relations changed from being adversaries to easing tensions, and the two countries even became partners in international security. The background for this change was the change in the international environment, with the most important factor being that Soviet strategic expansion posed a threat to both China and the US At the same time, the rise of the "Third World" outside the US and the Soviet Union and the support of many non-aligned countries for China were also important conditions for the improvement of China's international environment.
In other words, observing China-U.S. relations requires a third perspective—changes in the international environment. In the past few decades, the imbalance of economic development and population growth between countries and within countries at different levels has led to a widening gap between the rich and the poor. Populism and nationalism have resonated with each other, exacerbating political contradictions and social divisions. Global challenges in areas such as the ecological environment and public health have become increasingly severe. Geopolitical conflicts have erupted one after another. Technological innovations such as artificial intelligence have become a "double-edged sword," promoting economic development and human health progress but also increasing the instability and uncertainty of the world. The report of the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China pointed out that the world has entered a new period of turbulence and change. The Central Conference on Foreign Affairs held in December 2023 reiterated this major judgment and proposed "resolutely opposing counter-globalization and pan-securitization, and opposing all forms of unilateralism and protectionism." It is not difficult to see that the trend of counter-globalization and pan-securitization in the new period of global turbulence and change is part of the international environment in which China-U.S. relations have fallen into a trough.
The above three variables or perspectives are still insufficient to provide a comprehensive explanation for the changes in China-US relations. Against the backdrop of changes in the relative strengths, prominent ideological differences, and turbulent international situation, the domestic politics of both China and the US constitute the fourth variable affecting bilateral relations, and it is the factor with the greatest change and influence. The political polarization and social division in the US today mainly stem from changes in the US economic structure and imbalances in income distribution. In the process of capital expansion, multinational corporations have transferred industrial chains to lower-cost regions such as China and Latin America, opened up overseas markets, and obtained greater returns. With the rise of the Internet and more convenient transportation, high-tech companies can conduct business more smoothly in the global market. The US economy has shifted from production and consumption mainly domestically to a large amount of production overseas and consumption at home, resulting in an imbalance in the trade structure. The US economy has become "detached from reality and turned to the virtual", with the service industry rising and manufacturing declining (although still very developed), and the "Rust Belt" has appeared in the Northeast and Midwest. The income gap between Wall Street's "fat cats" and Silicon Valley's tech elites and the lost blue-collar class has rapidly widened. The global financial crisis that broke out in 2008 triggered populist political movements on the right and left in the US. The "Tea Party Movement" that emerged in 2009 gained the support of many Republicans. The "Tea Party Movement" adheres to the "small government principle", calling for lower taxes and controlling US national debt and federal budget deficits by reducing government spending, with its target set on the Obama administration's fiscal policy. In 2011, left-wing activists sympathetic to many Democrats launched the "Occupy Wall Street Movement", focusing on the greed of large financial groups and large corporations and the inequality in society, and opposing these large corporations' use of money to corrupt American politics and the rule of law. These two movements, which reflect class contradictions and different policy ideas in the US, have been obscured by ethnic conflicts and identity politics. In fact, African Americans and new Latino immigrants are disadvantaged groups in the US. After the Black Liberation Movement in the 1960s, African Americans migrated en masse from the agricultural areas of the South to the industrial base and big cities in the East. After the decline of traditional industrial sectors, black unemployment increased, and social problems such as crime, drug use, single-parent families, and homelessness followed, making upward social mobility increasingly difficult. New Latino immigrants are concentrated in big cities in Florida, California, New York and other regions, with uncertain identities and unstable incomes. However, lower-middle-class whites believe that they are being squeezed out by foreign immigrants and blacks, resulting in strong anti-foreign sentiments and resentment towards blacks. The superposition of class contradictions and ethnic conflicts has led to a distortion of political struggles and a shift in the battlefield. The right-wing in the US has defined its core mission as revitalizing the nation, with a typical slogan being Trump's "Make America Great Again". They oppose multiculturalism, highlight the native identity of Americans, resist immigrants and refugees, and implement overt or covert racism. The left, on the other hand, has reduced its focus on economic equality and instead seeks more support from minority groups, immigrants, refugees, women, and sexual minorities (LGBTQ), focusing on how to promote the interests of various "marginalized groups", with a notable slogan being "Black Lives Matter". Now, the struggle of identity politics is leading the US into a predicament and division. The political elites of both parties in the US are shirking their responsibilities and trying to restore domestic cohesion by exaggerating external threats. During Trump's tenure from 2017 to 2020, the US built a wall on the southern border to prevent illegal entry. The Trump administration passed discriminatory immigration regulations against Muslims and launched a trade war against China. After the Biden administration took office in 2021, it maintained high tariffs on trade with China in the name of strengthening national security, and adopted a so-called "small yard, high wall" technology blockade policy against China. The anti-China and anti-Chinese tendency in American society is becoming increasingly serious, with frequent violent incidents against Asians (especially Chinese). There are more and more anti-China bills in both houses of the US Congress, involving all aspects of China's internal affairs and diplomacy. Various public opinion polls show that the American public's negative perception of China has risen sharply. In international affairs, the consistent position of both parties in the US is to regard China as the biggest strategic competitor. 2024 is an election year in the US, and it is expected that candidates from both parties will compete to show their tough attitude towards China. On the Chinese side, since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2012, the Party Central Committee has promoted historic achievements and historic changes in the cause of the Party and the country. China has comprehensively strengthened the Party's leadership, firmly grasped the Party's leadership, management, and discourse power over ideological work, engaged in resolute struggles with hostile forces from the US and other Western countries, and safeguarded China's ideological security, political security, regime security, and institutional security. The Chinese government has taken resolute and powerful actions against the "Taiwan independence" separatist plot, and its determination to complete national reunification is unwavering. The Chinese path to modernization provides a new choice for mankind to achieve modernization and creates a new form of human civilization. In response to China's firm and just stance in safeguarding its own national interests, the US and some other Western countries, instead of reflecting on and adjusting their policies towards China, have intensified their suppression of China, making the overall relationship between China and the West tense. On March 6, 2023, President Xi Jinping pointed out: "The external environment for my country's development has changed rapidly, and the factors of uncertainty and unpredictability have increased significantly, especially the all-round containment, encirclement and suppression implemented by Western countries led by the United States, which has brought unprecedented severe challenges to my country's development." On May 30, 2023, at the first meeting of the new Central National Security Commission, President Xi Jinping emphasized "adhering to bottom-line thinking and extreme thinking, and being prepared to withstand major tests of high winds and waves and even stormy waves," and "deeply understanding the complex and severe situation facing national security". In the interactions between China and the US in recent years, the "stability" and "certainty" of Chinese politics have formed a sharp contrast with the "chaos" and "change" of American politics. In order to maintain domestic stability, China must dare to and be good at fighting against the US and be mentally and materially prepared for stormy waves in bilateral relations; the political struggle in the US needs to continue to use China as a "target," and the political mainstream of both parties will not reduce their hostility towards China. In summary, there are four sets of overlapping and interrelated logic behind the struggle and game between China and the US. The conclusion drawn from these logics is that China-US relations will not be able to return to the depth of exchanges and level of cooperation of the early 21st century for a long time to come. However, the long-term interests and strategic considerations of both countries determine that they must avoid war with each other and must maintain a certain degree of economic cooperation and social exchange. The biggest uncertainty factor in China-US relations in 2024 is the chaos that may be caused by political struggles in the US. However, the official and people-to-people contacts between China and the US since 2023 have made the upper limit of the development of bilateral relations, and the bottom line of conflicts tends to be clear. China-US relations are difficult to improve but are expected to be basically stable.
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