Wang Haolan's Analysis on the Democratic Party at Crossroads

Factional Struggles and Identity Crisis as Trump's Second Term Reaches 100 Days

Just as the West has its various "China Watching" channels, China hosts numerous "America Watching" platforms. Among these blogs and podcasts, I find Wang Haolan's analysis to be among the most insightful.

Wang serves as a Research Assistant at the Asia Society Policy Institute's Center for China Analysis, specializing in American politics and elections as well as Chinese politics. His position outside traditional Chinese institutions allows him to offer observations of America that are independent of the perspectives typically found in established Chinese think tanks such as CASS.

Beyond his contributions to major media outlets in Mainland and Hong Kong, Wang maintains his WeChat blog "Lanmu" (《岚目》), which has garnered significant recognition within Chinese international journalism circles. He regularly appears as a guest commentator on the Chinese-language American politics podcast "The American Roulette." (《美轮美换》) And should you have the opportunity to dine with him, you'll discover that, as a native of Tianjin, his taste in Chinese cuisine is truly impeccable.

Wang Haolan

Thanks to my friend Wang for authorizing me to publish his analysis of the Democratic Party at this crossroads.

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As the crucial 100-day mark of Trump's second administration approaches, multiple waves of protests have erupted across America. Simultaneously, Trump's personal approval ratings have plummeted dramatically, approaching the historically low levels of his first term. This public backlash against Trump and Republican governance has provided the Democratic Party, which suffered a comprehensive defeat in last year's election and has since been plagued by infighting and leadership vacuums, an opportunity to regroup and catch its breath.

Although the Democratic Party's political image remains largely negative in the eyes of most voters, and the neoliberal political ideologies and policies embraced during the Obama-Biden era are still rejected as "past mistakes" by the electorate, the domestic and international political and economic turmoil created by the Republicans' return to power has somewhat validated the Democratic leadership's previous "ostrich strategy." Their passive resistance approach—allowing Trump and the Republicans free rein to implement their platform and trigger voter pushback—has indeed shown some effectiveness.

However, the Democratic Party's internal political problems, particularly the ideological conflicts between different factions and the generational divide between new and established leaders, cannot be resolved merely by improving polling numbers and promising midterm election prospects. The current debates over future direction and core party ideology essentially stem from the complete repudiation of the mainstream Democratic paradigm of the past two decades. This paradigm, which championed postmodern liberalism (advocating tolerance and diversity on social issues while embracing globalization and technological innovation economically) and relied on a coalition of liberal whites and minorities (African Amrican, Latino, and Asian American voters) to win elections, was thoroughly rejected by the results of the 2024 election.

While the 2016 Trump victory could be explained away by factors like Hillary Clinton's overconfidence, Comey's last-minute email investigation interference, and voters' experimental curiosity about a political newcomer, the 2024 defeat has proven that Trumpism—or Trump himself—has successfully debunked the Democrats' cherished political theory of an "emerging Democratic majority." After experiencing Biden's four years of high economic growth coupled with high inflation, and witnessing the embrace of diversity, equity initiatives, and lenient immigration policies that triggered a border crisis, American voters not only chose to reinstate Trump—the controversial figure who lost re-election four years ago and slunk away under the shadow of January 6th—but many blue-collar and minority voters made unexpected political shifts, directly shredding the veil of Democrats' self-proclaimed role as champions and protectors of the working class and ethnic minorities.

The facts prove that even though the Biden administration implemented many policies catering to Midwest blue-collar voters—whether maintaining many of Trump's tariffs, passing legislation to promote manufacturing reshoring through industrial policy, or consistently emphasizing American workers first in both domestic and foreign policy—none of this could ultimately convince these voters, once the bedrock of Democratic support, to return. Instead, Harris saw further erosion of blue-collar support. Meanwhile, the push for social diversification that began under Obama, flourished during Trump 1.0, and reached its zenith under Biden—DEI, affirmative action, lenient immigration policies, emphasis on multiculturalism—failed to help Democrats maintain high support among minority voters. The 2024 election results show that, except for the African American community, which, due to unique historical and social factors, remained steadfastly Democratic without significant decline, other minority groups that Democrats embraced and whose left-wing social policies theoretically should have attracted—Latino and Asian voters—experienced a substantial rightward shift.

Therefore, unlike the previous losses of power in 2000 and 2016, when Democratic presidents had successfully completed two terms and lost by narrow margins to Republicans under the natural pattern of party alternation without their party's political image and established political direction being thoroughly repudiated, the post-2024 Democratic Party finds itself in a forced political transformation period reminiscent of the 1980s after Carter's devastating loss to Reagan and the complete collapse of the New Deal coalition. The old playbook no longer works, but the entire party doesn't know which direction to take or who could serve as an appropriate new Democratic leader. For Democrats to completely escape this political confusion, they need someone who can assume the mantle of party leadership for a new era on a national scale. But the problem is that America's political system—presidential system plus federalism—prevents the opposition party from appointing a formal opposition leader as in parliamentary/Westminster systems. Even if Democrats controlled both houses of Congress (and currently they're the minority in both), congressional leaders, not being elected by national voters and often limited by their positions' nature to being party hacks lacking distinctive political images and positions, struggle to effectively serve as opposition leaders. Therefore, under America's political system, often only when a new presidential nominee emerges is there a unified national strategy. In other words, until the 2028 primaries conclude, Democrats will likely remain in their current state of rudderless chaos, with various factions fighting intensely for control of the party's narrative.

On the other hand, the Democratic Party's current public image of frequent infighting stems from generational conflict and internal institutional reform issues. While Democrats and Republicans are the two major parties that jointly dominate American politics, their political ecosystems differ dramatically due to their distinct political histories and voter compositions (what political scientists call "asymmetric polarization"). Since its founding, the Democratic Party has been ideologically diverse, essentially a loose political coalition stitched together from different groups and demographics. At its 19th-century inception, the party was already an odd political alliance of Northern ethnic minorities (Irish/Italian) workers and new immigrants alongside Southern plantation owners. By the mid-20th century, the Roosevelt New Deal coalition that dominated American politics for nearly fifty years was similarly a bizarre alliance that transcended ethnicity and ideology. After the Civil Rights movement, while Democrats gradually lost their grip on the solid South, they still maintained a cross-ethnic base comprising a significant portion of conservative whites alongside urban liberals and African American minorities.

Even as political polarization has pushed both parties toward internal ideological unity, with Democrats largely shedding the Southern conservatives who once comprised a third of the party (while Republicans lost Rockefeller/liberal Republican voters in New England), the Democratic Party's ideological purity index still lags behind the Republicans'. This historical tradition of numerous local factions, ideological factions, and ethnic factions has made the party very "conservative" in its internal political institutional design, preserving substantial localist protectionism and an extreme reverence for seniority systems (honoring the old over the young).

For instance, Democrats required their presidential nominees to secure two-thirds majority support at conventions until the mid-20th century, effectively granting veto power to Southern state Democrats who controlled a third of delegates. While this veto power was eventually abolished as times changed, Democrats remained reluctant to nominate presidential candidates from outside their traditional strongholds—the East Coast, the South, and at most the Midwest. So even though the California contingent wielded enormous influence on Capitol Hill under Pelosi's leadership, until Harris unexpectedly replaced Biden as the 2024 nominee, Democrats had never fielded a presidential candidate from the West Coast/Western states. These regional tensions—whether between the new Democratic stronghold on the West Coast and traditional East Coast political elites, or between Rust Belt Midwest and Sun Belt Southern Democrats caught in the middle fighting coastal establishment figures for influence—represent a significant historical catalyst for the party's current internal strife.

Meanwhile, after Biden's forced withdrawal in 2024 due to age and health concerns, discussions about leadership age and generational transition within the Democratic Party have exploded. For years, because congressional Democrats haven't imposed term limits on party leaders and committee chairs like Republicans have (except for Speaker/Majority Leader positions), gerontocracy has flourished within the Democratic congressional caucus. The House Democrats' previous triumvirate of leaders who held power for over a decade (Pelosi/Hoyer/Clyburn) were all in their eighties by the end of their tenure, and committee chairs were mostly septuagenarians and octogenarians who had served in Congress for thirty-plus years. While Senate Democratic leadership has shown more fluidity than their House counterparts, there are still cases like Whip Durbin serving as number two for 22 years. With Biden's forced exit, criticizing gerontocracy has shifted from a politically sensitive topic to consensus within the Democratic Party. Over the past several months, numerous older Democratic committee leaders have been forced out, mostly replaced by younger middle-generation members (in Congress, 50-60 year-olds count as young), and multiple older Representatives and Senators have announced or plan to announce retirement. This generational changing of the guard will continue to ferment and ultimately shape the entire Democratic Party's strategic positioning for 2026 and 2028.

Party Factions/Ideologies and Attitudes Toward Trump/Republicans

Currently, the Democratic Party contains multiple competing policy philosophies and visions for the party's future direction, which can broadly be divided into three factions: the traditional establishment, progressives, and moderate conservatives.

The establishment faction, or mainstream liberals within the party, refers to the "liberals" who have firmly occupied the Democratic mainstream since the Clinton era, embracing progressive diversity on social issues while adhering to neoliberalism on economic matters. As the ruling faction and primary beneficiaries of America's economic growth over recent decades, establishment types generally emphasize institutional stability, advocate incremental reform, and prefer maintaining existing diplomatic, security, and trade frameworks. Establishment Democrats broadly accept America's capitalist system; while they maintain support for blue-collar workers, they don't reject cooperation and mutual prosperity with corporations, especially Wall Street and Silicon Valley. They represent the globalization-embracing, "Third Way" mainstream liberals of the new century. However, in recent years, due to the rise of populist forces and Trumpism, establishment Democrats have begun absorbing some anti-globalization sentiments and embracing economic populism/trade protectionism that favors manufacturing reshoring.

The establishment's representative party organization is the New Democratic Coalition, comprising roughly 100-plus House members. Their representative figures include party leadership like Senate Minority Leader Schumer and House Minority Leader Jeffries, along with former presidents Obama and Clinton. As for Biden, while his Senate tenure generally aligned with the party's ideological mainstream—exhibiting strong establishment characteristics—his presidential governing approach actually more closely resembles a Democratic version of America First, with pronounced economic populist and progressive elements. Therefore, after voters judged the Biden administration a failure, many Democrats have begun questioning whether this combination of economic leftism, social leftism, and elite politics remains a viable long-term political path.

The establishment faction maintains a highly unified stance toward Trump, uniformly opposing Trumpism on ideological grounds, viewing Trump as a threat to democratic institutions and a contemporary fascist. Subjectively, they are resolutely committed to opposing and resisting Trump, refusing proactive cooperation. However, the establishment simultaneously possesses what might be called a natural governing mentality—they cannot bear to see America's political institutions and government-related interests suffer excessive damage or disruption, and remain willing to ensure government funding and annual appropriations proceed without delay at critical moments. Many establishment Democrats are also reconsidering whether their reflexive opposition to everything Trump over the past eight years has created a one-dimensional, calcified image of Democrats before voters, causing them to lose their distinctive character and political appeal. This explains why, under congressional leadership's guidance, Democrats in both chambers have essentially failed to organize active resistance to Trump administration policies, instead adopting a passive response—sitting back and watching Trump's governance create social, economic, and diplomatic chaos, preparing to emerge unscathed and benefit from future public opinion swings and the pendulum effect/structural advantages that naturally accrue to opposition parties in midterm elections. Given Democrats' gradually improving momentum in midterm polling, this passive playing-dead strategy, while infuriating the party base and prompting many Democrats to openly advocate primarying establishment leaders like Schumer, remains a simple and effective long-term approach to handling Trump.

The progressive faction is currently the most vocal and politically active within the Democratic Party. Progressives broadly represent the most radical left-wing ideological pole within the party, sharing populist and anti-establishment/anti-system characteristics with Trumpism. On economic issues, progressives support radical left policies like Medicare for All, the Green New Deal, and student loan cancellation, advocating wealth taxes, limiting corporate power, and breaking up monopolies. On social issues, they similarly embrace diversity with clear conviction, pushing hard to address America's "systemic discrimination and racism" while supporting pathways to legalization for undocumented immigrants. On foreign policy, progressives lean toward non-interventionism and multilateralism, maintaining an overall critical stance toward America's military-industrial complex and persistently high defense spending, and generally refusing to provide unconditional support to Israel.

Currently, about 96 Democratic members belong to the progressive organization—the Congressional Progressive Caucus—with Vermont Senator Sanders and New York Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (AOC) as undisputed standard-bearers. Recently, Sanders and AOC have partnered on a nationwide tour delivering speeches criticizing "oligarchy" politics, attracting substantial voter and media attention. Their ability to draw large crowds even in conservative red states suggests that economic populism and anti-oligarchy politics possess potential to transcend traditional red-blue geographic boundaries and urban-rural political divides. However, following 2024's nationwide rightward shift and the repudiation of the Biden administration's progressive-tinged governing approach, whether Democrats will choose to continue down a left-populist path remains highly doubtful. Given Sanders' age, he clearly wants to pass the progressive torch to younger generations like AOC. But the question remains: will the now 36-year-old AOC challenge for the presidency in 2028 as a House member (typically, such political credentials would be insufficient for AOC to stand out in a presidential primary)?

Regarding Trump, progressive Democrats obviously harbor even greater antipathy toward Trump and Trumpism than the establishment. Progressive Democrats have consistently and clearly demanded accountability for Trump's criminal liability in the January 6th events over recent years, identifying Trump as an authoritarian and racist, while the entire Republican Party under Trumpism's leadership has evolved into an "extremely unreasonable right-wing party." The progressive strategy toward Trump essentially involves scorched-earth tactics—fighting Trump to the bitter end without any concessions, even willing to use government shutdowns and debt ceiling defaults as bargaining chips—political red lines that conventional Democrats hesitate to cross. However, while this progressive approach resonates deeply with Democratic base voters, it still cannot directly influence party leadership's strategic decisions. Hence Sanders and AOC's pivot to grassroots mobilization, using rallies and speeches as alternative forms of resistance.

Moderate conservatives represent the Democratic Party's counterpart to progressives, positioned further center-right on the ideological spectrum than the party establishment. They primarily hail from swing districts/red states where Democratic support is tenuous or where the party label itself is a significant liability. Historically, Democrats had numerous moderate-conservative members from the South, but as these traditional Southern Democrats gradually exited the political stage due to polarization and the South's political transformation, the party's moderate members increasingly come from rural agricultural areas and affluent suburbs—either remnants of the old Democratic coalition or newly competitive swing territories. These centrist Democrats generally hold moderate political positions, opposing radical reforms and diversity initiatives on social issues. Some even oppose abortion rights (now exceedingly rare) and acknowledge Trump and Republicans' hardline stance on immigration and border security. On economic issues, they champion fiscal conservatism and are reluctant to grant government an expansive role in economic life.

Representative figures among these members might include former West Virginia Senator Manchin, who has left Congress, while current members include the mere ten remaining Blue Dog Democrats in the House. At the state level, several Southern governors like Kentucky's Beshear and North Carolina's Stein fit this Democratic profile. Predictably, moderate Democrats prioritize local voter opinions, believing the party's past electoral defeats stem largely from Democrats' elite political image and policy agenda becoming disconnected from mainstream American society. For Democrats to remain competitive in the future, they must proactively align ideologically with the American people (such as shifting immigration attitudes, emphasizing masculine strength while avoiding excessive feminization and intellectualization, and promoting patriotic positions)—essentially pivoting rightward as Clinton did with the Third Way.

Therefore, these moderate Democrats don't want to completely sever cooperation and communication channels with Republicans and Trump, arguing the party should avoid the "oppose-Trump-at-all-costs" approach of the past eight years. moderate Democrats condemn Trump personally and his extreme measures, but maintain a willingness to collaborate with moderate Republicans, particularly on defense and security issues.

The Midterm and Presidential Election Prospects for Each Faction

Overall, the policy disagreements and strategic disputes among the Democratic Party's three major factions won't significantly impact the party's midterm election prospects and strategic positioning. Midterm elections differ from presidential elections—they're not comparative contests between two parties and two presidential candidates, but rather a unilateral assessment of the governing party's performance over the past two years. America's modern political history repeatedly demonstrates that presidential and midterm elections exist in completely different political ecosystems, with countless examples of parties winning sweeping victories and unified control only to suffer crushing defeats and lose both chambers two years later. The opposition party's greatest advantage in midterms lies in the voter composition naturally favoring the out-party. Midterm voters often express dissatisfaction with the current administration by voting for opposition congressional and gubernatorial candidates. Therefore, what Democrats themselves do, their current state, or whether they have unified ideology and political direction isn't crucial—what matters is the approval ratings of Republicans and Trump.

Currently, Republican and Trump's governing approval has already dropped to around 40% just past the hundred-day mark. Considering this period should still count as Trump's honeymoon phase or its tail end, his support may continue declining as tariffs and inflation further impact the American economy. Unless historical patterns are broken, Democratic victory in the midterms and recapturing House control should be a foregone conclusion. The Senate, given Republicans' substantial margin for error and structural advantages in the electoral map, presents a different challenge—whether Democrats can flip control depends on just how unpopular Trump becomes by his second term's midpoint.

Given that midterms will likely elect a considerable number of new Democratic members/governors from swing districts/states, moderate centrist Democrats' ranks should expand post-midterms. If Democrats achieve their desired midterm victory, the establishment's ostrich strategy will receive grudging voter validation, and congressional leadership's continued control of party power and political machinery becomes highly probable. The only suspense: as many older Democratic members retire voluntarily or under pressure, will their replacements be mainstream establishment figures or the currently ascendant progressives? Whether progressive ranks can expand further—particularly breaking beyond their current concentration in urban and deep-blue safe districts—will largely determine their acceptance by the party's ideologically "conservative" minority Black voters in the 2028 presidential primary.

As for the 2028 election, still over three years away, whether Democrats ultimately turn left or right depends on America's political-economic environment in 2027-2028. In other words, for Democrats to succeed in 2028, they need to find a candidate who matches 2028 American voters' appetites—they succeeded in 2020, clearly failed in 2024, but until that critical moment arrives, nobody knows what voters truly want or whether primary voters will accept new candidates who deviate too far from established paths.

Democratic Factions' Attitudes Toward China

Among the Democratic Party's various factions, overall differences in China policy attitudes and positions aren't extremely pronounced, yet unlike Republicans, they don't treat comprehensive hostility and hawkishness toward China as the sole political orthodoxy. Generally speaking, mainstream Democrats have accepted the strategic shift in U.S.-China relations from engagement-driven to competition-driven in recent years, but each faction has its own distinct policy priorities regarding specific approaches and areas.

The establishment clearly dominates the Democratic Party's basic China policy framework. Democratic establishment figures typically emphasize maintaining bilateral stability within the context of "strategic competition." They advocate avoiding direct conflict while promoting limited cooperation with China through diplomatic and multilateral mechanisms, particularly in global climate governance, pandemic control, and nuclear non-proliferation. Establishment representatives like former President Biden and Schumer emphasize "cooperation within competition," attempting to constrain China's rise through rules and alliance systems while preserving windows for cooperation on global issues. It was precisely the establishment, together with moderates, who supported the TikTok ban despite progressive opposition within the party, only to get cold feet when the ban was actually about to take effect.

Centrist moderates share similar China positions with the establishment, generally taking a harder line toward China while focusing on manufacturing reshoring, supply chain security, and technological competition. Many centrist moderate Democrats come from defense, security, and intelligence backgrounds, emphasizing national security and arguing that U.S. China policy should prioritize trade fairness, intellectual property protection, and national security, maintaining greater wariness in economic relations with China. However, on "hard security" issues like combating transnational crime, cybersecurity, and counterterrorism, centrists believe pragmatic cooperation with China is possible, preferring a "defend first, cooperate later" approach to managing China relations.

Progressive Democrats arguably represent this era's last remaining China doves, preferring to de-emphasize geopolitical confrontation and believing the U.S. and China shouldn't move toward military conflict or a new Cold War. While progressives like to emphasize human rights issues, they prioritize global social justice and multilateral cooperation more highly, advocating substantive cooperation with China on green energy transition, global poverty reduction, and health equity. Progressive legislators represented by AOC and Sanders generally advocate replacing containment with cooperation, pushing China to assume greater responsibility in global development agendas rather than isolating China and initiating a new Cold War confrontation and bipolar structure.

More analysis from Wang Haolan:

Haolan Wang's analysis on the attempted assassination of Donald Trump