U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy in the Eyes of Chinese Scholar
Li Yaqi from Shanghai Institute of American Studies Analyzes Trump 2.0's Indo-Pacific Strategy Through Hegseth's Shangri-La Dialogue Speech
While this year's Shangri-La Dialogue generated notably less attention in China than in previous years, several readouts from the event merit closer examination. Often, how one side interprets another's strategic messaging matters more than the original message itself. In this context, I found Li Yaqi's analysis of Hegseth's remarks at the dialogue, along with broader Chinese interpretations of the US Indo-Pacific strategy, offers insights worth sharing.
Li is a researcher at the Shanghai Institute of American Studies, his latest piece offers a comprehensive analysis of how U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth used his Shangri-La Dialogue keynote to unveil the first complete Indo-Pacific blueprint of Trump's second term. His piece traces how Hegseth's characterization of China as the pacing threat, advocacy for NATO-style 5% of GDP defense spending among allies, and emphasis on reviving America's defense industrial base align with three key documents: the leaked Interim Defense Strategic Guidance, the Army Transformation Initiative, and the forthcoming National Defense Strategy 2025. Li's analysis explains Washington's willingness to "accept more risk" in other regions to fund a denial-centered deterrence architecture along the first island chain. He also maps the varied regional responses—from Canberra's cautious endorsement to Southeast Asia's strategic hedging—revealing crucial insights into the evolving dynamics of U.S.-China competition.
This piece was first published on the WeChat account of The Program to Promote China-US Friendship, Trust and Cooperation under Fudan Development Institute. Thanks to Li’s kind authorization, I’m able to translate his latest piece into English.
Foreword:
On May 31, 2025, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth delivered a keynote speech at the 22nd Shangri-La Dialogue. This marked the first comprehensive policy statement by a senior U.S. official on a multilateral Asia-Pacific security platform during Trump's second term, and was viewed as setting the tone for the new administration's Indo-Pacific strategy. Hegseth's speech focused on great power strategic competition, threading the concept of "peace through strength" throughout his remarks. On one hand, he reaffirmed America's commitments to regional allies and enduring presence; on the other, he called on allies to shoulder more security responsibilities while warning the region of "imminent threats from China." Hegseth's rhetoric, combined with the leaked Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance (INDSG), the ongoing Army Transformation Initiative (ATI), and the emerging direction of the 2025 National Defense Strategy (NDS 2025), collectively outline a strategic loop centered on the "sole pacing threat/scenario" (referring to the primary and most challenging adversary or conflict scenario that sets the tempo for U.S. military development, resource allocation, and strategic calibration in defense planning—currently specifically referring to China and its potential actions in specific regions), running through "threat perception-deterrence model-burden sharing." This loop not only aims to calibrate America's strategy, budget, and alliance mobilization but also portends profound adjustments in U.S.-China relations and the Indo-Pacific regional security landscape.
Hegseth's Vision for U.S. Indo-Pacific Security
Hegseth's speech took place at the Shangri-La Dialogue on May 31, 2025, the annual premier security summit in the Asia-Pacific region. The new Defense Secretary chose this forum to systematically articulate his Indo-Pacific security policy for the first time. The U.S. delegation first noted that China's Defense Minister did not attend the dialogue, sending only a delegation of scholars from the National Defense University. Some accompanying U.S. officials interpreted this as an "opportunity for the U.S. to make progress" in the region, and Hegseth subtly referenced this absence at the beginning of his speech—a scenario that provided the backdrop for Hegseth to forcefully convey America's position. During the dialogue, Hegseth also actively engaged in multilateral and bilateral interactions, particularly holding the 15th U.S.-Japan-Australia Trilateral Defense Ministers' Meeting with Japanese Defense Minister Nakatani Gen and Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Richard Marles, highlighting America's reliance on its core alliance system and strategic orientation toward deepening minilateral mechanisms.
The keynote of Hegseth's speech can be summarized as America's vision for Indo-Pacific regional security and strategies for addressing the so-called "China challenge." The entire speech revolved around "four key terms": "Imminent Threat," "Burden-Sharing," "Selective Partnerships," and "revive our defense industrial base."
First, Hegseth positioned China as the "most realistic and potentially imminent security threat" in the Indo-Pacific region. He declared: "There's no need to sugarcoat it: the threat posed by China is real, and it may be imminent," and dramatized that the PLA is "credibly preparing to use force to change the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific" to dominate its periphery. Hegseth specifically mentioned the Taiwan Strait situation, and while he reiterated that the U.S. "does not seek conflict with China," he immediately pivoted to firmly state that America "will not be driven out of this critical region, nor will we allow our allies and partners to be coerced and intimidated." At the conclusion of his speech, Hegseth again emphasized the urgency of war risks, quoting the ancient maxim that "those who love peace must prepare for war," and warning: "Our time is now, threats won't wait, and neither can we sit idle." This series of hardline statements indicates that the U.S. assesses the window of conflict risk is approaching and needs to immediately strengthen deterrence to "stay ahead of danger."
The "imminent" assessment in the speech echoes the so-called "2027 window" proposed by former U.S. Indo-Pacific Commander Philip Davidson. Although Hegseth did not directly mention the "2027 window" in his speech, his emphasis that China is "credibly preparing to use military force to change the Indo-Pacific balance of power" essentially reflects America's high vigilance toward potential risks within a specific timeframe. Additionally, the ideological component in his references to China was stronger than in previous U.S. Defense Secretaries' Shangri-La speeches, and was considered unfriendly or even "provocative."
Second, while reaffirming U.S. commitments, Hegseth emphasized that allies must also shoulder more defense responsibilities, reflecting a distinct "burden-sharing" approach. He noted that because Trump has already pushed European allies to strengthen their self-defense investments, the U.S. can free up more resources to focus on the Indo-Pacific as the "priority theater." Hegseth praised: "This allows all of us to benefit from the peace and stability brought by America's enduring and robust presence in the Indo-Pacific." He then urged Asian countries to follow Europe's example in increasing military spending: "Incredibly, but (because of) President Trump's efforts, Asian allies should look to European nations as the new model." He cited NATO countries' commitment to raise defense spending to 5% of GDP, with even Germany being no exception, questioning why some key Asian allies weren't following suit. Hegseth declared that "deterrence is not cheap... time is of the essence," echoing his criticism of allies' "free-riding" phenomenon on different occasions. While this stance may cause pressure or even unease among some Asia-Pacific partners, it also conveys America's strategic intent to strengthen collective defense and jointly contain China through allied military spending sharing.
Third, Hegseth emphasized the importance of lowering ideological priorities and highlighting "pragmatic cooperation." He explicitly stated that the U.S. is not interested in ideology-driven diplomacy of the past, emphasizing "We're not here to force our politics or ideology on other nations; we won't lecture you about climate change or cultural issues; nor will we impose our will upon you. We are all sovereign nations." Instead, the U.S. seeks to establish and strengthen defense partnerships based on "solid foundations of common interests and common sense" to maintain peace and promote prosperity. This principle means the U.S. will adopt a "selective partnership" strategy—willing to cooperate with countries as long as there are common interests in security and prosperity, no longer making complete alignment of values a prerequisite. Hegseth even unusually emphasized so-called "respect" for China in his speech, stating that Trump and America "have great respect for China and its civilization," and promised "not to seek to provoke, conquer, or humiliate China." He lowered the cooperative tone to the level of sovereignty and equality, aiming to dispel some countries' concerns about U.S. "interference in internal affairs" or "exporting ideology."
Notably, Hegseth quoted Lee Kuan Yew's remarks about "maintaining peace through calm realism," immediately adding that "this aligns perfectly with President Trump's common-sense approach." He also described both leaders as "historic figures who both center on national interests." Singaporean and ASEAN social media and local commentary sections were not receptive to this rhetoric. The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) found in post-conference polling that over 68% of surveyed Singaporean netizens considered this comparison "misplaced or even offensive."
Singapore's Senior Minister and Coordinating Minister for National Security and Minister for Defence Chan Chun Sing acknowledged that the U.S. Defense Secretary's commitment to active U.S. engagement in Indo-Pacific affairs was welcomed by multiple defense ministers, but also expected to see how the U.S. would translate commitments into concrete actions. Additionally, he proposed that security issues across different regions of the world are far more interconnected than imagined, and traditional security concepts are struggling to address current complex situations. "In the past, when people discussed security issues, they often viewed them from a geographical perspective, such as Southeast Asian security, European security, etc. However, we increasingly feel that while this understanding is necessary, it will be difficult to fully address future realities." "It's very important for all parties to proactively engage and better understand each other, as this is the only way to minimize misunderstandings and misjudgments of each other's intentions."
Finally, Hegseth placed "revitalizing the defense industrial base" at the core of the deterrence chain in his speech, developing his argument through a progressive logic of "funding-capacity-alliance." He opened with budget figures, emphasizing that defense spending for FY2026 would "exceed one trillion dollars for the first time"; then clearly proposed two priority investment directions: expanding production of long-range precision munitions and hypersonic weapons, and restoring shipyard and maintenance capabilities, "investing in our shipyards to expand the fleet again." He further noted that the Pentagon is "rapidly pushing emerging technologies to the battlefield" to maintain America's "stronger yet more agile" combat advantages.
At the policy implementation level, Hegseth announced the launch of the "Regional Sustainment Framework," incorporating forward countries like Australia, the Philippines, and Japan into networks for munitions prepositioning, ship maintenance, and unmanned systems assembly: for example, establishing new 155mm artillery ammunition lines in Australia, expanding surface ship maintenance windows in Cebu and Shimonoseki, to "push the industrial chain forward and pull costs down." He emphasized that this "industrial interdependence" would make allies not just customers of America's industrial base, but a "second engine for denial warfare."
Cross-Validation of Policy Documents: Formation of "Indo-Pacific Priority"
Hegseth's Shangri-La speech was not an isolated policy declaration, but rather a public expression of a series of deep adjustments within the U.S. defense strategy system. By examining the Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance (INDSG), the Army Transformation Initiative (ATI), and the framework of the 2025 National Defense Strategy (NDS 2025) draft led by Deputy Secretary of Defense Elbridge Colby, one can clearly see a "closed" logical chain from top-level threat assessment to specific resource allocation, collectively supporting the strategic signals conveyed by Hegseth.
1. Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance: Top-Level Design Shift
The Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance, released in March 2025, is the first key document for understanding the Trump administration's defense policy shift. This guidance explicitly lists China as America's "sole focus" overseas while elevating homeland defense to an unprecedented height. Its specific content includes ensuring border security, maintaining Panama Canal passage, and responding to transnational organized crime in the Western Hemisphere, quite characteristic of "modern Monroe Doctrine." This document marks a shift in U.S. defense strategy from the Biden administration's "parallel multi-threat" approach (China as "pacing threat," Russia as "acute threat" and others) to a "single-point focus" on China.
Simultaneously, homeland security was elevated to a priority level parallel to Taiwan Strait denial: the document requires the Department of Defense to "directly undertake missions" in border enforcement, combating transnational organized crime, and protecting critical passages like the Panama Canal. The INDSG explicitly authorizes the Pentagon to "accept higher risks in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa" to shift resources and attention to the Indo-Pacific "priority theater." Hegseth subsequently stated bluntly at a press conference in the Philippines: "As Europe takes on more responsibility itself, we can direct our main forces to our true priority theater." Some media noted that during his visit to Hawaii, he had already publicly referred to Indo-Pacific forward-deployed forces as America's "spearhead." This "resource triaging" logic means the U.S. military is willing to accept readiness gaps in peripheral theaters as long as it can ensure the China denial chain doesn't lose momentum.
The Washington Post's comparison found that the INDSG drafting team extensively quoted verbatim from the Heritage Foundation's 2024 "Prioritization Initiative" report, even copying phrases like "accepting risk in other theaters" almost word-for-word. The guidance's co-author, former Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Alexander Velez-Green, was one of that report's authors; while Elbridge Colby, who now serve as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, is the spokesperson for "denial strategy" theory—both advocate "prioritizing limited resources for denying the PLA." In their view, only if "denial" succeeds will China find it difficult to achieve a fait accompli in a blitzkrieg, thereby maintaining the credibility of America's Indo-Pacific alliance system.
2. Army Transformation Initiative (ATI): Organizational and Operational Reshaping for High-End Conflict
If the INDSG defines "what to do," then the Army Transformation Initiative (ATI) released by the U.S. Army on May 1, 2025, specifically explains part of "how to do it," particularly how the Army adapts to high-end conflict in a great power competition environment. ATI's core objective is to create "a leaner, more lethal force," with measures directly echoing goals like "rebuilding the military" and "prioritizing forward-deployed credible combat power" mentioned in Hegseth's speech.
The document indicates that the U.S. Army will focus on developing long-range precision strike missiles (requiring capability to strike mobile land and sea targets by 2027), modernized unmanned aircraft systems, M1E3 main battle tanks, Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft (FLRAA), counter-small unmanned aircraft systems (C-sUAS), integrating artificial intelligence into command and control nodes (by 2027 at latest), and promoting advanced manufacturing technologies like additive manufacturing to combat units (by 2026 at latest). Meanwhile, the document requires cutting 1,000 staff positions from Army headquarters; merging Army Futures Command (AFC) and Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC); integrating Forces Command (FORSCOM) with Army North and South Commands into a Western Hemisphere Command; aligning Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTFs) with theater commands; and fully transforming Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) into Mobile Brigade Combat Teams (Mobile BCTs) to achieve "trading weight for speed, scale for decisive force."
In weapons procurement, the U.S. military will cancel purchases of outdated or redundant equipment like AH-64D Apache attack helicopters, HMMWVs, and Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTVs), and stop procuring drones like the MQ-1C Gray Eagle model.
The document's emphasis on long-range fires, mobility, intelligence, and distributed operations concepts is precisely to meet operational requirements in the Indo-Pacific's complex geography and against China's "Anti-Access/Area Denial" (A2/AD) capabilities. This indicates the U.S. Army is fundamentally adjusting to adapt to scenarios of large-scale, high-intensity conflict with a "peer competitor" like China, with the core being to build key capabilities for "deterrence by denial."
3. 2025 National Defense Strategy: Resource Focus and Defense Industrial Base Revival
In early May, Hegseth announced that the new National Defense Strategy (NDS) would be developed under the leadership of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby, solidifying the blueprint outlined in Hegseth's speech at the strategic and budgetary levels. Colby himself was a principal author of the 2018 National Defense Strategy report, which first explicitly defined China as a "strategic competitor." His policy views have consistently emphasized concentrating resources to deter China and vigorously "reviving the defense industrial base." His 2021 book "The Strategy of Denial" further advocates: through forward defense forces and distributed lethal fires, preventing the adversary (referring to China) from achieving fait accompli in a short timeframe, and outsourcing risks in other theaters to allies. At a Senate hearing on March 4, Colby again endorsed this framework. Thus, it can be judged that the three core pillars of "The Strategy of Denial"—single-point focus, alliance burden-sharing, and industrial resilience—are highly likely to become the backbone of NDS 2025, while the "threat-deterrence-burden sharing" logic proclaimed by Hegseth in his Shangri-La speech sets the tone for its public messaging version.
Implications for U.S.-China Relations and Regional Security
America's definition of China as an "imminent threat" and vigorous development of targeted "denial deterrence" capabilities, such as long-range strike, distributed operations, and advanced missile defense systems, are highly provocative and contain containment intent. According to a report by the International Crisis Group, as China's military capabilities grow rapidly and the U.S. strengthens its military deployments and alliance systems in the region, the trend of regional militarization is intensifying.
This arms race is reflected not only in the increase in weapons quantities but more so in the intense competition at qualitative and technological levels. Cutting-edge technology fields such as artificial intelligence, hypersonic technology, cyber warfare, space confrontation, and advanced unmanned systems have become focal points of Sino-U.S. military competition. These emerging technologies develop rapidly, are difficult to verify, and have strong potential for disruption, making strategic balance more fragile and increasing risks of miscalculation and accidental escalation. For example, the emergence of hypersonic weapons compresses warning and reaction times, blurs the boundaries between conventional and strategic weapons, and poses severe challenges to existing crisis stability mechanisms. This technology-driven arms race, with its uncertainty and unpredictability far exceeding traditional arms races, makes building strategic mutual trust even more difficult.
Concerns about the arms race simultaneously heated up at the Shangri-La venue. Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Marles warned of a "new cycle of nuclear proliferation," noting that if forward forces are blindly stacked without a control architecture, the Indo-Pacific could fall into a "spiraling" security dilemma. The Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) noted that while Hegseth aims to secure missile and unmanned systems budgets from Congress and accelerate deployment of land-based long-range strike units along the first island chain, genuine Taiwan Strait deterrence remains constrained by U.S.-Japan-Australia industrial capacity bottlenecks. Politico also observed that while the Trump administration claims to reduce global force footprints, whether rebalancing can gain domestic public support and fiscal backing remains the core variable for testing the speech's credibility.
America's strategic adjustments in the Indo-Pacific, particularly its expectations and demands of allies, have triggered complex and varied reactions among different allies. Allied nations, on the one hand, hope to obtain U.S. security commitments and support, while on the other, worry about being drawn into great power conflicts or affecting their own development by shouldering excessive defense responsibilities. Australia's Lowy Institute notes that while Washington strives to assure allies it "will never leave the Indo-Pacific," many Asian countries still doubt whether the U.S. would pay equal costs in a real crisis, especially in a Taiwan Strait scenario, where concerns about America's "first battle being the endgame" have significantly intensified. Analysis from Nanyang Technological University's S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) believes that while Hegseth downplays ideological elements, emphasizing "no lectures on climate and culture," this indeed creates space for ASEAN countries to maintain "hedging strategies," but cannot change the general trend of their careful balancing between China and the U.S.
In contrast to Hegseth's remarks, Macron reminded the audience in his opening keynote that if Europe and Asia allow themselves to be pulled into the "centrifugal force field" of U.S.-China confrontation, both regions could lose autonomy in shaping order; he advocated for Europe and Indo-Pacific countries to jointly form an "alliance of independents," carving out a "third path" in rules, supply chains, and climate, thereby "sharing" rather than "amplifying" great power competition risks. In Macron's view, the Ukraine and Taiwan Strait fronts are embedded in each other; if the West's credibility collapses on the former, deterrence on the latter will be shaken. This view precisely touches the soft spot of Hegseth's strategic contraction logic: the U.S. is prepared to "accept more risks" in Europe, while France insists that once Europe's security deficit expands, the resource assumptions for Indo-Pacific deterrence will lose touch with reality.
The intersection of the two speakers also reflects different interpretations within the West of "industrial resilience" and "fiscal limits." Hegseth grandly announced that the FY2026 defense budget would exceed one trillion dollars for the first time, with new increments targeted at hypersonic munitions, shipyard reconstruction, and production line expansion in forward positions like Australia, the Philippines, and Japan, aiming to let potential adversaries sense the sustained capability of U.S. supply chains "within seconds." Macron doesn't deny the necessity of expanding capacity but criticizes rigidly anchoring spending at 5% as "treating fiscal indicators as deterrence proxies," easily leaving small and medium countries caught between social and security budgets.
Different voices also emerged within the U.S.: Reuters quoted Senator Tammy Duckworth stating bluntly that directly transplanting Europe's 5% military spending benchmark to Asia is "condescending," ignoring differences in regional economic volume and social welfare pressures. Tokyo's Sasakawa Peace Foundation reminded that if the U.S. military continues to "throw Europe to its own devices" while demanding Indo-Pacific allies expand their militaries, logistical resilience and force sustainability must be simultaneously addressed, otherwise deterrence remains verbal. Manila scholars noted that while the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty is repeatedly cited, without maritime domain awareness and ammunition stockpiles, U.S. commitments cannot translate into "visible deterrence." Meanwhile, the Observer Research Foundation of India noticed that America's de-ideologized tone makes it easier for New Delhi to engage with U.S. high-tech and intelligence cooperation without losing strategic autonomy.
Beyond the gap between signals and actions, the trust deficit became another media focus. Defense News commentary claimed that the Chinese Defense Minister's absence from the Shangri-La Dialogue made Hegseth's "unnamed opponent" more prominent, also exposing the vacuum in high-level Sino-U.S. military communication mechanisms. A subsequent U.S. Department of Defense press release emphasized that the U.S. still "keeps the door open" for dialogue with China, but the overall tone of the speech, combined with the "forward posture escalation" blueprint, increased Beijing's vigilance against "containment and encirclement." In the view of regional media like Nikkei Asia, if the U.S. wants to avoid pushing deterrence into an arms spiral, it must work with regional partners to advance crisis communication and arms control issues, especially establishing transparent rules in new domains like hypersonics and undersea capabilities.
On the evening of May 31, in response to the unfounded accusations against China, Major General Hu Gangfeng, head of the Chinese People's Liberation Army National Defense University delegation and Vice President and Dean of Education at the National Defense University, refuted them during his remarks at the Shangri-La Dialogue. Hu Gangfeng stated that he did not accept the groundless accusations against China, noting that the relevant content was fabricated, incited confrontation, attempted to create chaos in the Asia-Pacific, was unpopular, and could not succeed. He stated that maritime security in the Asia-Pacific currently faces severe challenges, with certain countries wantonly pushing to build exclusive, confrontational small circles, substantially increasing military presence, frequently violating other countries' territorial sovereignty and maritime rights under the pretext of so-called freedom of navigation; certain countries deliberately support Taiwan independence separatist forces, seriously undermining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Asia-Pacific maritime security cooperation faces the severe challenge of either advancing or retreating. Hu Gangfeng proposed three initiatives: first, adhering to genuine multilateralism to maintain Asia-Pacific maritime security order, opposing treating Asia-Pacific waters as an arena for hegemonic competition, and firmly opposing illegal acts that create division, obstruct reunification, and damage core interests of sovereign states. Second, adhering to sincere dialogue and consultation, with directly concerned parties peacefully resolving territorial and maritime rights disputes through friendly consultation. Third, adhering to equal exchange and mutual learning, adhering to the Asian security model of shared risks and rewards, seeking common ground while reserving differences, and dialogue and consultation.
On June 1, when asked about U.S. Defense Secretary Hegseth's negative China-related remarks at the Shangri-La Dialogue, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated that Hegseth ignored regional countries' calls for peace and development, peddled Cold War mentality of camp confrontation, smeared and attacked China, and heavily promoted the "China threat theory," full of provocation and instigation. China is strongly dissatisfied and firmly opposed to this, and has lodged solemn representations with the U.S. side. In fact, the United States is the world's genuine hegemonic country and the biggest factor undermining peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. To maintain its hegemony, the U.S. advances its so-called "Indo-Pacific Strategy," deploys offensive weapons in the South China Sea region, fans flames and creates tensions in the Asia-Pacific, turning the Asia-Pacific region into a "powder keg," causing deep concern among regional countries. The Taiwan issue is purely China's internal affair, and no foreign country has the right to interfere. The U.S. should not delude itself into using the Taiwan issue as a bargaining chip to contain China, and should not play with fire. China urges the U.S. to earnestly abide by the one-China principle and the three Sino-U.S. joint communiqués, and stop emboldening "Taiwan independence" forces. Freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea has never been a problem. On the South China Sea issue, China has always insisted on properly handling differences through dialogue and consultation with relevant countries, and maintaining territorial sovereignty and maritime rights in accordance with law and regulations. The United States is the biggest factor undermining peace and stability in the South China Sea. China urges the U.S. to earnestly respect regional countries' efforts to maintain peace and stability, stop deliberately undermining the regional peace and stability environment, stop hyping conflict and confrontation, and stop aggravating regional tensions.
If the Sino-U.S. trust deficit continues to expand, any additional forward deployments could accelerate collisions on a track without guardrails, making crisis management and arms control dialogue increasingly unavoidable, supporting issues in the regional security ecosystem.
I don't understand the desire of any ASEAN nation to jump on America's defense strategy. Isn't the goal of defense to reduce the risk of war? America has done nothing but increase the risk of war in the last hundred years and initiated more wars than any nation in history. Seems the ASEAN countries have done okay without our meddling.