TRUMP'S BACK：The U.S., China, and the World in the Post-2024 U.S. Election
Douglas Paal, Jia Qingguo, Da Wei, and Neil Thomas joined the CGHK panel analyzing post-election world
On Nov.14, HK-based think tank Center for Globalization Hong Kong (CGHK) held a panel discussion with top China-US relations experts. Chaired by the Chairman and Founder of the CGHK, Peter Qiu. Panelists are
Douglas Paal, Distinguished Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Former Director of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT)；
Jia Qingguo, Professor and Former Dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University, Director of the Institute for Global Cooperation and Understanding at Peking University;
Da Wei, Professor and Director of the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University；
Neil Thomas, Fellow, Center for China Analysis, Asia Society Policy Institute（ASPI）
I listened to this panel, and I could say it’s one of the most comprehensive ones talking about China-US relations in the Trump era. They have reached the Taiwan issue, trade, tech, and the appointment of Marco Rubio, which is incredibly educational. Also, with lots of fun predictions. Thanks to the generous authorization of CGHK and my friend Sheldon Xie, I’d be able to share a detailed summary of this discussion I made and some of my personal takes. Feel free to share it and press the like button if you find it helpful.
How is This Relationship Going to be?
Douglas Paal:
First, there's a historical continuity in America's attempted pivot toward China. This shift began about 15 years ago with Barack Obama's "pivot to Asia," which was ultimately derailed by Middle Eastern conflicts. Similarly, Biden's strategy with China was hampered by the Ukraine conflict and Gaza situation. Despite multiple administrations' intentions to focus on China, global events have consistently prevented a full commitment to this strategic shift. Trump's current approach can be seen as an attempt to fulfill these previously unrealized ambitions.
Second, historically, presidents with strong mandates typically have a two-year window to implement their major initiatives and make key appointments. Trump now enters office with support from both houses of Congress and the Supreme Court, giving him substantial authority to implement his agenda. This initial period represents Trump's opportunity to implement a radical version of his campaign promises, particularly in foreign policy and China relations.
Neil Thomas:
Trump's goals over the decades have been to oppose the American trade deficit and to bring manufacturing back to the United States. During his first presidency, he embraced tariffs as a key tool to achieve these goals and gain leverage in international negotiations. There could be a substantial and rapid increase in US tariffs, especially targeting China. While Trump has promised 60% tariffs on Chinese imports, this figure may be reduced due to lobbying and implementation challenges, though tariffs remain an attractive option as they can be implemented through executive orders without congressional approval.
A key uncertainty lies in whether these tariffs are part of a broader strategic approach to China or simply a negotiating tactic for deal-making. (That’s an important question)
Regarding the cabinet composition, there appears to be an impending power struggle between national security hawks and Wall Street-oriented advisers. This dynamic could mirror the tensions seen in Trump's first administration between figures like Lighthizer (US Trade Representative) and Mnuchin (Treasury Secretary) over the extent of economic measures against China and the balance between protectionist policies and business interests' demands for open trade and investment.
Da Wei:
Trump's victory, which included strong performance in swing states and support in both houses, represents a clear mandate from the American people. This shift can be traced back to the 2008 financial crisis, marking the beginning of challenges to the hyper-globalization period that had benefited both China and the US since the 1990s. Both nations are now readjusting their development models, with the deterioration of China-US relations being a natural, albeit unfortunate, part of this process.
Dr.Da Wei believes Trump's 2025 presidency might differ from his 2017 term. While Trump has been characterized as a deal-maker and transactional president, there's uncertainty about his ultimate goals for any potential deals with China. His experience during the first term has significantly altered his view of China, as he believes China contributed to his previous campaign loss. His team, composed of what are termed "super hawks" on China policy, suggests a strong element of retaliation and revenge in their approach.
From the Chinese perspective, there's a need for careful management of the relationship to avoid falling into a pattern of tit-for-tat responses and a vicious cycle of retaliation despite the challenges in doing so.
Jia Qingguo:
American voters were primarily responding to policy concerns, particularly regarding economic issues and what some view as extreme Democratic positions on social issues and identity politics. This suggests that Trump's primary focus will likely remain on domestic issues, including government restructuring and immigration reform.
Regarding China policy, there's now a bipartisan consensus on taking a tough stance toward China, though with different approaches between Democrats and Republicans. While Democrats focus on managing competition to avoid accidental military confrontation, Republicans, particularly under Trump, appear more focused on "winning" the competition outright. This suggests an even tougher approach to China policy, including increased tariffs, high-tech decoupling, and potentially more aggressive positions on issues like Taiwan.
However, there are important limitations to how far this hardline approach can go. First, both nations being nuclear powers creates an implicit barrier against military conflict. Second, American business interests in China, developed over centuries, represent a significant moderating force. The business community is unlikely to support policies that would completely sacrifice their access to the Chinese market.
What will the bottom line and Ceilings of China-US relations be?
Da Wei:
While there's confidence that Trump and his team don't intend to change the One China policy or engage in direct military conflict with China over Taiwan, several concerning developments are anticipated.
The Trump administration is expected to continue strengthening US military presence in the region and enhance Taiwan's military capabilities, actions that will likely provoke China's displeasure and potentially trigger an arms race. A particularly concerning scenario revolves around Taiwan's upcoming election in three to four years. Drawing parallels to events from 20 years ago, there's concern that a relatively weak leader in Taiwan might deliberately create crisis situations to provoke Beijing and mobilize domestic support.
While such situations were effectively managed two decades ago through China-US cooperation, the current political climate presents new challenges. The Trump team would likely blame Beijing for any developments and take a more supportive stance toward Taiwan authorities. Although none of the parties - Trump, Beijing, or Taiwan - actively seeks war, these interactions could escalate into a serious crisis that becomes difficult to control.
The situation becomes particularly precarious when considering internal political dynamics in Washington, where Trump's team would face crucial decisions during any potential crisis. This combination of factors creates a dangerous scenario that requires careful management to prevent unintended escalation,
Neil Thomas(continue with the Taiwan issue):
On the Taiwan situation and its implications for US-China relations. First, any wavering US support for Taiwan under Trump (who may be less personally invested in Taiwan than his national security appointees) could pressure the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Taiwan to reevaluate its policies. Recent opinion polls in Taiwan show declining support for independence and increasing preference for maintaining the status quo since Pelosi's visit. This shift in public sentiment might make the DPP less inclined to risk creating crises and potentially more open to dialogue with the mainland.
The second key point concerns the security dilemma in the Taiwan Strait. Mainland's military modernization and increased patrols around Taiwan are viewed differently by different parties - Beijing frames these actions as deterrence against US attempts to change the status quo, while Washington perceives them as aggressive acts threatening Taiwan's security. This disconnect in perception highlights the crucial importance of maintaining military-to-military dialogue between the US and China, along with broader government, academic, and civil society exchanges.
Jia Qingguo:
The Trump administration faces competing perspectives on Taiwan policy, creating a complex diplomatic challenge. One faction, focused on national security, advocates for a tougher stance toward China and stronger support for Taiwan. The other, oriented toward economic interests, emphasizes the importance of maintaining access to Chinese markets while avoiding military conflict.
The national security perspective pushes for increased military support to Taiwan, including weapons sales and integration of Taiwan's military into the regional American defense architecture. Meanwhile, the economic faction seeks to reassure Beijing that the One China policy remains unchanged. However, regardless of these competing views, there's a likelihood that the One China policy will continue to be eroded through enhanced Washington-Taipei relations.
This is expected to manifest in several ways:
Higher-level official meetings between Washington and Taipei representatives
Increased sales of both defensive and offensive weapons to Taiwan
Greater presence of US military personnel in Taiwan
These developments could lead to serious consequences, potentially including a downgrading of official relations between Beijing and Washington. There’s a possibility of suspended diplomatic relations if US actions regarding Taiwan exceed what China considers acceptable limits.
Host Peter Qiu:
Is it possible for China and the US to reach a sort of transaction agreement on Taiwan? For example, China is willing to pay 200% tariffs; sounds naive, though. (most interesting question)
Da Wei:
It’s totally unworkable. Taiwan is not a tradeable commodity. While theoretically, an extreme scenario might exist where a "crazy American leader" might propose trading support for Taiwan in exchange for concessions, the practical implications of such a deal would be insurmountable. How would governance of the island work? How would the mainland manage relations with the 23 million people living in Taiwan? While there might be room for arrangements to reduce tensions between China and the US over Taiwan, the core issue of Taiwan itself is not something that can be resolved through simple transactional diplomacy.
Douglas Paal:
First, there's the potential scenario of a weak leader in Taiwan seeking support from independence-leaning factions within the DPP, particularly if facing a legislative majority opposition in two to three years. This situation could create political complications.
Second, there's a growing tension between Washington's expectations and Taiwan's domestic reality. The US, similar to its approach with NATO allies regarding Russia, is pressuring Taiwan to increase its military preparedness in response to China's military modernization. However, the KMT-led majority in the Legislative Yuan is unlikely to support it, and the general public in Taiwan shows little appetite for military expansion.
Third, there's an interesting paradox in Taiwan's public response to Trump's election. Many in Taiwan appear to view Trump's presidency as a security guarantee, leading them to feel less urgency about increasing their own military spending to 3-4-5% of GDP or strengthening draft and training programs.
Neil Thomas:
Trump has expressed personal respect for the Chinese leader on the campaign trail, frequently mentioning their relationship and expressing interest in future meetings and deals. While this personal relationship represents a significant diplomatic channel.
There's a notable contrast and similarity between Trump's and Biden's approaches. While both of them believe in the value of direct leader-to-leader diplomacy, Trump may be more inclined to visit China personally. Trump might also consider inviting Xi Jinping to the US.
This leadership diplomacy could serve as a "guardrail" in US-China relations, even as other aspects of the relationship face challenges. If both sides show a cooperative spirit, this channel could provide opportunities to negotiate areas of conflict and potentially de-escalate economic tensions.
Host Peter Qiu: What’s Trump’s consideration of appointing people like Marco Rubio, who is on the sanction list of Beijing, as his state secretary?
Douglas Paal:
Notably, China and Taiwan issues were likely not primary considerations in Trump's consideration of Rubio for this position. Interestingly, the existing Chinese sanctions against Rubio might actually work in his favor during Senate confirmation hearings. This situation suggests that China might want to reconsider these sanctions, similar to how the US reconsidered its sanctions on the Chinese defense minister to maintain diplomatic channels.
A significant positive outcome from the recent Biden-Xi summit has been the continuation of military-to-military dialogue, albeit at a low profile but substantive level. These communications have remained active even in recent weeks, demonstrating the commitment of both sides to maintain essential channels of communication despite broader political tensions.
Neil Thomas:
Appointing Rubio is more like rewarding politicians and members of the traditional Republican establishment who supported his 2024 reelection campaign. The Chinese sanctions against Rubio were likely not a significant factor in Trump's decision-making process, and Trump might not have even remembered this detail when making the appointment.
Regarding US-China relations, while Rubio's sanctioned status presents an impediment to bilateral diplomacy, Beijing may need to find creative solutions to maintain diplomatic channels. One approach could be arranging meetings in third countries, following the model established by Jake Sullivan and Wang Yi, who have successfully held meetings in various locations, including Vienna and Southeast Asia. Additional opportunities for diplomatic engagement could arise on the sidelines of international gatherings such as APEC, G20, and other multilateral summits.
Peter Qiu: To What extent will Trump manage this trade war?
Jia Qingguo:
Trump appears to have two primary objectives regarding trade tariffs. First, he believes tariffs help protect American industry, treating the US almost like a developing country that needs protection to become competitive. Second, he sees tariffs as a means to reduce the American government deficit through revenue generation.
However, these approaches face significant challenges. Trade tariffs have not proven effective at increasing American manufacturing efficiency or productivity. More critically, they risk triggering or exacerbating inflation. The proposed 60% average tariffs on Chinese goods could potentially create another round of inflation in the US, particularly problematic given that the Biden administration has only recently managed to reduce inflation rates through harsh measures.
The implementation of such high tariffs remains uncertain, as advisers might try to persuade Trump against extreme measures. However, the Trump administration is likely to be composed of loyalists, making Trump's personal direction more significant than individual cabinet members' preferences. This centralization of decision-making means China's policy will largely depend on Trump's personal inclinations.
Trump's transactional and unpredictable nature in policy matters suggests that personal leadership dynamics, particularly between him and Xi Jinping, could play a crucial role. If the two leaders can establish a working relationship and reach agreements, the rest of the administration would likely fall in line. This potential for personal diplomacy offers a "glimpse of hope" for the US-China relationship. In terms of removing Rubio from the sanction list, Jia believes anything is possible.
Peter Qiu: About the China-US tech issue, is the “small yard high fence““policy still workable?
Da Wei:
I don’t think there’s a fundamental change in the technological war between the US and China under a second Trump administration. There appears to be consistency in this approach across different administrations - from Trump's first term through Biden and likely into Trump's potential second term. In fact, the situation might worsen, particularly with the possible revival of initiatives similar to the "China Initiative," which could create additional complications in technological relationships.
However, there’s a distinction between broad strategic issues and specific industry concerns. While Trump may not be willing to make transactional deals on major strategic issues like Taiwan, there might be more flexibility when it comes to specific companies, technologies, or industries. The Trump administration could be more amenable than the Biden administration in reconsidering certain restrictions if they believe it could serve American industrial or corporate interests.
Douglas Paal：
There’s expected continuity in technology control policies across administrations, with the Biden administration set to issue new rules on technology controls in December. Trump administration is not expected to reverse this general direction.
However, the case of TikTok illustrates how specific cases might be handled differently under Trump. Trump has suggested that the approach to TikTok may have been too aggressive. This could lead to more nuanced solutions, such as compromise proposals for ownership structure or new monitoring mechanisms.
Neil Thomas:
The expectation is for a definite intensification of export controls and tech warfare in the initial phase of a Trump presidency. The concept of "small yard, high fence" might be replaced with a "big yard, high fence" approach, potentially expanding export controls to new sectors such as biotech and various AI-related industries. A new watch point might be the BIS appointee.
Jia Qingguo:
While Republican senators and congressmen typically advocate for the toughest policies on high-tech restrictions, and Trump's cabinet members are likely to push for stricter measures, there are counterbalancing factors to consider.
One significant factor is the influence of tech industry figures like Elon Musk, who has a close relationship with Trump. The impact of such relationships on Trump's decision-making remains uncertain but could potentially moderate some policies.
Also, American high-tech development is significantly tied to the Chinese market. US companies losing access to the Chinese market would face significant revenue losses, potentially undermining their long-term competitiveness due to a reduced market size.
About the relationship between Trump, his cabinet, and Musk:
Douglas Paal:
There’s a fundamental tension in Trump's political and economic challenges. Trump's base largely consists of people who have been "losers in globalization." This creates a crucial imperative: Trump needs to deliver economic growth to support these constituents. To "float all boats on a higher tide of economic growth," Trump needs to work with business leaders like Musk, deregulation, or tax code reforms. That brings significant internal conflict within the administration between two competing approaches, with one faction pushing for greater control and interference and the other advocating for less control and deregulation. Which faction wins will have a large influence over Republicans in the next 2 years.
Neil Thomas:
Trump does care about economic data, which is a key factor that could influence his policy decisions. Trump might initially implement his planned aggressive policies, including extensive tariffs, but the economic consequences of these actions could take several months or even a couple of years to manifest fully. If these policies begin showing negative effects on economic indicators that Trump values, it could trigger a reconsideration of his approach.
About Trump’s approaches to US allies:
Da Wei:
Trump is bad for US-China relations, but the basic geopolitical structure remains constant. So, US allies’ need for US presence persists, even with reduced confidence in a Trump administration.
If the Ukraine war resolves within a year (potentially unfavorably for Ukraine):
US-Europe relations might deteriorate by 10-20%
China-Europe relations could improve by 10-20%
US-Russia relations might improve by 10-20%
China-Russia relations could worsen by 10-20%
Douglas Paal:
Regarding Russia and Ukraine, there's significant skepticism about Trump's ability to reach an agreement with Putin. While Trump will likely pressure European allies to increase defense spending, both major European powers face internal challenges. German and French governments are entering periods of political weakness. European leaders may struggle to balance between resisting Trump's pressures and preventing serious damage to the alliance, they may face difficulties meeting Trump's expectations for increased defense contributions.
In Asia, Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asian nations may show more responsiveness while grappling with their strategic positioning between China and the US. Trump’s pressure may force them to make more definitive choices.
Neil Thomas:
Just as Trump is said to have learned from his first term, allied and partner nations have been actively preparing for the possibility of his return, particularly over the past couple of years since he re-entered the political arena. For now, some proactive steps are already visible. Indo-Pacific nations are showing a greater willingness to increase defense spending. Eastern European countries have already been boosting defense investments. Allies are developing strategies to maintain relationships while adapting to Trump's demands. The US allies still need its presence.
Jia Qingguo:
There’s a foreseeable tension between the US and its allies. Such as continued US dissatisfaction with allies' military spending levels, increased pressure on allies to boost defense spending, and uncertainty created by some Trump camp members calling for US withdrawal from NATO, withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, etc.
This creates an interesting situation for China, reflecting on how China failed to capitalize on similar circumstances during Trump's first term to improve relationships with US allies. There's a suggestion that both the Trump administration and the Chinese government might approach this situation more strategically this time, having learned from previous experience.
Peter Qiu: Is the US’s withdrawal from global governance institutions imagable?
Neil Thomas:
"you don't have to kill something for it to die." It may just reduce the contribution to NATO. People in Trump's circle are generally hostile to global governance. The "America First" slogan reflects a fundamental skepticism toward multilateral institutions. Trump views these institutions as potential obstacles to his preferred diplomatic approach rather than assets. Trump may just reduce participation in international bodies, decrease support, or limit engagement on issues like climate change.
What could be the best and worst scenario for the relations:
Douglas Paal:
The worst-case scenario involves a downgrade in US-China relations triggered by Taiwan-related issues, which could emerge from Taiwan's politics or military incidents like collisions between US and Chinese aircraft or ships near the Taiwan Strait. The best realistic outcome might simply be avoiding the full extent of the expected deterioration in relations.
Neil Thomas:
The primary concern centers on the risk of accidental military confrontations, particularly in sensitive areas like the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea. During a period of potentially weakened diplomatic ties under a new Trump administration, such incidents could spiral dangerously due to reduced crisis management capabilities and less embedded bilateral relationships.
However, there remains room for positive engagement, particularly through leader-to-leader diplomacy, with lower-level systems likely to follow suit if leadership sets a constructive tone. One specific recommendation is for the US to demonstrate confidence by reopening programs like Fulbright and Peace Corps with China. A confident nation should be open to sending its people out and showing its worldview. These are low-hanging fruit the Trump administration should take.
Da Wei:
The situation could be, Dr.Da called "US-Russia plus" - a deterioration of relations similar to US-Russia dynamics. Mutual perception as enemies or adversaries, with downgraded diplomatic relationships, decreased trade and economic ties, and reduced people-to-people exchanges, including fewer Chinese students in the US.
The worst adds to military conflict; this is considered possible due to US commitments to allies like the Philippines and its ambiguous commitment to Taiwan, unlike the situation with Ukraine (which lacks NATO membership). This could lead to not just a new Cold War but potentially a "hot war."
The best-case scenario, though modest, envisions that after two to three years of difficult relations, both sides might learn from experience and work to stabilize bilateral relations.
Jia Qingguo:
Both best and worst scenarios are significantly influenced by Trump's leadership style, which is characterized by a leader with substantial power who can mobilize support and override opposition.
The worst-case scenario involves comprehensive decoupling between the US and China across multiple dimensions, including economic ties, political relations, and even accidental wars during this process.
The best-case scenario has two possible variations:
The optimal but unlikely scenario is for Trump to recognize the shared interests and stakes between the US and China and acknowledge both countries as stakeholders in the international order. Leverages each other's resources for mutual benefit.
A more realistic "best" scenario is after experiencing conflicts, both sides recognize the dangers and work to stabilize the relationship. Build new "guardrails" different from the Biden administration's approach
Due to the length limit, I just skip the Q&A part
For the full panel, please check: