The Raid That Produced China's Biggest Food Safety Fine — and the Compliance Meltdown That Made It Worse

Pinduoduo's Government Relations Team Tried to Stonewall Regulators. One of Them Literally Ate the Paper Trail. Then Came the $200 Million Fine.

I’d like to introduce readers to a recent piece published by China Quality Daily (中国质量报), an industry newspaper under the former General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine. As “anti-involution” (反内卷) has become one of Beijing’s defining policy keywords, this RMB 3.597 billion penalty, which is the largest fine issued by regulatory authorities since the implementation of the Food Safety Law, covers all seven major e-commerce platforms in the country. It can be read as the regulator’s latest move to push back against platform-economy “involution” through quality control and qualification review. The article itself pointed out the policy background in blunt terms: “The lowest-bidder-wins auction mechanism has fully exposed the vicious-competition nature of these platforms.”

But what I find most interesting about the piece is something else entirely: it offers details of how the Government Relations (GR) team of a major platform, according to Xinhua, Pinduoduo (PDD), the parent company of Temu, use force to resist a regulatory inspection.

Below are the key passages:

Around 11 p.m. on December 4 last year, while the task force was conducting its investigation, the platform’s head of security suddenly lost his composure. In full view of the police and the investigators, he led a group of people in directly charging the investigation site, shoving and grappling with the enforcement officers — an outright act of violent obstruction of law enforcement. Guo Hui, who had fractured his hand the day before and was still on duty, immediately moved to intervene. A former military officer, he instinctively placed himself at the front of the confrontation — only to be shoved to the ground, his head striking the floor hard. He was rushed to the hospital by ambulance.

One might have expected that after such an egregious incident the platform would promptly hand over the requested data. Instead, after a private conversation between the company’s Chief Technology Officer and the company’s head, the CTO suddenly collapsed and was also taken away by ambulance, forcing the day’s investigation to end. Task force members followed him to the hospital, where doctors confirmed that the CTO’s heart and overall health were perfectly fine.

When local police and regulators later summoned the platform for formal questioning over the violent-obstruction incident, the GR team’s response reached the level of performance art:

In the middle of the interview, one of the platform’s staff members wrote the words “Silence” and “Don’t talk” on a sheet of A4 paper, holding it up to coach the colleague being questioned. He was caught red-handed by the task force — and then came a moment so shocking and so cinematic it felt scripted: the staff member crumpled the A4 paper into a ball and, in front of everyone in the room, ate it.

The absurdity of this script goes beyond anything any compliance law firm or PR agency could ever advise. As a former GR at a Chinese internet platform, I have to admit that my peers’ performance here is eye-opening.

It also lays a structural contradiction that the Chinese internet industry has long ignored, that the staggering sophistication of these companies’ business models coexists with a shockingly primitive understanding of risk management and regulatory compliance. For some practitioners inside these firms, “cooperating with regulators” has become “putting on a show for the boss to prove that you’re defending the company’s interests.” Ironically, it is precisely this kind of theater that tends to push regulators toward harsher penalties. PDD tops the list with a penalty of RMB 1.522 billion. Its legal representative, Zhao Jiazhen, was also personally fined RMB 6.9373 million.

In terms of outcome, this RMB 3.597 billion “epic fine” marks the beginning of a new era in China’s oversight of e-commerce platforms. The regulator’s “one shop, one penalty” approach directly magnifies the consequences of hosting large numbers of problem merchants, increasing the deterrent effect on platforms.

The full article in English follows below:

Sword Strikes “Ghosts,” Iron Fist Protects People’s Livelihoods

A Documentary Record of SAMR’s Investigation into the “Ghost Takeout” Cases Involving 7 E-Commerce Platforms

By Xu Jianhua

A maximum fine of RMB 1.5 billion on a single platform; combined fines and confiscations of RMB 3.597 billion across seven platforms; nearly RMB 20 million in combined fines on legal representatives and food safety directors of these enterprises; suspension of new cake shop registrations for periods ranging from 3 to 9 months… On April 17, the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) announced the administrative penalties imposed in accordance with the law on seven e-commerce platforms — Pinduoduo, Meituan, JD.com, Ele.me (Taobao Shangou), Douyin, Taobao, and Tmall — in the “Ghost Takeout” series of cases.

The total penalty of RMB 3.597 billion is the largest ever issued by regulators since the Food Safety Law came into force. Spanning nearly 10 months, covering all 31 provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities nationwide, and involving every major e-commerce platform currently operating, what kind of battle of wits and will — a painstaking process of breakthrough and transformation — lies behind this “largest penalty in history”? It all began with a cake order and a forged certificate.

“Ghosts” Appear: Case Elevated for Handling

“This case gravely concerns the safety of what the people put on their tongues — it must be investigated and handled strictly and swiftly.” On September 8, 2025, after SAMR conducted a surprise inspection of an order-transfer platform, SAMR leadership issued these resounding instructions on the handling of the “Ghost Takeout” case. The directive not only reflected SAMR’s confidence in getting to the bottom of the matter, but also demonstrated the firm resolve of market regulators to hold the line on food safety and safeguard the authority of law enforcement.

Let us turn the clock back two months before this directive.

On July 12, 2025, the Beitaipingzhuang Market Regulation Office of the Haidian District Market Regulation Bureau in Beijing received a complaint from a consumer surnamed Liu, who reported that a birthday cake he had purchased from a shop called “Tianyan Qingshu” (Sweet-Face Love Letter) on a certain platform was suspected to pose food safety problems.

Upon receiving the complaint, Haidian District market regulators sprang into action. During the investigation, they unexpectedly discovered that none of the 20-plus “Tianyan Qingshu” shops in the Beijing area had brick-and-mortar premises. Even more shocking to the enforcement officers: all 378 food business licenses held under the “Tianyan Qingshu” chain name turned out to be forgeries.

Following the trail, enforcement officers uncovered a black-market “Ghost Takeout” industry chain with a clear division of labor among e-commerce platforms, order-transfer platforms, and cake shops. On August 6, the Beijing Municipal Market Regulation Bureau reported the “Ghost Takeout” case up to SAMR.

How could a small cake takeout operation forge 378 food business licenses in bulk? The lead immediately drew high-level attention at SAMR. The Bureau of Law Enforcement and Inspection at SAMR concluded after review that this lowest-bidder-wins auction mechanism fully exposed the platforms’ vicious-competition nature — platforms and “ghost shops” reaped the profits, while genuine food operators were trapped in “involutionary” cutthroat competition. Brick-and-mortar shops had no margin to speak of, and food quality and safety could not possibly be guaranteed. Given the broad scope of the case and its pernicious impact, the investigation was to be elevated.

SAMR immediately decided: extend the investigation, get to the bottom of it, follow the “Ghost Takeout” chain to conduct on-site verification, electronic evidence collection, and evidence gathering.

Tracking the “Chain”: Resolutely Drawing the Sword

On August 11, 2025, under SAMR’s deployment, enforcement officers Lou Chao and Wang Fang of the Zhejiang Provincial Market Regulation System led a Zhejiang team to the mountain city of Chongqing to conduct an on-site inspection of Chongqing Zhuandanbao Network Technology Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Chongqing Zhuandanbao”).

While obtaining key data from Chongqing Zhuandanbao, Lou Chao and his team also uncovered a crucial lead in Chongqing: besides Chongqing Zhuandanbao, Anhui Xunmeng was another — and larger — order-transfer platform. The two order-transfer platforms were interlinked, forming a complete illegal industry chain that provided technical support and a trading venue for “ghost shops” to come online in bulk and for orders to be illicitly transferred.

After grasping the operating model, SAMR immediately directed enforcement officers from Zhejiang and from market regulators in Wuhu, Anhui, to jointly conduct a surprise inspection of Anhui Xunmeng, obtaining a substantial body of evidence.

After the data from both order-transfer platforms were in hand, Wang Fang — SAMR data-analysis expert and director of the Electronic Data Forensics and Analysis Section of the Administrative Enforcement Team of the Longwan District Market Regulation Bureau in Wenzhou, Zhejiang — led a technical team into a rapid offensive, analyzing the data. Wang Fang is an electronic-data expert with rich case-handling experience and formidable technical skill.

Once the Chongqing Zhuandanbao database was actually extracted, tens of millions of records were laid out before Wang Fang — many tables, complex fields, plenty of noise. How to filter out the case-relevant content from this ocean of data was the first obstacle. Rather than spreading out the work all at once, they first seized on the characteristics of order-transfer behavior itself, starting with order flow, account aggregation, and dispatcher-receiver relationships, gradually untangling the logic of order transfers. Their analysis revealed that within Chongqing Zhuandanbao, a single dispatcher account often corresponded to hundreds or even thousands of order-transfer shops on the platform, with platform orders being consolidated and run under a small number of accounts. Zeroing in on this feature, they dug deeper into key orders, cross-correlating IP addresses, login logs, and recipient phone numbers. One by one, they locked in the specifics of more than ten “ghost shops.” Later, when the Longwan District Market Regulation Bureau investigated one of those “ghost” merchants, they further uncovered the collusion among intermediaries, fake-certificate gangs, and internal platform auditors — confirming the earlier data-analysis findings.

Hard work pays off. When the data from the Chongqing Zhuandanbao and Anhui Xunmeng platforms were combined, the total reached hundreds of millions of records. Building on the success with Chongqing Zhuandanbao, Wang Fang and his team quickly achieved a breakthrough, successfully cracking the database and obtaining key evidence.

About half a month later, when SAMR’s Bureau of Law Enforcement and Inspection saw the data analysis results, the numbers far exceeded expectations: the two platforms had illicitly transferred as many as 3.6 million cake orders, involving seven platforms — JD.com, Meituan, Douyin, Pinduoduo, Ele.me (Taobao Shangou), Taobao, and Tmall.

Faced with such a major case, SAMR leadership issued their directive. Subsequently, under the leadership of SAMR and with the nationwide market-regulation system jointly participating, a formal investigation — “drawing the sword” — was launched against the seven leading e-commerce platforms involved.

A blockbuster case, set in motion by a single cake, had truly begun.

National Coordination, Iron-Fist Action

“When I received the SAMR task force’s ‘muster order,’ I felt really excited. In everyday enforcement work I had seen complaints and reports about ‘ghost takeouts,’ but those were all about individual shops. My family and I, too, had harbored similar suspicions when ordering takeout in our daily life.” Recalling his arrival in Beijing in October 2025 to join the task force, Zhang Jie, brigade leader of the Comprehensive Enforcement Bureau of the Nanjing Municipal Market Regulation Bureau in Jiangsu Province, remains deeply impressed to this day.

Like Zhang Jie, over a hundred elite enforcement officers from market regulators in other parts of the country received the “muster order” to come to Beijing — among them Hu Chao, Level-1 Chief Staff Member of the Nanjing Market Regulation Bureau in Jiangsu, who, like Wang Fang, had won the national Electronic Data Forensics Competition; Yu Yan, Deputy Director of the Law Enforcement and Inspection Division of the Zhejiang Provincial Market Regulation Bureau; Li Xin, Director of the Market Regulation Comprehensive Administrative Enforcement Supervision Bureau in Yangzhou, Jiangsu; Zhou Qunbiao, Deputy Director of the Comprehensive Enforcement Bureau of the Xingtai Market Regulation Bureau in Hebei; Zhang Jun, Level-3 Research Fellow at the Law Enforcement and Inspection Bureau of the Hebei Market Regulation Bureau; Zhang Li, Deputy Chief of the Jiangwan Market Regulation Office of the Hongkou District Market Regulation Bureau in Shanghai; Yuan Xiaolong, Captain of Enforcement Team No. 5 of the Haidian District Comprehensive Enforcement Brigade in Beijing; and others.

The 2025 National Day holiday was spent entirely on overtime for this team. They worked intensively to sort through case details and prepare materials. Two or three days before the National Day break, Li Xin had already led the Jiangsu case-handling team on investigations in Yangzhou, Nanjing, and elsewhere.

On October 10, more than a hundred enforcement specialists from the nationwide market-regulation system gathered at No. 9 Madian East Road, Beijing, for a full day of specialized training. SAMR also drew up enforcement manuals, case-handling key points, and investigation checklists, so that this enforcement team drawn from all corners of the country could achieve “uniform actions and uniform objectives” in the shortest possible time — laying a solid foundation for efficiently completing the special mission.

Confronted with what might be the largest case in the history of online catering in China, SAMR attached the highest importance to it. SAMR leadership personally took command and personally drove the effort forward. The entire national market-regulation system operated as a single chessboard, with top-down coordination and joint action:

Based on preliminary investigation, SAMR organized this elite enforcement team into seven task forces, with one technical task force providing technical support. Yu Yan, Zhang Li, Yuan Xiaolong, Li Xin, Zhang Jie, Zhou Qunbiao, Zhang Jun, and Wang Fang each served as team leader, with clear division of labor and close cooperation.

SAMR leadership personally directed the operation and established a unified coordination and command mechanism, dispatching resources in real time as the cases progressed. SAMR’s Bureau of Law Enforcement and Inspection was specifically responsible for handling the cases, while the bureau’s Inspection Division No. 4 coordinated the enforcement process. A dedicated task team was set up to serve the case-handling effort.

In line with the “Ghost Takeout” case’s different “chain” divisions, different handling mechanisms were established: SAMR directly handled the e-commerce platforms; the order-transfer platforms were placed under designated supervision; and “ghost takeouts” were jointly investigated nationwide.

This was an enforcement “elite squad” of the market-regulation system — answering the call at a moment’s notice, ready to fight upon arrival. Every member was a seasoned professional who had handled numerous major cases.

This was an enforcement “army group” of the market-regulation system — skilled in coordination, each with their own strengths — who, under SAMR’s unified deployment, had repeatedly worked together to crack national-level major cases.

Thus, an “iron fist” aimed at “Ghost Takeouts” was tightly clenched.

As the saying goes, true heroes reveal themselves when the torrent sweeps across the sea. October 11, 2025 — a day worth remembering. On that day, the seven task forces set out from Madian in Beijing for the frontlines at the seven e-commerce platforms, to conduct on-site investigation and evidence collection. A full-scale battle — commanded by SAMR and drawing on the combined strength of the entire system — was launched: a breakthrough campaign against e-commerce platform “Ghost Takeouts,” a food-safety defense battle, and a sustained regulatory-for-the-people campaign.

Battles of Wit and Will: Pressing on Despite Difficulties

The hands of the clock had quietly moved past 10 p.m. This “standoff,” which had already gone on for nearly three hours, still showed no signs of producing any common ground.

On one side of the standoff were task-force leader Zhou Qunbiao, team members Wen Lingyan and Lou Sihan — who was running a high fever — and an expert. On the other side were liaison representatives dispatched by a certain platform enterprise. The main disagreement: defining the scope and authority of the investigation, and a key search term for evidence collection.

At 10 a.m. that day, the task force had entered the platform as scheduled to begin the on-site inspection. However, the platform adopted “tai chi tactics” — letting the officers stew, stalling, then refusing — and even threatened to file complaints against the enforcement officers.

Faced with the company’s non-cooperation, Wen Lingyan was moved to tears of frustration. But her back did not bend and she did not yield on her bottom line. Wiping away her tears, she pressed on. Standing firm on the principle that “without legal authorization, nothing may be done; where legal duties are assigned, they must be carried out,” she and her colleagues used the weapons of law to break through the platform’s runaround “tai chi tactics.” Finally, after the task force’s unrelenting efforts, the other side at last provided the relevant data around midnight. By the time the task force completed its evidence collection, it was 3 a.m. the next morning.

From the moment the task force went on-site at the platforms, it became clear that technical evidence collection from the large e-commerce platforms was both the key to breaking the case and the greatest challenge. “The biggest challenges we faced were that data volumes are huge, evidence is hard to collect, hard to preserve, and hard to verify. E-commerce platforms’ business data are not only enormous in volume but also scattered in storage — generally in the cloud,” said Zhang Yuhao, a Level-1 Administrative Enforcement Officer with the Zhumadian Market Regulation Bureau in Henan Province and a task force member. This meant that investigation and evidence collection could not succeed, as in routine enforcement, simply by examining computers and hard drives — instead, the platform’s technical staff had to cooperate on-site to retrieve data from the cloud and hand it over to the task force.

In the course of actual investigation, however, the task force encountered layer upon layer of difficulties in obtaining data and gathering evidence, because the platform companies generally resorted to “soft resistance” to frustrate evidence collection. They refused to provide data on grounds of “system upgrades,” “no data authorization,” or “data not stored locally”; they used “trade secrets” or “insufficient network speed” as pretexts to stall; they arranged for irrelevant personnel to run officers in circles. Some platforms appeared “actively cooperative” on the surface while in fact providing fragmented, chaotically formatted data, attempting to drown out the critical information. What Zhou Qunbiao’s team went through was typical for the task forces. Many times the task force would arrive at a company at 10 a.m. and still have nothing to show for it by 10 p.m. Even when a platform did provide data, it was often only one-third, one-fourth, or even less of the full dataset.

Where evil grows a foot, righteousness grows ten. Facing the platforms’ various “tricks,” the task force engaged in a comprehensive battle of wits — a contest of data.

“Zhang, my phone number’s used up, you register with yours and keep checking…” Exchanges like this were extremely common and frequent among task force members during that period.

As it turned out, in dealing with data from the major platforms, the task force came up with the “dumbest” of approaches: they logged into all seven platforms and verified information and credentials one cake shop at a time; some they even went to the physical premises to inspect further.

But each phone number had a capped number of login views imposed by the platform — hence the daily conversations among team members. Over the course of about two weeks, “burning through” dozens of phone numbers and verifying three to four thousand shops, they chewed through the “hard bone” using “dumb” methods. Combined with the data from Chongqing Zhuandanbao and Anhui Xunmeng, the task force now had its own big database.

When an enterprise first provided the task force with “discounted” data, the officers could compare it against their own database, establishing a working mechanism of “data commonality, data comparison, cross-verification, and traceability-based reverse checking” to spot the irregularities — and then go back to the platform for another round of “dialogue” or “confrontation.”

Facing a task force so well-armed with data evidence, the platforms began to “squeeze the toothpaste” — 20%, 40%, 60% — until finally 100% of the data was provided. “To break the technical impasse, we repeatedly studied the platforms’ data architecture, transaction flows, and algorithmic logic, and finally penetrated the platforms’ data barriers, achieving precise extraction, classified organization, and effective preservation of key electronic data on order flow, credential filings, and order-transfer transactions,” said Ma Zhenduo, a Level-1 Staff Member with the Tianjin Municipal Comprehensive Administrative Enforcement Corps for Market Regulation and a task force member.

When platforms used “soft resistance,” the task force had to match wits; but when a few platforms escalated to “hard resistance,” the task force had to match courage.

At 10 a.m. on December 3, 2025, when task force members from the Jiangsu-Jiangxi team — Zhang Jie, Chen Cao, Hu Chao, Guo Hui, and others — arrived on-site together to begin their inspection, they could not have imagined they were in for a turbulent three days and two nights.

Under the platform’s “tai chi tactics” — letting them stew, stalling, then refusing — by 11 p.m. no substantive progress whatsoever had been made on the investigation. With no other recourse, Guo Hui and several enforcement officers decided to use the access card the company had given them — good only down to the first floor — to walk around and see what they could spot.

Where the mountains loom and waters wind, and no road seems to lie ahead — suddenly, amid dark willows and bright blossoms, another village appears. At this “rush hour” for the platform’s staff clocking in and out, enforcement officers actually tracked the movements of platform employees and identified where they were really working.

Doing everything possible to get into those offices, Guo Hui spotted a suspicious-looking room. Even though he was in enforcement uniform and had identified himself, the other side still forcibly blocked them from entering. In the struggle over control of the door, Guo Hui’s hand was deliberately crushed in the door by a company employee, causing a fracture. Guo Hui gritted his teeth and held on until the person in charge of the company finally relented and agreed to provide data. But the other side then started playing the “delay game” — the initial promise was to hand over the data at 3 a.m., but officers waited until 5 a.m., and then from 5 a.m. until noon; and the data finally handed over were heavily discounted. Having learned from day one’s “surprises,” the task force specifically coordinated with the local public security authorities to conduct the second round of data extraction and evidence collection together, and insisted the Chief Technology Officer operate the systems in person.

Around 11 p.m. on December 4, just as the task force was conducting its investigation, the platform’s head of security suddenly lost control, and in front of the police and the task force, led a group of people in a direct assault on the enforcement scene — shoving and grappling with the enforcement officers in a violent resistance incident. Guo Hui, who had kept working despite the hand fracture from the day before, immediately stepped forward to intervene. As a demobilized military officer, he instinctively threw himself to the forefront of the conflict, but was shoved and knocked to the ground, his head striking the floor hard. A 120 ambulance rushed him to the hospital.

One might have expected that after such an outrageous incident, the platform would promptly hand over the data. Instead, after the company’s Chief Technology Officer held a private conversation with the person in charge, the CTO suddenly collapsed of his own accord and was also taken by 120 ambulance to the hospital. The day’s investigation was forced to end. Enforcement officers from the task force followed them to the hospital, where doctors confirmed that there was nothing wrong with the CTO’s heart or body.

After the violent-resistance incident, SAMR attached the highest importance. Leadership convened a special meeting to study the response, and instructed the Bureau of Law Enforcement and Inspection to immediately dispatch a senior official to the scene to assess the situation. On the evening of December 5, Peng Zengtian, Deputy Director of SAMR’s Bureau of Law Enforcement and Inspection, rushed to the site under orders to handle matters. Only then did the platform provide the relevant data for a second time.

That same day, the task force, together with local public security and market regulators, held a meeting with the platform regarding the violent-resistance incident. Right in the middle of the exchange, a platform employee wrote “stay silent” and “don’t speak” on a piece of A4 paper, signaling to a colleague being questioned. Caught red-handed by the task force, what unfolded next was shocking and as dramatically theatrical as a movie scene: the employee actually balled up the A4 paper and — right in front of everyone in the room — ate it.

When courage meets courage on a narrow path, the bolder prevails. The “Ghost Takeout” investigation was a contest between arrogance and justice, illegality and law enforcement. Confronted with unprecedented resistance — whether “soft” or “hard” — every member of the task force matched wits with wits and courage with courage. With a fighting spirit of “the more perilous the path, the more resolutely we press on,” they cut through every barrier and forged ahead.

Guo Hui, after simple bandaging and treatment, ignored doctors’ advice and returned resolutely to the investigation site. Zhou Qunbiao, after 72 hours of continuous work, suffered a sudden heart attack and was rushed to the hospital. Lying on the emergency-room bed, all he could think about were case-file details and unfinished verification items. Once his condition stabilized, Zhou Qunbiao rushed back from the emergency room to the investigation site: “The case isn’t done; I can’t rest easy.”

Behind these simple words lies a spirit of “exceptional endurance of hardship, exceptional combat capability, and exceptional devotion.” “Day and night, 5+2” had become the norm — no rest on holidays, no standing down for minor injuries. After three rounds of on-site inspections, the task force tore open gaps in the “iron walls” of the seven platforms and nailed down rock-solid evidence on 67,604 “ghost shops,” laying a firm foundation for the successful resolution of the case.

One Shop, One Penalty: Far-Reaching Impact

As the investigation deepened, the evidence of violations became ever clearer — yet a new challenge now confronted the task force: how to structure the administrative penalties for the platforms.

“On the surface we’re handling one big case, but in reality we’re facing more than 60,000 individual cases. Each shop’s situation is different, and we can’t treat them in bulk,” Zhang Li remarked, pinpointing the difficulty of imposing administrative penalties in this case.

At this critical juncture, SAMR once again drew on the task force’s successful experience — pooling forces from all sides to build case-handling synergy:

In the course of the investigation, the task force sent more than 50,000 case-transfer orders to provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities nationwide, verifying each platform lead the case had uncovered one by one. On matters of major import, SAMR’s Bureau of Law Enforcement and Inspection worked jointly with the General Office, the Department of Laws and Regulations, the Department of Online Transaction Supervision, the Department of Catering and Food Supervision, the Department of News and Publicity, and other departments to resolve issues together.

This time, SAMR extended its inquiry into legal application beyond the system itself to legislative bodies, judicial authorities, and academia, ensuring that the case handling could withstand both legal and historical scrutiny. SAMR leadership led four delegations to consult with legislative and judicial departments, repeatedly soliciting input on core questions such as the determination of platform liability and the calibration of penalty ranges — ensuring that the case was handled according to law and that discretionary power was exercised with prudence.

SAMR also convened a legal-experts symposium, inviting authoritative scholars from administrative law, civil law, e-commerce law, and other fields to delve into key issues such as the identification of offending entities, the boundaries of platforms’ review obligations, and the calculation of illegal gains — producing written expert opinions.

SAMR leadership presided over 24 specialized meetings, examining the platforms’ violations point by point and repeatedly refining the administrative penalty plan to ensure that every company, every violation, and every penalty amount had a firm legal basis.

After fully absorbing the views of legislative bodies, judicial authorities, and academia, a penalty plan gradually took shape — one that embodied the principle of “penalties commensurate with violations,” reflected the “four strictest” requirements, and aligned with public expectations.

SAMR resolved: in accordance with the principle of “penalties commensurate with violations,” to lawfully impose “one shop, one penalty” on the platforms’ failure to perform their review obligations.

Wang Huowang, Director of SAMR’s Bureau of Law Enforcement and Inspection, said that this case was a landmark case in SAMR’s history for safeguarding food safety and regulating platform development. SAMR’s penalties reflect the regulatory orientation of supporting the standardized and healthy development of the platform economy, and of “grasping both development and regulation firmly with both hands.” The fundamental aim is to urge platform enterprises to fulfill the obligations set out in law — to establish and effectively operate food-safety risk prevention and control mechanisms covering credential review, risk monitoring, problem screening, and rapid response — so as to genuinely safeguard food safety and promote the standardized and healthy development of takeout platforms.

Upon receiving SAMR’s administrative penalty decisions, Pinduoduo, Meituan, JD.com, Taobao Shangou (formerly Ele.me), Douyin, Taobao, and Tmall all pledged resolute implementation of regulatory requirements and meaningful protection of takeout food safety.

People regard food as heaven, and food safety comes first. Though the market regulators’ “sword strike against ghost takeouts” has reached its conclusion — and all platform enterprises have, in line with rectification requirements, taken down unreviewed “ghost shops” and ended catering order-transfer cooperation with the relevant transfer platforms — food-safety regulation is a journey without end. The sword of enforcement remains ever poised overhead, ready to be drawn at any moment.

(This article also benefited from contributions by our newspaper’s reporters Peng Xie, He Ke, and Xu Yachen, and intern reporter Wang Yiming.)

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