The psychology behind trying to ascribe a "grand strategy" is akin to the psychology behind conspiracy theories. People want to believe there's some kind of order behind the chaos.
I think the truth might be far scarier for them -- the idea that at the top, people are still winging it. They nake random, stupid decisions that don't serve their interests or the interests they purport to represent.
Look at Elbridge Colby, he's obviously far smarter than Hegseth. He created the whole plan on how to counter China with a "decent peace" and he continuously spoke against being involved in the Middle East. He was still forced to defend the Iran attacks and couldn't give a good answer.
2. You miss to address certain arguments made in favour of the thesis that Iran is attacked in the context of confronting China, probably because you're not aware of them. Here are a couple:
A. You rightly point out the nature and spirit of China's foreign policy: Iran is no "ally," at least not in the Western sense of the term. Westerners have trouble understanding China's modus operandi, for them it's an enigma. But, even so, even they can more or less understand that whatever China stands for, it is some kind of order rather than disorder and outright chaos. And thusly, we have to address the possibility that the Washington's course may be one of generating chaos around the world. Such a course may be a result of things like 1) panic, disorganisation and malice in Washington DC, 2) an instinct of a social predator, and a habit of an empire 3) a genuine strategy, made either in the state apparatus or by shadowy powers behind the curtains. And we can agree that (3) appears unlikely. Despite documents such as "Which path to Persia?" (2009). But to me, just as an amoeba can orient itself toward a food source, and as a wolf pack's movements can be predictable, so can Trump's team go and do something that's somewhat sensible for the empire's long term relations with China. Things have an organic logic to them.
B. "China needs energy from the entire Middle East, not just Iran, and even if Saudi Arabia and others have alternative routes for Chinese-bound energy exports it will still be far less than they've been receiving before the conflict. [.....] "
Basically, I agree – the idea that America's appropriate actions fall within some kind of "deep grand strategy" is completely illogical at this stage. The nature of the American political system and Trump's personality don't allow for such a grand strategy, at least not under his administration.
Furthermore, this article also makes a good correction regarding China's position. However, I think it misses a crucial point. That is, while China pursues a legal approach and prioritizes national interests over ideology, it also needs partners with deterrent capabilities like Russia, North Korea, and Iran to counterbalance the coercive power of American hegemony.
During Trump’s first term, after he bought the made-in-China lie about covid, he was pretty well ineffective afterwards. Now in his second term, after he has bought the Iran-is-about-to-have-nuclear-weapons lie, perhaps he will become pretty well ineffective too. Maybe the Iran war was not aimed at China, but was aimed at Trump. I may be wrong, but what are your thoughts.
The rationale for this war is Trump fulfilling his obligation to Netanyahu, or trying to anyway. Iran has been the obsession of the on-again off-again Israeli PM for 30 years now, as the country is the last and most important counterweight to Israeli expansionist agenda - which also has been openly advocated by the Israeli PM.
It is about a particularly myopic conception of Israel's national interest. China doesn't enter it at all, nor does the rational interest of the US for that matter.
Some people say it better to assume stupidity than malice. I'm inclined to agree but I think there are equal portions of both in this war. I think Trump has both stupidity and knowledge towards Trump and Iran.
And I'm not sure Trump even knows how much of each he is applying to China and Iran.
From where I’m sitting, the logical conclusion is that the US is riven with internal factions squabbling over control of the levers of power. When there are ongoing knife-fights in the control room, should we be surprised at the drunken lurching of the ship of state?
The psychology behind trying to ascribe a "grand strategy" is akin to the psychology behind conspiracy theories. People want to believe there's some kind of order behind the chaos.
I think the truth might be far scarier for them -- the idea that at the top, people are still winging it. They nake random, stupid decisions that don't serve their interests or the interests they purport to represent.
Look at Elbridge Colby, he's obviously far smarter than Hegseth. He created the whole plan on how to counter China with a "decent peace" and he continuously spoke against being involved in the Middle East. He was still forced to defend the Iran attacks and couldn't give a good answer.
1. You missed to make your argument stronger when you referred to the motive for the 2003. Iraq war as about democratization. Back in 2003, practically everyone opposed to the invasion on Iraq, and that was a large proportion of the population of the West, saw the motive for the war summed up in the famous catchphrase “It’s the oil, stupid!” But if Iraq was invaded for oil, "then the US was remarkably negligent in securing the prize’. Iraq awarded its first major post-invasion oil concessions in 2009, and the big winners? Norway, France, China and Russia." https://pulsemedia.org/2015/01/30/israelpolitik-the-neocons-and-the-long-shadow-of-the-iraq-war-a-review-of-muhammad-idrees-ahmads-book-the-road-to-iraq-the-making-of-a-neoconservative-war/
2. You miss to address certain arguments made in favour of the thesis that Iran is attacked in the context of confronting China, probably because you're not aware of them. Here are a couple:
A. You rightly point out the nature and spirit of China's foreign policy: Iran is no "ally," at least not in the Western sense of the term. Westerners have trouble understanding China's modus operandi, for them it's an enigma. But, even so, even they can more or less understand that whatever China stands for, it is some kind of order rather than disorder and outright chaos. And thusly, we have to address the possibility that the Washington's course may be one of generating chaos around the world. Such a course may be a result of things like 1) panic, disorganisation and malice in Washington DC, 2) an instinct of a social predator, and a habit of an empire 3) a genuine strategy, made either in the state apparatus or by shadowy powers behind the curtains. And we can agree that (3) appears unlikely. Despite documents such as "Which path to Persia?" (2009). But to me, just as an amoeba can orient itself toward a food source, and as a wolf pack's movements can be predictable, so can Trump's team go and do something that's somewhat sensible for the empire's long term relations with China. Things have an organic logic to them.
B. "China needs energy from the entire Middle East, not just Iran, and even if Saudi Arabia and others have alternative routes for Chinese-bound energy exports it will still be far less than they've been receiving before the conflict. [.....] "
https://x.com/BrianJBerletic/status/2032308716339675424
So much for now. Perhaps I'll think of something additional or better later. Cheers.
Thank you for the comment!
Basically, I agree – the idea that America's appropriate actions fall within some kind of "deep grand strategy" is completely illogical at this stage. The nature of the American political system and Trump's personality don't allow for such a grand strategy, at least not under his administration.
Furthermore, this article also makes a good correction regarding China's position. However, I think it misses a crucial point. That is, while China pursues a legal approach and prioritizes national interests over ideology, it also needs partners with deterrent capabilities like Russia, North Korea, and Iran to counterbalance the coercive power of American hegemony.
During Trump’s first term, after he bought the made-in-China lie about covid, he was pretty well ineffective afterwards. Now in his second term, after he has bought the Iran-is-about-to-have-nuclear-weapons lie, perhaps he will become pretty well ineffective too. Maybe the Iran war was not aimed at China, but was aimed at Trump. I may be wrong, but what are your thoughts.
The rationale for this war is Trump fulfilling his obligation to Netanyahu, or trying to anyway. Iran has been the obsession of the on-again off-again Israeli PM for 30 years now, as the country is the last and most important counterweight to Israeli expansionist agenda - which also has been openly advocated by the Israeli PM.
It is about a particularly myopic conception of Israel's national interest. China doesn't enter it at all, nor does the rational interest of the US for that matter.
Some people say it better to assume stupidity than malice. I'm inclined to agree but I think there are equal portions of both in this war. I think Trump has both stupidity and knowledge towards Trump and Iran.
And I'm not sure Trump even knows how much of each he is applying to China and Iran.
From where I’m sitting, the logical conclusion is that the US is riven with internal factions squabbling over control of the levers of power. When there are ongoing knife-fights in the control room, should we be surprised at the drunken lurching of the ship of state?