The psychology behind trying to ascribe a "grand strategy" is akin to the psychology behind conspiracy theories. People want to believe there's some kind of order behind the chaos.
I think the truth might be far scarier for them -- the idea that at the top, people are still winging it. They nake random, stupid decisions that don't serve their interests or the interests they purport to represent.
Look at Elbridge Colby, he's obviously far smarter than Hegseth. He created the whole plan on how to counter China with a "decent peace" and he continuously spoke against being involved in the Middle East. He was still forced to defend the Iran attacks and couldn't give a good answer.
2. You miss to address certain arguments made in favour of the thesis that Iran is attacked in the context of confronting China, probably because you're not aware of them. Here are a couple:
A. You rightly point out the nature and spirit of China's foreign policy: Iran is no "ally," at least not in the Western sense of the term. Westerners have trouble understanding China's modus operandi, for them it's an enigma. But, even so, even they can more or less understand that whatever China stands for, it is some kind of order rather than disorder and outright chaos. And thusly, we have to address the possibility that the Washington's course may be one of generating chaos around the world. Such a course may be a result of things like 1) panic, disorganisation and malice in Washington DC, 2) an instinct of a social predator, and a habit of an empire 3) a genuine strategy, made either in the state apparatus or by shadowy powers behind the curtains. And we can agree that (3) appears unlikely. Despite documents such as "Which path to Persia?" (2009). But to me, just as an amoeba can orient itself toward a food source, and as a wolf pack's movements can be predictable, so can Trump's team go and do something that's somewhat sensible for the empire's long term relations with China. Things have an organic logic to them.
B. "China needs energy from the entire Middle East, not just Iran, and even if Saudi Arabia and others have alternative routes for Chinese-bound energy exports it will still be far less than they've been receiving before the conflict. [.....] "
Some people say it better to assume stupidity than malice. I'm inclined to agree but I think there are equal portions of both in this war. I think Trump has both stupidity and knowledge towards Trump and Iran.
And I'm not sure Trump even knows how much of each he is applying to China and Iran.
The psychology behind trying to ascribe a "grand strategy" is akin to the psychology behind conspiracy theories. People want to believe there's some kind of order behind the chaos.
I think the truth might be far scarier for them -- the idea that at the top, people are still winging it. They nake random, stupid decisions that don't serve their interests or the interests they purport to represent.
Look at Elbridge Colby, he's obviously far smarter than Hegseth. He created the whole plan on how to counter China with a "decent peace" and he continuously spoke against being involved in the Middle East. He was still forced to defend the Iran attacks and couldn't give a good answer.
1. You missed to make your argument stronger when you referred to the motive for the 2003. Iraq war as about democratization. Back in 2003, practically everyone opposed to the invasion on Iraq, and that was a large proportion of the population of the West, saw the motive for the war summed up in the famous catchphrase “It’s the oil, stupid!” But if Iraq was invaded for oil, "then the US was remarkably negligent in securing the prize’. Iraq awarded its first major post-invasion oil concessions in 2009, and the big winners? Norway, France, China and Russia." https://pulsemedia.org/2015/01/30/israelpolitik-the-neocons-and-the-long-shadow-of-the-iraq-war-a-review-of-muhammad-idrees-ahmads-book-the-road-to-iraq-the-making-of-a-neoconservative-war/
2. You miss to address certain arguments made in favour of the thesis that Iran is attacked in the context of confronting China, probably because you're not aware of them. Here are a couple:
A. You rightly point out the nature and spirit of China's foreign policy: Iran is no "ally," at least not in the Western sense of the term. Westerners have trouble understanding China's modus operandi, for them it's an enigma. But, even so, even they can more or less understand that whatever China stands for, it is some kind of order rather than disorder and outright chaos. And thusly, we have to address the possibility that the Washington's course may be one of generating chaos around the world. Such a course may be a result of things like 1) panic, disorganisation and malice in Washington DC, 2) an instinct of a social predator, and a habit of an empire 3) a genuine strategy, made either in the state apparatus or by shadowy powers behind the curtains. And we can agree that (3) appears unlikely. Despite documents such as "Which path to Persia?" (2009). But to me, just as an amoeba can orient itself toward a food source, and as a wolf pack's movements can be predictable, so can Trump's team go and do something that's somewhat sensible for the empire's long term relations with China. Things have an organic logic to them.
B. "China needs energy from the entire Middle East, not just Iran, and even if Saudi Arabia and others have alternative routes for Chinese-bound energy exports it will still be far less than they've been receiving before the conflict. [.....] "
https://x.com/BrianJBerletic/status/2032308716339675424
So much for now. Perhaps I'll think of something additional or better later. Cheers.
Thank you for the comment!
Some people say it better to assume stupidity than malice. I'm inclined to agree but I think there are equal portions of both in this war. I think Trump has both stupidity and knowledge towards Trump and Iran.
And I'm not sure Trump even knows how much of each he is applying to China and Iran.