The Intoxicating Power: Alcohol's Role in Chinese Governance and Strategies for Change

A Central Party School Professor Unveils the Dynamics of China's Official Drinking Culture and How Political Reform Changed it

Happy Mid-Autumn Festival! It's a time for family reunions, festive banquets, and toasts with Chinese baijiu (白酒). But in this episode, we're serving up something different: a look into the drinking culture within China's bureaucracy. We'll explore why it's been so tough to change and how recent political reforms have started to shake things up.

The article named “How Did Institutional Environment and Local Governance Shape the Drinking Culture of Chinese Cadres—An Empirical Study on County-level Cadres’ Drinking Behavior“ 制度环境与治理需要如何塑造中国官场的酒文化——基于县域官员饮酒行为的实证研究. It’s a study made by Professor Qiang Ge(强舸), an Associate Professor in the Party Building Department of the Central Party School. It was first publied by the journal 社会学研究（Sociological Studies), a leading journal in Chinese Sociology.

Professor Qiang Ge

Experts used to believe that drinking permeated official circles due to loopholes in formal institutions, leading to widespread drinking customs among officials. However, after studying over 100 cases (including joining many of those banquets), Professor Qiang identified more structural roots behind this phenomenon. Local government faces three main problems: insufficient information flow, unclear job duties, and weak worker motivation. These issues contribute to the prevalence of drinking among officials.

The government's top-down structure impedes information flow, creating challenges for lower-level officials. Uncertain about available resources and exact responsibilities, they often face surprise short-term tasks. To cope, they use drinking as a way to build trust with bosses and improve promotion chances. Simultaneously, bosses use drinking sessions to motivate staff, show respect, and foster teamwork, compensating for the lack of official incentive mechanisms.

Drinking has persisted as a habit because it addresses some of these systemic problems, building trust and providing extra motivation where the system falls short. This explains its prevalence, albeit unhealthy, among government officials.

After the 18th Party Congress, tackling the drinking culture in official circles became a major focus in the fight against the Four Malfeasances (favoring form over substance, bureaucratism, hedonism, and extravagance). This effort has yielded clear results, significantly reducing reception costs and improving work efficiency.

However, completely eliminating drinking in official circles is complex and requires addressing deeper governance issues. The goal is to replace drinking's role in governance with proper systems and mechanisms, focusing on three main areas:

1. Making governance more organized and systematic

2. Creating official ways to motivate staff instead of relying on bosses' personal actions

3. Establishing a system where job roles and ranks work side by side, reducing the need for lower-level officials to drink for career advancement

PS: When facing problems, many would attribute these issues to work styles or even moral failings. However, such an approach is fundamentally misguided. I believe Professor Qiang’s analysis is on the right track; he knows drinking is just a symptom of deeper structural problems and quickly identifies the flaws in organizational and institutional design, such as insufficient incentives or other systemic issues.

Since it’s a long article, I’d use the edited ver published by the WeChat account of Longway Foundation(修远基金会). Neither Professor Qiang nor the Longway Foundation was aware of this translation.

Source: https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/6Sp8i_1yQ17fDv1Fp663GQ

How Did Institutional Environment and Local Governance Shape the Drinking Culture of Chinese Cadres—An Empirical Study on County-level Cadres’ Drinking Behavior

▍Phenomenon and Problem

Since the Reform and Opening Up, the drinking culture in official circles has been a persistent issue in building party integrity, government operations, and grassroots governance. It has led to many negative consequences, such as misuse of public funds, damage to government image, reduced work efficiency, and even casualties. Since the 1990s, governments at all levels have been trying to tackle this issue, but it has been difficult to eradicate completely.

Therefore, this article focuses on the following real-world questions: Why has China developed a unique drinking culture? Why does this drinking culture persist despite official prohibitions, frequent crackdowns, and even the reluctance of many officials themselves?

This article answers these questions through an empirical study. While drinking culture is prevalent in various sectors of Chinese society, we limit our research subjects as follows:

1. All participants at the drinking table must be officials. Gatherings involving non-officials are not within our scope.

2. Drinking behaviors of officials at different levels and in different systems (party and government organs/state-owned enterprises) have some differences in characteristics and driving mechanisms. This article focuses on the county-level party and government organs, which is currently the most scrutinized area of official drinking culture, characterized by the consumption of large amounts of high-alcohol spirits.

3. We only consider drinking occasions arising from official duties, which is also the main focus of existing literature, and do not include private gatherings of officials.

The empirical materials for this article come from two sources:

1. The author's observations and interviews in more than a dozen provinces nationwide from 2011 to 2015.

2. The author interviews cadres from various regions from 2014 to 2015.

In the first category of materials, the author observed a total of 57 drinking occasions: 19 in the eastern region, 20 in the central region, and 18 in the western region. 63 individuals were recorded speaking, including 9 county (city, district) party secretaries, 31 deputy county-level cadres, and 23 section-level cadres.

In the second category, there were 13 individual interviews and 11 group discussions, with 36 individuals recorded speaking.

During the analysis, the author found no significant differences in drinking behavior among officials from eastern, central, and western regions. The views quoted in the following text were mentioned by at least three interviewees from different regions rather than being unique opinions or experiences of a single interviewee.

▍One of the Governance Functions of Drinking Behavior I: Building Trust

(1) Insufficient Information in the Government's Pyramid Hierarchical Structure

China's local governments are very large in scale. Firstly, they govern large populations. Most county-level areas have populations of hundreds of thousands, with the largest counties exceeding 2 million. This is equivalent to a first-level local administrative division in most countries, which would typically have at least two lower levels, but Chinese county-level governments only have one level below them.

Secondly, the Chinese government is a developmental government, taking on more functions than those in other countries. Thirdly, local governments also manage numerous public institutions and state-owned enterprises. These factors result in county-level governments managing a very large number of institutions (including townships, streets, committees, bureaus, enterprises, and public institutions), averaging over 100.

Consequently, county-level governments and their subordinate institutions form a highly disparate pyramid structure. Without discussing other impacts, this structure creates an information deficit in terms of interpersonal interactions among officials. Specifically, there are, on average, 100-200 section-level cadres managed by a county-level government, and nearly a thousand deputy section-level cadres are included. Their assessment and promotion are controlled by the county-level government, but only 14-18 people (members of the county party standing committee and deputy county mayors) hold this power. The information exchange between these dozen or so county-level leaders and nearly a thousand section-level cadres is clearly insufficient.

This lack of information affects the assessment and promotion of subordinates. County-level leaders may not even know many of the section-level cadres they need to evaluate.

"I know all the section-level cadres in my area of responsibility, but I'm not familiar with some deputy section-level cadres. As for townships and bureaus I don't oversee, I can recognize the heads, but I can't put names on many of the deputy heads. It's not that I'm bureaucratic, but with over a thousand section-level cadres in a county, it's hard to know everyone well. However, when it comes to cadre appointments, I have to voice my opinion and vote in the standing committee meetings." (W37, Standing Committee Member of a county in S3 province, September 2014)

Moreover, the information deficit is more severe for the three county-level leaders with the greatest weight in cadre appointments (party secretary, county mayor, and organization department head) because these three positions "should be filled by officials from other areas." This means that while locally grown county-level leaders have time to understand local cadres gradually, these three don't have much time to grasp cadre information fully.

"A party secretary essentially does two things: provide ideas and appoint cadres. But there's a problem with appointing cadres. Party secretaries are always assigned from other areas. I've only been in this county for a little over a year, and I had no prior knowledge of the cadres here, which makes things difficult." (D13, Party Secretary of a county in H2 province, March 2015)

The information deficit mainly creates job performance confusion for superiors, but it has a much greater impact on the career prospects of subordinates. If a superior doesn't even know about a subordinate, trust is out of the question. Therefore, subordinates must find ways to make themselves known to their superiors.

Of course, there are many ways to achieve this goal outside of work interactions, such as private socializing, networking through intermediaries or hometown associations to join the leader's inner circle, or even engaging in illegal benefits transfer. These methods can generally bring significant benefits to subordinates, but the problem is that they require high input, are difficult to execute, and carry high risks. Most officials lack sufficient willingness, courage, ability, or resources for these approaches.

In comparison, "drinking" may not yield high returns, but its advantage lies in its low risk and simple operation. It's a method available to all subordinates.

"In local government, doing a good job alone isn't enough. Leaders manage too many people and might not even know you exist. We in the townships have limited opportunities to meet leaders, mostly during meetings where personal interaction isn't possible. Fortunately, the party secretary visits our township for research once or twice a year, and other leaders come too. When they come, we always have meals together. At the dinner table, I can toast the leader once, they'll return the toast, and we might exchange a few more. In one meal, there could be three or four interactions. After drinking, everyone relaxes. If you seize the opportunity well, you can hold the leader's hand and say a few heartfelt words, leaving a good impression." (W38, Party Secretary of a township in a county in S3 province, September 2014)

Compared to those in top positions, the opportunities at the dinner table are even more precious for deputy officials.

"There are several hundred deputy section-level cadres like me in the whole county. Our bureau chief can occasionally visit the party secretary's office, but I can usually only meet with the county leader in charge of our area. I rarely have contact with the party secretary, and even less work-related contact with other county leaders. But at the dinner table, everyone has the right to propose a toast, introducing themselves in the process. If the leader is interested and chats a bit more, they might form some impression of me, which can't be a bad thing. I'm not one to scheme and plot, that's too risky. I'm not after great wealth or status, I just want stability and a bit of hope for progress." (W24, Deputy Director of a bureau in a county in J province, April 2014)

During the drinking process, subordinates convey two layers of information:

1. They strive to help superiors match their name, position, and face.

2. Relying on the effects of alcohol and the atmosphere at the dinner table, they convey certain personality traits, such as being generous, down-to-earth, sincere, etc., and use this to build initial trust with superiors.

It should be noted that the trust built in this way is very limited, but it's still better than being unknown. However, this mechanism that encourages subordinates to drink is not triggered in the second type of dinner table (see the classification in the second part for details). This is because, at these dinner tables, there isn't a vast hierarchical structure between superiors and subordinates. Information is sufficient, and there are enough opportunities to build trust through work, so alcohol is not needed as a mediator.

"Different dinner tables have different rules. I'm not familiar with township and other committee or bureau cadres, and we don't usually interact. So at the dinner table, if someone rushes up to me for a 'bottoms up' toast, I generally remember them and think 'they're not bad, down-to-earth.' But it's different within our own department. We have dozens of people in our department, how can I not know what everyone is like? At a recent department gathering, a young man also came to me for a 'bottoms up' toast, which was very awkward for me. According to custom, I should at least drink a full glass, otherwise I'd seem arrogant. But my health really can't handle it. I had thought that among our own people, we could just drink casually." (W57, Standing Committee Member and Organization Department Head of a county in S1 province, May 2015)

On the contrary, at these types of dinner tables, if subordinates drink too aggressively, they might leave a negative impression.

"When you're in the government office, you see your unit leaders every day. There are plenty of opportunities to perform well if you're inclined to do so. You don't need to put effort into drinking. If you can't do anything well in your regular work, what's the use of being enthusiastic only about drinking? Isn't that just telling the leaders, 'I'm good for nothing but drinking and eating'?" (W9, Bureau Chief of a county in Z province, May 2012)

(2) Non-institutionalization of Governance Tasks: The Resource Dilemma in Local Governance

Insufficient information not only affects the personal development of officials but also causes many problems in governance. Specifically, China currently faces the issue of non-institutionalization of governance tasks, mainly manifested in three aspects: uncertainty in the distribution of governance resources, unclear work coordination, and numerous temporary or phased tasks. This section first discusses the first two aspects.

For a long time, in China's local governance, the allocation of funds, resources, and policies has lacked systematic institutional norms, resulting in significant uncertainty. The rise of the project system in recent years has further exacerbated this uncertainty. In terms of central-local relations, this has given rise to the well-known phenomenon of "running to departments for money."

Although there's no similar idiom for townships, their dependence on allocated resources is even stronger. After the tax and fee reform, townships lost their fiscal extraction capacity and could only rely on higher-level allocations. However, institutionalized allocations are generally only enough to maintain basic operations. More resources need to be sought independently, and the dinner table has become an important stage for townships to seek resources from higher levels.

Existing research has already discussed this phenomenon of "doing business at the dinner table." The driving mechanism for subordinates drinking to obtain resources is similar to drinking for personal development, so we won't discuss it in detail here. We only need to emphasize two points:

1. In this situation, subordinates drink for official business, which means that personal drinking behavior has become part of the governance process.

2. The superiors in this situation refer not only to county-level leaders but also to officials from committees and bureaus who have the same administrative level as township officials but possess some resource allocation authority for specific governance tasks.

This mechanism does not exist at the second type of dinner table. Whether it's between county-level leaders and the committees and bureaus they oversee, or within committees, bureaus, and township governments, the level of institutionalization in governance resource allocation is higher, and officials generally don't need to seek resources through personal behavior.

The above analysis has explored how the dilemma of insufficient information and uncertain resource allocation drives subordinates to choose drinking behavior to convey information and build trust with superiors. It has also discussed why this mechanism does not exist at the second type of dinner table. However, it has not yet explained the driving mechanism for superiors to choose drinking, which will be discussed in the next section.

（3）Non-institutionalization of Governance Tasks II: Unclear Work Coordination

"A thousand needles from above, a single thread below" - the various clearly defined governance tasks at higher levels of government ultimately need to be executed by the same group of people at the grassroots level. On the surface, the pressure seems to be mainly on the grassroots, as they have to handle numerous tasks. However, faced with heavy governance tasks, grassroots governments often selectively execute them, seriously completing those they deem important and perfunctorily handling those they consider unimportant. This doesn't significantly affect their performance evaluation. But for the superiors (county-level leaders/heads of committees and bureaus) whose tasks are handled perfunctorily, their performance evaluations can be severely compromised.

"Leaders aren't omnipotent. Although I'm a county leader, I'm not the party secretary, so I can't directly manage township cadres. On the contrary, much of my work relies on their implementation. While they won't directly oppose me, they can certainly handle things perfunctorily." (W51, Deputy County Head in N Province, June 2015)

Faced with this situation, superior officials generally have three choices:

1. "Win over" the county party secretary, making them feel the work is important and list it as a "secretary project" for personal supervision. Then, subordinates generally won't dare to be perfunctory.

2. Provide sufficient material or spiritual rewards to motivate subordinates to complete tasks seriously.

3. Rely on personal relationships with subordinates to ensure that work in their line is taken seriously.

Among these three choices, the first is generally unfeasible. It's difficult to win over the secretary, and if the secretary is won over every time, "secretary projects" lose their constraining significance. The second choice is sometimes feasible, sometimes not, because sufficiently attractive material resources and spiritual rewards are limited, and superiors may not always have them available. The third choice is feasible in most cases, although it's the least effective.

Among these, drinking, as a social activity that can quickly convey friendly messages, build initial trust, and be replicated on a large scale at low cost, becomes the preferred method for superiors to develop personal relationships with subordinates.

"Every time I go down to the countryside for a meal, I make sure to toast every township cadre present. Why? We need to leave a good impression on the comrades below, so they'll seriously complete my work. After all, I'm not the secretary, and how hard the township cadres work to implement my tasks largely depends on their level of approval of me. There are too many county officials, and the townships are far away. I'm busy with work and don't have chances to interact normally, so I have to seize the opportunity at the dinner table." (W29, Standing Committee Member and Propaganda Department Head of a county in S4 Province, June 2014)

Conversely, if superiors don't actively interact with subordinates through drinking at the dinner table, if they go through the motions, or even refuse toasts from subordinates, they're likely to suffer setbacks in their work, damaging their own performance.

"We used to have a deputy county head, sent down from the province, young and promising. But when he came to my township, he wouldn't even drink when I toasted him at dinner. What was he so proud of? I don't expect him to promote me, but he needs achievements for his own advancement, doesn't he? Don't we still have to do the work? What right does he have to look down on me? Later, when he assigned work, I just wasn't enthusiastic about doing it. After all, there's so much work assigned from various departments above that we can't finish it all. What leverage does he have over me?" (W19, Township Party Secretary in S2 Province, April 2014)

Unlike the situations described earlier, within the relationships between county-level leaders and the committees and bureaus they oversee, within the committees and bureaus themselves, and within townships, there are clear institutional regulations for work coordination and task allocation. In these contexts, superiors generally don't need to rely on drinking to build personalized relationships with their subordinates.

▍The Governance Function of Drinking Behavior II: Providing Incentives

The third part analyzed the driving mechanism for most officials' drinking, but there's still a key gap - the county party secretary. The phrase "after all, I'm not the secretary" frequently appears in interviews. Its theoretical logic can be expressed as: Most superiors need to develop personal relationships with subordinates, especially township officials, through drinking because they "can't manage" them within the formal institutional system. However, the county party secretary firmly controls the two lifelines of subordinate officials: personnel arrangements and resource allocation. In other words, it seems that the formal system has already given the secretary enough power to influence subordinates. So, in the governance process, is there no mechanism that prompts the secretary to choose to drink? Empirical materials provide a negative answer. County party secretaries are rarely "unable to drink" and are often active participants at the dinner table. However, they are also the least suitable for drinking (older, heavy workload, poorer health). So, what factors and mechanisms prompt secretaries to choose to drink? This section will discuss this.

By understanding the secretary's behavioral choices, we will recognize a fact: officials' drinking behavior can not only affect governance performance within their personal scope but also function at the organizational level, to some extent enhancing organizational cohesion and stimulating organizational vitality.

(I) Insufficient Organizational Incentives

"The lower you go, the heavier the tasks, the harder the work, and the greater the pressure" is an important characteristic of current local governance in China. First, grassroots work is very heavy. Although selective handling is possible, even "perfunctory handling" requires time and energy and, at most, reduces the burden quantitatively but cannot qualitatively change the "heaviness" itself. Second, responsibility and pressure are great. There are many "one-vote veto" items in grassroots governance (improved somewhat after the 18th Party Congress, but still numerous); the pressure from superiors is very high, but implementation easily triggers conflicts. Third, the authority and financial power at the grassroots level are highly disproportionate to the heavy tasks, making work even more difficult. Moreover, compared to county direct agencies, township officials generally work in townships but have homes in the county town, often only able to return home once a week, making extra sacrifices for children's education and family life.

Higher-level governments have assigned very heavy governance tasks and made many demands but provide very limited incentives. First, income is not high. Currently, in most areas of the country, section-level cadres have monthly salaries of 2,500-4,500 yuan, which is not high among people with the same education and years of service. Of course, it's often said that "civil servants have grey income," but this article can neither prove nor disprove this proposition. It only states a basic fact: except for some townships and streets in the Yangtze River Delta and Pearl River Delta with more fiscal revenue, most townships and streets in the country are on "subsistence finance." With such a small overall pie, how much grey income can most township cadres get? Second, the government "makes overtime work whenever needed," with little overtime pay, and often "doesn't even provide meals." Third, officials often care more about promotion incentives. However, due to "many people, few positions" and "being far from leaders," promotion is most difficult in townships, with many unable to even reach the deputy section chief level.

(II) The Organizational Incentive Effect of Superior Officials' "Drinking"

With heavy tasks, great sacrifices, and low returns, work motivation, organizational identity, and cohesion become problematic. The media have reported many cases of officials resigning. More officials, though not resigning, try various ways to transfer (even temporary secondments). Faced with this situation, superiors cannot let things drift. Among them, the county party secretary has the strongest motivation to change this situation. On the one hand, the organization gives the secretary the main power, thus also placing the highest demands on them. On the other hand, compared to other superiors, the secretary's personal interests are most closely related to organizational interests. The better the organization operates, the more authority it has consolidated, the more outstanding its performance is, and the greater its chances of promotion.

The key difference between secretaries under the Chinese system and regional leaders under electoral systems is that the latter are already social celebrities before taking office, having accumulated considerable wealth, social influence, or even family power, and remain elites even after leaving government. However, the former is "cultivated by the organization," with all authority based on organizational identity, "nothing without the organization."

So, where do superior officials, represented by the secretary, seek new organizational incentives to alleviate organizational difficulties? There are roughly three choices: First, strive to provide more material and spiritual incentives within their authority. Second, take some institutional risks by allowing some not-so-serious style problems among subordinates (such as setting up small private funds or distributing excessive benefits). Third, compensate for insufficient organizational incentives with personal compensation to subordinates. These three choices are generally all possible to be adopted, and this article focuses on the third, with drinking being one of its important manifestations.

"At my age, and having been a leader for so many years, I have all sorts of health issues - high blood pressure, high blood sugar, high cholesterol, gout, you name it. The doctor says it's best not to drink. So why do I still drink? I have to. When I go to the townships, I must drink, and drink heavily. If I don't drink, who will work for me? It's not easy for our township comrades. They have heavy tasks, little money, and they rarely get to see their wives and children. As leaders, we can't promote them, we can't give them more money, so if we don't even drink with them, how can we face our own conscience?" (W44, County Party Secretary in H2 Province, December 2014)

How can the fact that subordinates can't see their wives and children lead to the conclusion that superiors who don't drink have no conscience? Without being in the specific context of local governance, it's difficult to understand this seemingly paradoxical logic. There are many difficulties and great pressures in township work, which superiors are aware of and sympathize with, but they can't solve. Some of these problems are caused by the institutional environment, but a large part is actively created by superiors for the sake of their own performance. So, while they sympathize, tasks and pressures are still assigned and given as usual. However, at the same time, they need to find ways to provide incentives and compensation in other aspects to maintain organizational cohesion. Drinking serves this function.

"When drinking with office cadres, I mainly consider my physical condition. If I'm in good shape and there aren't many people, I'll down the drinks they offer me. If I'm not feeling well, I'll drink as I please. I'm the secretary, so I have this privilege. But in the townships, no matter how poor my condition is, I never skimp on the drinks I should have or the toasts I should make. They work so hard, I'm not drinking for myself, I'm drinking on behalf of the county party committee and government, representing them in thanking the cadres who have made sacrifices and contributions." (D27, County Party Secretary in J2 Province, June 2015)

To some extent, in the perception of superior officials, especially county party secretaries, drinking (particularly excessive drinking) in these scenarios is not only not a bad practice but, on the contrary, has a strong moral legitimacy. It becomes a moral obligation that superiors must bear in the governance process. Driven by this moral legitimacy, even when the physical conditions of all actors at the dinner table are unsuitable for continued drinking, they often continue to drink. What's important is not the alcohol itself but the process of drinking together to express emotions, achieve resonance, and enhance organizational identity and cohesion.

▍Aspect of Non-Institutionalized Governance Tasks III: A Large Number of Temporary and Phase-Based Work

A further question is, what kind of organizational incentives does drinking behavior provide? We will answer this in conjunction with the third aspect of non-institutionalized governance tasks - a large number of temporary and phase-based work. There are two advantages to answering this question in this section: First, drinking behavior here directly targets specific governance tasks, more clearly identifying its position in the concrete governance process. Second, the organizational incentives here apply to both township cadres and department officials (there are some differences in the logic behind these two types of situations, which the author will detail in the conclusion).

Urban major project promotion, "creating civilized and hygienic cities," rural fire prevention and burning bans, and widespread land acquisition and demolition all belong to temporary, phase-based work. These tasks are time-intensive, high-responsibility, and heavy-duty, requiring a large number of personnel to work around the clock. To advance the work, superior leaders, especially secretaries, often adopt a very harsh working style, "giving orders without leeway," "pushing progress as if pushing for life," and "scolding people regardless of occasion or face."

Our secretary is usually fine, but once he starts on a project, he becomes a bandit, able to curse loudly in any situation. Last year, the district launched a large batch of projects. So, the secretary required all committee office, bureau, and town street team members to work on Saturdays. Many people had objections: Why? And no overtime pay. He didn't care, had the office and organization department check attendance, personally led surprise inspections, disciplined those caught, and scolded at meetings: "Don't want to work overtime? Complaining about no overtime pay? Whoever doesn't want to work overtime can give up their position, plenty of people are willing to work overtime." (W51, Director of a certain bureau in a district of X2 Province, April 2015)

It should be noted that the harsh style should not be mainly attributed to personal quality; it is largely shaped by the environment because this style is most conducive to completing governance tasks.

I know everyone below says my style is harsh. Among secretaries who can achieve results, how many don't have a harsh style? County-level work has to be done this way. I worked in the provincial department for a few years, rarely losing my temper then. Why? There were no urgent, life-or-death matters there. (D33, County Party Secretary of a county in G1 Province, October 2015)

However, although the harsh style helps achieve governance goals, it also causes serious estrangement and trauma between superiors and subordinates, which will eventually erupt after long-term accumulation. Therefore, those superior officials who are harsh in promoting work often take the initiative to organize gatherings after the work is completed satisfactorily to win back hearts at the dining table.

When the work is done, everyone needs to be rewarded. Money should be given out; commendations should be made. In addition, we need to gather for a drink. When doing things, I've offended almost everyone below me, some people were scolded by me every day, didn't go home for a month, they must have been cursing me in their hearts. So, I need to repair relationships. I gather those who contributed the most for a drink; sometimes, I even go especially to drink with the units that contributed the most. Of course, it's impossible to take care of everyone, so let other leaders handle the rest. After this repair, when there's another big project next time, I can continue to make them work overtime and continue to scold them. (D25, County Party Secretary of a county in H3 Province, June 2015)

The organizational incentives in drinking interactions include three aspects: First, superiors express respect and recognition for subordinates' personhood and work, and subordinates also express understanding for superiors. Over the course of drinking, interactions are frequent, and the atmosphere is harmonious. Aided by the effects of alcohol and the atmosphere at the table, superiors and subordinates engage in dialogues like:

"Brother, don't blame me; it was all for work, I'll drink this glass to apologize," "I know it's not easy for you. You haven't been able to take care of your family much; this time, it all depended on you," "Leader, don't say that; you pushing me helps me improve; it's right for me to be scolded when I don't do well."

Second, it constructs a temporary equal status between superiors and subordinates. "At the drinking table, there are only brothers, no big or small officials," which both create an image of approachable superiors and allow scolded subordinates to release pressure. Third, sometimes it even allows subordinates to "bully" superiors to "vent."

Rural fire prevention in winter and burning bans in summer and autumn often last for half a month, with all township personnel dispersed across the mountains. It's either extremely hot or bitterly cold. In the past, when management was looser, they could get a daily allowance of one or two hundred yuan. But during the New Year holiday, who would willingly freeze half to death in the mountains for this small amount of money? Everyone is forced to go, and there's always some resentment. So, when the task is completed, the township gathers everyone for a big drinking session. On these occasions, the party secretary and township head always drink more, making a spectacle of themselves to amuse everyone. I also attend some of these township gatherings and drink heavily with them. My alcohol tolerance is average, so I often end up passing out. When everyone sees that the secretary can drink so much and eventually has to be carried out, they laugh heartily, and most of their resentment dissipates. (W47, District Party Secretary of a district in S2 Province, March 2015)

Conclusion and Discussion

(1) Governance Logic at the Drinking Table

Based on rich empirical material, this paper examines the driving mechanisms behind officials' drinking behavior in specific government governance contexts. Compared to existing research's broader discussions, this paper distinguishes between four types of officials: township officials, department officials, other superiors (non-top leaders), and county party secretaries. It discusses their different identities (actors/strategy targets), behavioral strategies, and specific roles of drinking behavior in different situations, starting from three governance dilemmas. The following table systematically presents the governance logic at the drinking table, synthesizing the entire paper's discussion.

Further explanation is needed to clarify that, under the same governance dilemma, although different officials may all choose drinking strategies, there are differences among them due to varying institutional environments and governance needs. This has not been fully discussed earlier and will be elaborated on here.

First, in the information deficit dilemma, both township officials and department officials adopt drinking strategies, but the latter do so less frequently and to a lesser degree. The reason is that, as mentioned earlier, departments have clear county-level supervising leaders, with frequent work contact and sufficient information exchange. Therefore, they generally don't need to build trust with their supervising leaders through drinking. However, they still need to convey information and build trust with superiors who don't directly supervise them through drinking behavior. Nevertheless, this need is relatively small, as their promotion primarily depends on the opinion of their supervising leader, and their career paths are mainly within their own system or related fields (i.e., within the scope of their supervising leader's supervision). In contrast, township officials don't have clear supervising leaders, and their promotion paths are less clear, requiring them to convey information and build trust with as many superiors as possible. On the other hand, departments have fewer drinking opportunities. All county-level leaders have work connections with townships and have tasks to visit townships, but they rarely have work connections with departments outside their own supervisory domains. Therefore, department officials have fewer opportunities to drink with other county-level leaders for official business compared to township officials.

Second, the resource dilemma is mainly manifested in township governance. Specifically, townships are comprehensive "blocks" where all resources can be allocated to or withheld from a particular township institutionally. Departments are specialized "lines" that generally don't need resources outside their line to carry out their work. However, departments sometimes need help from other departments, so they may also become actors, using drinking to express sincerity and seek resources from other department officials, county-level leaders who don't supervise them, or the county party secretary, conducting business at the drinking table. This includes two specific situations: First, some daily work requires cooperation from other units. For example, urban construction is the responsibility of the construction department, but it also needs help from urban management, finance, and other departments. However, formal institutions rarely stipulate the obligation of related departments to assist, so construction department officials need to seek cooperation on their own. Second, the resources needed to respond to emergencies often exceed the capabilities of the business department. Therefore, department officials usually try to maintain good relationships with officials in areas such as politics and law, propaganda, etc., in hopes that they will provide assistance when emergencies occur.

Third, all superiors face the dilemma of temporary, phased work and insufficient organizational incentives. However, due to differences in work responsibilities, these dilemmas affect county party secretaries more frequently and to a greater degree than other superiors. Correspondingly, their motivation to take action is also higher. For example, the head of the propaganda department will face the aforementioned dilemmas in "creating a civilized and hygienic city," the deputy county head in charge of agriculture will face these dilemmas in fire prevention and burning bans, and different major projects will present these dilemmas to different supervising leaders. Outside their respective domains, deputy officials generally neither need to take on much responsibility nor can they claim it as their own achievement. However, for the party secretary, everything done well is their achievement, and everything done poorly is their potential risk.

Moreover, from the micro perspective of individual motivation, based on the culture of personal relationships, multiple considerations of norm compliance and instrumental logic constrain officials' drinking behavior. In this aspect, there are some differences between superiors and subordinates. Specifically, for subordinates, especially those in poor health, the benefits of drinking behavior may not outweigh the costs of harming their health. Therefore, if only instrumental considerations were at play, they would be more likely to choose to drink less or not at all. However, the long-term operation of drinking culture has also produced implicit norms. Drinking less or not drinking, especially in front of superiors, would be seen as lacking in human touch and breaking the rules, leaving a negative impression within the group and causing a loss of existing benefits. As a result, the potential losses and possible gains combined would outweigh the costs, prompting them to choose to drink. However, it is difficult to distinguish based on specific situations whether it is the consideration of preventing losses or seeking gains that dominates a subordinate's certain type of drinking behavior. This is more individual-dependent rather than situation-determined.

In contrast, different situations do have different effects on superiors' drinking behavior. Taking the county party secretary as an example, the organizational incentives they provide include two categories: First, routine incentives are mainly based on norm compliance considerations. Not drinking would be seen as failing to fulfill moral obligations, resulting in negative evaluations of not being considerate of subordinates. Second, specific incentives for certain work involve more instrumental considerations. This doesn't mean that the secretary can choose whether to drink or not, but rather that they can choose the drinking table. In routine incentives, they can't choose the drinking table (they must go to townships for work needs), and once at the table, they should drink. In specific incentives, they are neither obligated nor able to participate in all related drinking sessions, so they will selectively participate in some based on importance and work performance. Other superiors are similar to the secretary, but their motivation to drink is weaker.

Furthermore, regarding unclear work connections, other superiors have more instrumental considerations. This is reflected in their willingness to drink until drunk with township officials but generally not with department officials. This is because unclear work connections mainly refer to the implementation of "line" work by "blocks," and institutions do not clearly stipulate the responsibilities of "blocks" in this regard.

(2) How to Change the Drinking Culture in Official Circles?

After the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, governing the drinking culture in official circles became an important part of the fight against the "Four Winds" (formalism, bureaucratism, hedonism, and extravagance), achieving notable results. By strictly controlling the quality of alcohol and prohibiting drinking at lunch, reception costs were significantly reduced, and work efficiency improved. The anti-"Four Winds" campaign externally suppressed the escalating drinking culture in official circles.

However, building on the success of the anti-"Four Winds" campaign, eradicating the drinking culture in official circles still requires addressing deeper governance challenges, namely replacing the role of drinking behavior in governance with institutional mechanisms. A series of national governance modernization initiatives currently underway are expected to comprehensively transform the governance environment that induces the official drinking culture. These initiatives are not specifically proposed to govern the drinking culture, but their effects may be superior to measures that solely focus on drinking.

Firstly, improving the level of institutionalization in governance:

1. Decentralizing governance resources. In grassroots governance, townships have many tasks but few resources and lack a reasonable allocation system. Township officials need to use personal relationships to compete for resources, thus embedding drinking behavior into governance. If townships could have more resources with reasonable allocation, the motivation for drinking would decrease. China is currently promoting reforms in this area. President Xi Jinping has repeatedly emphasized: "Put resources, services, and management at the grassroots level as much as possible, giving the grassroots the position, authority, and means." In 2019, Beijing's "Whistle-Blowing and Reporting" reform received high praise from the central government, calling for nationwide learning. Its essence is to decentralize resources to townships.

2. Clarifying the relationship between rights and responsibilities. Unclear work connections require superiors to develop personal relationships with subordinates, which can be alleviated in two ways. Regarding relationships with departments, societal development brings many new governance affairs that often exceed the original departmental authority and the division of work among county-level leaders. The current institutional reform aims to redefine governance authorities, helping to alleviate related dilemmas. For townships, the excessive workload determines that they can only complete some tasks assigned by superiors while perfunctorily dealing with others. Superiors thus need to compete for subordinate support to avoid being dealt with perfunctorily. However, many tasks are unnecessary. In 2019, the central government specifically issued a "Notice on Solving Prominent Problems of Formalism and Reducing Burden at the Grassroots Level." Therefore, if the total number of tasks can be reduced, enabling the grassroots to complete (rather than perfunctorily deal with) most governance tasks, the motivation for superiors to compete for subordinate support through drinking behavior would also weaken.

3. China is in a period of rapid development, resulting in many temporary and phased tasks in grassroots governance, such as poverty alleviation and urban construction. Formal institutional incentives cannot meet the needs of these tasks, so superiors need to provide organizational incentives through personal behavior. However, these tasks will naturally decrease as the development stage changes.

Secondly, while improving the level of institutionalization in governance is a fundamental solution, it must be recognized that grassroots governance cannot be completely institutionalized. There will always be gray areas in the relationship between superiors and subordinates' rights and responsibilities, and some temporary tasks are inevitable (such as fire prevention and burning bans). For such situations, it is necessary to improve compensation and incentive mechanisms (such as overtime pay, major project rewards, etc.) to replace organizational incentives provided by superiors' personal behavior with formal systems.

Finally, the information dilemma in the pyramid structure may be difficult to change in the short term. However, if the aforementioned governance methods are fully implemented, they can largely curb the drinking culture in official circles. Specifically, if both superiors and subordinates are fully motivated, it's easy to drink excessively. But when the superiors' motivation to drink is eliminated, it becomes difficult for subordinates to initiate frequent toasts.

Additionally, exploring the parallel system of positions and ranks can help reduce subordinates' motivation to drink. The reason is that to obtain a position promotion; subordinates must convey information and build trust with enough superiors, giving drinking behavior a role to play. Rank promotion, however, is mainly a threshold system where superiors play a relatively smaller role. Long-term research shows that many grassroots officials may not care much about position promotions, but because all benefits are tied to positions, they can only compete fiercely for limited positions. With the choice of ranks, their motivation to establish personal relationships with superiors will also weaken.