The Deepening China–Japan Standoff

Why Beijing Is So Furious About Takaichi’s Remarks

Head of the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau, Masaaki Kanai, arrived in Beijing on Monday amid growing tensions over Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi’s statements, which hinted at the possibility of Japan’s armed intervention in the Taiwan Strait. Today, he met with his Chinese counterpart, Liu Jinsong.

The Chinese official readout stated:

During the consultations, the Chinese side once again made solemn representations to the Japanese side regarding the erroneous remarks about China made by Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae, pointing out that Takaichi’s fallacious statements seriously violate international law and basic principles of international relations, seriously undermine the post-war international order, seriously contravene the one-China principle and the spirit of the four China-Japan political documents, fundamentally damage the political foundation of China-Japan relations, and are extremely vicious in nature and impact, arousing the indignation and condemnation of the Chinese people. The Chinese side solemnly urged the Japanese side to retract the erroneous remarks, cease creating incidents on China-related issues, acknowledge mistakes and make corrections through concrete actions, and safeguard the political foundation of China-Japan relations.

It’s sad to see that bilateral relations have reached this stage. Especially at the early this year, it seemed so hopeful during the Ishiba administration.

I also saw a frame published on the latest episode of

Sinocism

saying that

PM Takaichi’s remarks about a “crisis situation threatening Japan’s existence(存立危機事態）” solely mean that if the U.S. military intervenes in a Taiwan contingency, Japan could exercise its right of collective self-defense to support that action. It does not imply Japan would independently intervene in a Taiwan contingency, yet the Chinese government is deliberately portraying it that way. (Or perhaps, due to distrust toward Takaichi, China may genuinely believe this misinterpretation to be true. At least, Japan experts understand this is a misunderstanding yet deliberately spread it).

However, this reading does not align with what Takaichi actually said.

In her answer, Takaichi skipped over all such preconditions. She did not frame the issue as “if the US intervenes, then Japan has to exercise collective self-defense.” According to the report of The Japan Times, when asked what kinds of situations could be regarded as a survival-threatening situation, her answer was essentially:

If battleships are used and a naval blockade involves the use of force, I believe that would, by any measure, constitute a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan

In other words, she directly presented Taiwan as a contingency itself that could trigger 存立危機事態, without tying it to prior US military involvement.

I checked the definition of that in Japan’s 2023 Defence White Paper. Here’s the definition in Japanese and English:

「存立危機事態」とは、わが国と密接な関係にある他国に対する武力攻撃が発生し、これによりわが国の存立が脅かされ、国民の生命、自由及び幸福追求の権利が根底から覆される明白な危険がある事態。

Survival-threatening situation” refers to a situation where an armed attack occurs against another country that has a close relationship with our country, and this threatens our country’s survival and poses a clear danger of fundamentally overturning the people’s rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

But under Japan’s own official position, Taiwan is not recognized as a “country.” Tokyo adheres to the “one China” policy and does not have diplomatic relations with Taiwan as a state. So how exactly does a Taiwan contingency fit into a clause that explicitly refers to “another country”?

I don’t want to overstate this or assume bad faith too easily, but it’s hard not to ignore the implication. If a sitting prime minister casually discusses a Taiwan contingency as a potential 存立危機事態, while the legal text is framed around “another country,” it becomes reasonable for China to view this as a salami-slicing of the Taiwan status issue.

Takaichi is a political heir to Abe Shinzo. After stepping down, Abe emphasized multiple times that “a contingency in Taiwan is a contingency for Japan,” tying to link the Taiwan issue to Japan’s national security. So when Takaichi now says that a Taiwan crisis could amount to a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan, it’s natural that China sees this as a continuation and extension of Abe’s line. It’s not Beijing “misreading her as Abe,” but about seeing her as taking one step further along the same security narrative and actively poking a hole in strategic ambiguity.

Considering the US is still sticking to strategic ambiguity — deliberately refusing to say clearly whether it would send troops if there were a crisis in the Taiwan Strait, when a Japanese PM openly links a “Taiwan contingency” to a Japanese “survival-threatening situation,” China naturally reads it’s a Japanese active attempt to get involved and to test how others will react. From Beijing’s perspective, it’s also an outward push to connect the chain of “Taiwan in crisis → Japan in crisis → U.S.–Japan alliance steps in.” Being dragged in under US pressure is one thing; actively breaking strategic ambiguity while Washington itself is still keeping things vague is, in China’s eyes, something it cannot accept.

That also explained why the later comment that she won’t cite specific examples again doesn’t really calm Chinese concerns. For Beijing, it actually confirms two points. First, this kind of scenario is not some media invention; it’s a real option being discussed in Japanese policy and security circles. Second, the reason she walked it back is tactical — a response to external backlash and diplomatic pressure — rather than a fundamental rejection of the idea itself.

Seen this way, Takaichi’s remarks look to Beijing like an aborted attempt at a policy “solo run”独走: she floated the idea, saw the strong reaction, then pulled back for the moment — but the underlying intention she revealed can’t be taken back.

I don’t want to dwell too much on history, but whenever Chinese officials or analysts see Japanese politicians taking the lead in “testing the boundaries,” they very naturally fit it into a pattern of “acting alone → testing reactions → creating a fait accompli” which Japanese officers used a lot during the WWII period. So it’s not accurate to say China is misunderstanding Takaichi’s words. A more fitting interpretation is that Beijing views them as a concrete extension of Abe’s “a Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency” line, and as a small but deliberate step by Japan toward “strategic clarity” in its language, while the US remains officially ambiguous. From that perspective, Beijing believes it has to push back diplomatically and force Takaichi to walk back her statement.