Soft Words, Long Game: A Chinese Decoding of America's National Security Strategy
Embracing a Han Feizi-style focus on internal strength, pursuing a Nixonian retrenchment to wage long-term technological competition
As the U.S. published its new National Security Strategy last week, it has inevitably become a trending topic among the Chinese IR circle. And today, I want to share an article by Meng Weizhan, a researcher at the Fudan Institute for Advanced Study in Social Sciences.
I think it’s worth sharing because his view reflects a large number of thoughts within China’s strategic community. Meng argues that the report’s seemingly softer tone is not a retreat. The U.S. is shifting from high-cost ideological confrontation to a more sustainable, long-term strategy centered on realist competition. He compares this to the ancient Chinese statesman Han Feizi’s emphasis on internal strength over external alliances. The primary battlefield is now economics and technology—what he terms “Technological Machiavellianism”—where the U.S. aims to secure decisive, enduring advantages.
Meng warns that beneath the surface, the strategy seeks to consolidate a “civilizational” alliance among Western nations while internally focusing on strengthening the U.S. economy and tech base. Notably, Meng draws a parallel between Trump’s current posture and the Nixonian strategy of retrenchment—pulling back temporarily to regroup and solidify foundations for long-term competition. The goal is to wage a lower-cost constraint on China’s rise over decades, not through loud confrontation but through persistent pressure and structural advantage.
Meng’s suggestion is clear; do not be misled by the change in rhetoric. The fundamental U.S. objective of maintaining primacy remains unchanged. The solution, in the author’s view, is for China to stay focused on its own development, accelerate innovation, and prepare for a protracted competition where strategic patience and internal strengthening are paramount.
The article was first published on the WeChat Public Account of Greater Bay Area Review大湾区评论. Thanks to Meng’s authorization, I can share the English ver. Below is the full text
当美国开始“休养生息”，特朗普新国安战略背后的长期布局
On the evening of December 4, 2025, the White House of the United States finally released the long-delayed new version of the National Security Strategy (NSS). In reality, the report’s content offers nothing new; it is merely a systematic integration of the positions repeatedly advocated by former President Trump during the 2024 presidential campaign. In other words, the strategy was formulated during last year’s election and has been implemented for nearly a year; it is not a sudden, novel concept. Following the report’s release, think tanks from both major U.S. political parties immediately offered contrasting interpretations and evaluations: Democratic-aligned groups called it “a betrayal of U.S. national interests and a declaration of global retreat,” while Republican-aligned groups claimed the report demonstrates Trump’s unwavering resolve to defend the nation’s interests. Such polarized commentary is hardly surprising—the high degree of political polarization in contemporary America ensures that virtually any issue is viewed through starkly partisan lenses. The controversy surrounding the NSS reflects more about partisan bias than it does a genuine engagement with the report’s strategic implications. It is imperative for us to see beyond the fog of partisan strife, rationally assess the significant impact and potential dangers this report poses for China, and not be misled by the superficial clamor of America’s internal conflicts.
I. The Report Does Not Necessarily Reflect the True Intentions of the Trump Administration Toward China
On the surface, the language concerning China in the new NSS appears somewhat “toned down.” Unlike the 2017 NSS, which under Trump directly labeled China a “competitor” or “challenge,” this report deliberately softens such rhetoric, avoiding explicitly labeling China as a “threat” to the U.S. Among the four listed priorities, China and the Indo-Pacific are positioned relatively lower. When enumerating America’s top concerns, the report first emphasizes homeland security and border control (e.g., combating illegal immigration, drug cartels), followed by dominance in the Western Hemisphere (reviving the “Monroe Doctrine”), then economic security (reindustrialization and supply chain security), and only finally mentions China and the Indo-Pacific region. This ordering suggests that, in the eyes of the Trump administration, addressing domestic and “backyard” issues is prioritized over direct confrontation with China.
More notably, the report largely avoids using overly provocative labels to describe China. The NSS even states that the U.S. and China should pursue “a truly reciprocal economic relationship,” framing the bilateral dynamic more as a competition of interests rather than a clash of values. The report neither prominently hypes the “China threat” as in the past, nor does it frequently mention China’s political system. Since the 1980s, every U.S. National Security Strategy document has referenced the issue of China’s democratization. Therefore, it is evident that the new NSS uses considerably milder language toward China compared to its predecessors.
However, we must not be lulled into complacency by this apparent “softening.” Multiple media outlets have revealed that the NSS was originally scheduled for earlier release but was delayed for weeks at the request of Treasury Secretary Bassett to modify its content on China. A Politico report confirms this: Bassett requested a “softening” of some language concerning China because Washington and Beijing were engaged in sensitive trade negotiations at the time. It can be inferred that the initial draft of the NSS held a more hardline position toward China than the final version, which we have not seen. In other words, the Trump administration’s attitude toward China is not as “diluted” as the public text suggests; more aggressive rhetoric was likely suppressed for tactical reasons. This also reflects the internal struggle within the U.S. regarding how to approach China, a result of competing demands from various factions.
Regardless, it is certain that the new strategy’s level of toughness toward China is lower than the 2017 version. The 2017 NSS, spearheaded by then-National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster, unequivocally positioned China as a “revisionist rival,” filled with belligerent language. Reportedly, Trump himself did not even read the full document carefully before hastily releasing it, leading to McMaster’s replacement soon after due to ideological differences. In contrast, the 2025 NSS better reflects Trump’s own thinking and exhibits more restrained wording. However, changes in rhetoric do not mean the U.S. no longer views China as a competitor. The Trump administration’s move away from highly visible displays of strength toward China may simply represent a shift in tactics to secure a more advantageous position.
II. Debates over Rhetorical Hardness or Softness Do Not Alter the Fundamental Positioning of China
Interestingly, following the release of Trump’s new NSS, divisions also emerged within China’s public discourse and strategic circles: for example, the wording on the Taiwan issue was interpreted differently, with some seeing a softening compared to the past and others seeing continued toughness. In reality, however the U.S. chooses to characterize China, it will not fundamentally change its overarching strategic objectives and positioning regarding China. Historical experience shows that deep-seated, often unavoidable, divergences and contradictions frequently exist between the world’s leading power and the second-ranked rising power. The most powerful nation is unlikely to “give a pass” to the rapidly ascending second power; objectively, the two are bound to enter a state of competition or even conflict. This structural rivalry will not qualitatively change based on the harshness or mildness of language in a single document.
The report’s emphasis on focusing on internal construction can, on another level, be interpreted as precisely aiming to strengthen national power domestically to ultimately better address China, the foremost external challenge. This is well understood within the U.S. strategic community: an analysis by the Atlantic Council points out that the new NSS attempts to draw a connection between security in the Americas and deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, emphasizing that ensuring stability in the Western Hemisphere is actually about enabling greater focus on containing Beijing in the Indo-Pacific. Therefore, the pressure China faces from the U.S. is unlikely to diminish simply because of a few conciliatory phrases. While the Trump administration ostensibly claims to “focus domestically,” the ultimate objective remains serving the strategic competition with China—this has not wavered in the slightest.
In this sense, debating whether U.S. policy toward China is “tough” or “soft” holds little significance. The underlying basis of U.S. strategy toward China remains constant: maintaining its own advantageous position and preventing or containing China’s rise. Merely counting how many times the word “China” appears in the document is rather meaningless. The new U.S. NSS is, in fact, targeting China throughout, just less overtly. We must see through this deceptive facade and recognize its strategic intent.
III. The Emerging Consensus on China Strategy: Pursuing a Low-Cost, Enduring Competition
The new NSS indicates the Trump administration is working to build a new consensus on China policy: pursuing a relatively low-cost, sustainable long-term strategy toward China, rather than the high-cost, comprehensive confrontation of the past. The report’s language subtly conveys an important message: many U.S. strategists are beginning to acknowledge that American hegemony is in decline, or at least that a relative weakening of power is a factual reality at this stage. Given this, the U.S. must adjust its old strategy and design an approach to competing with China that matches its own national strength. Trump surely also knows that 19th-century America was not the most powerful period in history, yet he can only nostalgically recall that Gilded Age. This is less about grand ambition and more about necessity. Deep down, most Americans are unwilling to relinquish global hegemony, but faced with reality, they have had to temper their once aggressive posture. In recent years, the Biden administration implemented comprehensive containment against China, achieving some results but at a high economic cost to the U.S. and causing domestic discontent. Trump advocates building a truly sustainable competitive strategy toward China: it should neither recklessly suppress China as in the short-term past, resulting in mutual damage, nor should it severely impact American livelihoods due to external competition. No matter how brilliant a strategy, it cannot endure without public support. While the Biden era’s tough policy toward China was intense, its massive investment made it unsustainable. In contrast, Trump seeks a “persistent, low-cost drip” containment plan for China—suppressing China’s development over the long term without significantly harming the quality of life for ordinary Americans.
The sophistication of this concept lies in its strategic continuity. Trump and his supporters hope that by appealing to domestic voters, their foreign policy strategy can gain durable, bipartisan support, avoiding the pattern where successive Democratic and Republican administrations undo each other’s foreign policy achievements. If such a strategy can be executed uninterrupted over multiple terms, its cumulative advantages will gradually become apparent, potentially leading to a significant lead over China in comprehensive national power. Beneath the populist veneer of “America First,” the new strategy still seeks to maintain U.S. dominance over global peace and security. Future acceptance of this adjustment across the American political spectrum is likely to increase. Many once dismissed Trump’s approach, but over time, his views may gradually become the consensus. Even Democrats will likely accept this somewhat isolationist-leaning course to some degree, albeit varying in extent. The pendulum of U.S. foreign policy thought is swinging back from idealism toward realism; whoever is in power must consider public dissatisfaction with war expenditure and economic stagnation.
In other words, the U.S. strategic community is contemplating a new paradigm: how to suppress China over the long term at a lower cost. This represents a new equilibrium reached through eight years of strategic contest between China and the U.S. The new NSS is a concentrated expression of this thinking: it highlights domestic renewal and consolidation of the Western Hemisphere, lowers the tone on foreign intervention, appearing to retreat but actually seeking an alternative path. China must be vigilant against this subtle, pervasive change—the adversary is no longer loudly shouting anti-China slogans, but pressure on China may manifest in a more concealed, enduring, and difficult-to-counter form.
IV. Economics and Technology as the Decisive Battlefield: “Technological Machiavellianism”
Another major feature of the new NSS is the reduction of ideological attacks on China while sharpening the focus on more “lethal” arenas—economics and technology. The report explicitly states: “Economics are the ultimate stakes.” Many officials in the Trump administration believe in and support a “technology accelerationism” strategy: choosing to retreat in some traditional or high-cost areas (like new energy, climate agenda), but heavily investing in future core technologies like artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and biotechnology to achieve leapfrog development. Breakthroughs in these frontier technologies will directly translate into advancements in U.S. military technology and economic efficiency, widening the power gap with China—a prospect posing the greatest threat to China.
Some argue that Trump’s conservative policies will lead to U.S. technological decline, for example, withdrawing from new energy and tightening immigration could harm innovation. However, this view lacks sufficient basis and likely underestimates or lulls us into complacency regarding U.S. technological potential. In fact, the new NSS consistently emphasizes the need for the U.S. to consolidate its technological leadership. The report explicitly calls for revitalizing the defense industrial and manufacturing base, ensuring dominance in cutting-edge technologies like AI, quantum computing, and supercomputing. The White House views advanced technology as a core component of 21st-century American power; Trump treats it as an absolute priority, even willing to sacrifice unrelated fields to concentrate resources. In these areas, U.S. national investment will only increase, striving to set global standards for new technologies. It can be said that the Trump administration practices a form of “Technological Machiavellianism”: discarding ideological baggage and seizing geopolitical advantage solely through technological and economic prowess.
In a sense, concentrating efforts on developing the economy and technology yields faster results than traditional alliance-building policies. In the past, the U.S. was keen on rallying allies into “values-based alliances” to politically encircle China; Trump prefers to prevail through competition in industrial strength and technological innovation. This strategy may be more pragmatic and efficient. Internal governance is the foundation of a nation; foreign policy is its extension. As the ancient Chinese philosopher Han Feizi韩非子 said, “A state’s strength and stability cannot be demanded from external sources; they depend on internal governance.”（治强不可责于外，内政之有也） He criticized the alliance strategies promoted by diplomats like Su Qin and Zhang Yi as essentially “benefiting the outside world while harming the domestic,” arguing they helped other states but over the long term weakened a country’s rule of law and autonomy. If a country excels in internal governance, external support will naturally follow. Trump is taking the “economic card” to its extreme, practicing thorough realism by strengthening itself rather than relying on allies to indirectly weaken opponents.
Of course, the Trump administration does not entirely abandon allies but demands that allies become more “self-reliant” economically and in defense, no longer dragging down the U.S. The report bluntly states that Europe should “stand on its own two feet and assume primary responsibility for its own defense”; the Middle East should no longer consume U.S. strategic resources; Indo-Pacific allies must share more security burdens. The purpose of these measures is to free up American resources to fully focus on domestic economic and technological development. Trump aims to discard high-cost, slow-result methods and instead use more cost-effective ways to pressure China. For China, this “bloodless” economic and technological front poses greater long-term danger. As the U.S. concentrates resources to achieve key technological leaps and reshape industrial chain advantages, we will face unprecedented strategic pressure.
V. From Liberalism to Realism: The Shift in U.S. Strategic Philosophy for Containing China
The new NSS under Trump reflects a fundamental shift in U.S. strategic philosophy toward China: realism is returning to center stage, replacing the liberal and pluralist ideologies that dominated post-Cold War thinking. Since the Cold War’s end, the U.S. pursued liberal and multilateral foreign policies, repeatedly attempting to export its own values and political system, believing this could transform other nations to align with U.S. economic and political interests. However, reality often fell short: most countries did not change their models as America intended. The U.S. paid a heavy price for exporting values with limited returns. Worse, the double-edged sword of pluralism also harmed America itself: on one hand, it shaped U.S. soft power, creating dependencies; on the other, the U.S. bore heavy costs in promoting its values, while domestic divisions over ideology weakened national capacity. These frustrations led many Americans to believe they gained little from geopolitical competition.
Trump essentially discards the liberal foreign policy fantasy in favor of bare-knuckled realpolitik. As he stated in his inaugural address, he aims to return U.S. foreign policy to “common sense.” This “common sense” is essentially the enduring law of the jungle in international politics: power is paramount, money rules, and interests are exchanged. The new NSS completely sheds moral packaging, filled with accusations against allies and ridicule of the “establishment elite,” while using ambiguous language toward Russia. On Europe, the report even directs fire at traditional U.S. allies, harshly criticizing European elites for “restricting freedoms and undermining democracy,” claiming the continent faces a threat of “civilizational demise.” This anomaly indicates that, in Trump’s view, the world is no longer about competing value blocs but a life-and-death struggle for civilizational survival and interests. He believes the U.S. no longer needs to bear losses for ideological allies but should act like shrewd businessmen, calculating every transaction clearly. Terms like “democracy” and “human rights” are extremely scarce in the entire NSS. The U.S. government even declares willingness to cooperate with countries of differing ideologies as long as they “do not undermine our core interests.” It can be said that realist philosophy is becoming the guiding principle for Trump’s strategy toward China and the world.
This shift has dual implications for China: On one hand, we will face a U.S. that openly “plays by no rules.” Trump’s America can unabashedly tear up agreements and shed pretenses, willing to turn hostile whenever profitable. This means future U.S. actions in trade, diplomacy, and security may become more unilateral and arbitrary, increasing uncertainty in the international order. On the other hand, Trump’s extreme realism often manifests as “bullying the weak while fearing the strong.” Realists are typically more cautious than liberals; they act only when confident of victory and avoid provoking evenly matched opponents. Trump himself has repeatedly expressed reluctance for direct conflict with China and Russia, showing particular caution toward truly powerful rivals. Conversely, the U.S. may intensify pressure on weaker nations, even allies. For example, since taking office, Trump has repeatedly targeted countries much weaker than the U.S., such as Venezuela, Denmark, Canada, Mexico, Ukraine, Brazil, and India, among others. Under this jungle logic, international relations may see more bullying, with some smaller and medium-sized nations even facing open coercion and crude interference from the U.S.
Interestingly, realist diplomacy, though seemingly brutal, may not be entirely negative for others. For other countries, a realist America might be easier to understand and deal with. Once the U.S. discards its “liberal democracy” mask, its demands become very straightforward—money, power, or resources. This might make it easier for countries with different systems to reach understanding and compromise, as ideological differences can be set aside if interests align. Therefore, in the long run, America’s turn toward realism might reduce sharp ideological confrontations in international relations. For China, while we must be vigilant against America’s tougher pursuit of interests, there may also be new opportunities for finding common ground in certain areas. In this context, managing Sino-U.S. contradictions and securing respective reasonable interests will test our diplomatic wisdom.
VI. Uniting Alliances through “Civilization”: Constructing a New Containment Posture against China
One of the striking features of the new NSS is Trump’s attempt to use a “civilizational” narrative to unify the Western camp and create greater combined pressure against China. For the first time, the report places “civilizational threats” above “ideological threats,” emphasizing that the primary challenge facing the U.S. and the West exists at the civilizational level. Such phrasing is unprecedented post-Cold War. Previously, the U.S. habitually highlighted ideological threats to shape a binary “us vs. them” opposition. But Trump’s NSS shifts the focus inward toward the West itself: it claims the European continent is mired in a crisis of “civilizational self-erasure,” criticizing the EU’s political system and social policies as threatening the future of Western civilization.
The report uses rather sensational language to depict Europe’s situation: for example, warning that “if current trends continue, Europe will be unrecognizable in 20 years,” noting Europe’s declining share of global GDP, surging minority populations, and that “some NATO members will have non-European majorities within decades.” This is defined in the report as a crisis of “civilizational erasure” facing Europe. Clearly, the Trump administration believes Western civilization is being eroded from within—mass immigration, proliferation of multiculturalism, so-called political correctness suppressing traditional values are all seen as more serious threats than ideological enemies. U.S. Vice President Vance earlier this year accused some European nations of suppressing right-wing populist parties and restricting speech, calling these “elite-driven anti-democratic measures” that undermine core Western freedoms. The report declares: “The growing influence of patriotic European parties is indeed an encouraging sign.” The implication is that the U.S. will tacitly support Europe’s anti-establishment right-wing populist forces to steer Europe back onto a traditional nation-state path, “make it great again,” and thus safeguard Western civilization.
Such language would be unthinkable in past official U.S. documents. On the surface, directing fire at Europe’s internal problems seems to shift U.S. attention away from China, potentially easing China’s pressure within U.S. strategy, as the main enemy appears to be Europe’s liberal elite rather than China. However, in reality, Trump’s ultimate intent in playing the “civilization card” remains to deal with China. By uniting the West internally into a tighter alliance based on shared civilizational identity (primarily white Christian civilization), the U.S. hopes to draw Europe back to its side to jointly address challenges from “other civilizations.”
Simply put, Trump is attempting to create a civilizational version of the “new Cold War.” The Cold War era was the liberal democratic camp versus the communist camp; now he wants to shape a “Western civilization camp” against forces allegedly threatening Western civilization. Although the report does not explicitly name China as a civilizational threat, the hints are clear—it places non-Western powers like China in an opposing position. After all, without the rise of external competitors, why would “Western civilization” suddenly feel so existentially threatened? One can imagine that if Trump successfully pushes European politics rightward, establishes a more “homogeneous” Western alliance, and fully consolidates control over the Western Hemisphere and Latin America geopolitically, then the next hypothetical adversary for this alliance would inevitably be the largest “alien civilization”—China.
Therefore, China should not let its guard down due to the seemingly softened language toward China in the U.S. NSS. Currently, the West is embroiled in internal ethnic and cultural struggles, temporarily alleviating strategic pressure on China. Although the structural contradictions between China and the U.S. have never been eliminated or reduced, various internal U.S. divisions have kept these contradictions from becoming prominent. However, in the future, we may face a Western camp with stronger internal cohesion and less ideological noise, taking more forceful and unified containment actions against China. Such an alliance based on civilizational identity might prove more offensive and destructive than the loose values-based alliances of the past. We must closely monitor the rise of “civilizational discourse” within the West and its impact on China policy.
VII. “Learning from China to Counter China”: U.S. Bipartisan Adoption of Chinese Models Against China
In recent years, a thought-provoking idea has gained traction in U.S. political circles—”learning Chinese techniques to counter China.”（师华长技以制华，coming from 师夷长技以制夷） Figures from both Democratic and Republican parties advocate that the U.S. should borrow from China’s development strategies and governance experiences to enhance its own competitiveness and counter the China challenge. Rush Doshi, a China affairs advisor in the Biden White House, authored The Long Game, which meticulously studies China’s grand strategy and implies the U.S. needs a similarly long-term strategy to counter it. Trump is evidently practicing this as well: since taking office, he has continually broken conventions and expanded presidential authority, largely aiming to create a more efficient and centralized system to mobilize national resources to deal with China.
Regarding central-local relations, the Trump administration strengthens federal authority, emphasizing centralization. On vertical separation of powers, Trump greatly expands executive power, weakening Congressional and judicial constraints on foreign policy decisions. He also restructures the bureaucracy through executive orders (notably the “Schedule F” plan) to ensure smooth implementation of policies. At the international strategic level, Trump’s strategic retrenchment can be seen as an American version of “Hide your strength, bide your time.”（韬光养晦） This retrenchment is not passive avoidance but active accumulation of strength: the U.S. needs to address internal economic and social problems to stage a comeback.
It can be said that Trump’s vision is almost equivalent to an American version of “Fukoku kyōhei” 富国强兵—the strategic thinking of Chinese elites. He emphasizes that “economics are the ultimate stakes,” which essentially acknowledges that “focusing on economic development” is the correct path to national strength; overextending in pursuit of global hegemony only drains national power and accelerates hegemonic decline. The “technology accelerationism” promoted by Trump’s team also draws inspiration from China’s development model—some U.S. strategists openly express admiration for China’s whole-nation system in concentrating resources on major technological projects, hoping the U.S. can partially emulate it. To some extent, the U.S. is adopting strategies that proved effective for China to use against China itself. This will render some of China’s past counter-strategies ineffective and force us to adjust our responses.
For China, this undoubtedly increases the complexity of the challenge. If the U.S. can genuinely correct its own flaws, its competitiveness will significantly improve. On one hand, we must maintain confidence and stay our course; on the other, we must have a sense of crisis and make necessary strategic and tactical adjustments. Facing such an opponent, we need to hold our ground, accelerate our own reforms and innovation, and strive not to be trapped by its counter-strategies.
VIII. Conclusion: The Long-Term Threat of Trump’s Strategy Must Not Be Underestimated
Although the new NSS does not list China as America’s primary concern in its text, and even omits mention of China in many sections, the entire document is essentially laying the groundwork for how to deal with China. Rather than a “declaration of war” against China, it is more like a long-term blueprint Trump has drafted for the U.S. to win long-term competitive advantage over China. It tones down short-term confrontation but plans for a deeper foundation to prevail in future contests. Perhaps over the next three years, Trump’s policy toward China will not appear excessively aggressive or tough; looking back after his term, one might even think his tenure was “not too bad” for China. However, precisely his current strategic retrenchment and accumulation of strength are building a more solid platform for his successors to defeat China.
This inevitably recalls Republican President Richard Nixon in the 20th century. In the 1970s, Nixon pursued detente with the Soviet Union and withdrawal from Vietnam to heal America’s strength depleted by the Vietnam War. His “nurturing strength” directly paved the way for President Reagan’s strategic counteroffensive and eventual Cold War victory in the 1980s. Without Nixon’s retrenchment and adjustment, America’s later Cold War reversal might not have occurred. Similarly, Trump’s current strategic retrenchment bears resemblance to Nixon’s. Although Trump and his supporters often liken him to Reagan, his strategic actions are closer to Nixon’s. Notably, figures within the Trump administration are undergoing “Nixonian” transformations: for example, current Secretary of State Marco Rubio. Once known as an extreme hawk, he now uses moderate diplomatic language, appearing conciliatory toward China and Russia. Some of his “multipolarity” viewpoints, though different from China’s advocated multipolar international order, echo Nixon’s “Five Great Power Centers” theory. History seems to be repeating itself.
Of course, we cannot simplistically analogize history. Just as Nixon’s retrenchment laid the groundwork for Reagan’s expansion, Trump’s accumulation of strength may prepare the U.S. for more intense pressure on China in the future. Trump caters to rising isolationist and populist sentiments within the U.S., actively retrenching globally (except in the Western Hemisphere), even at the apparent cost of traditional U.S. national interests. When public demands conflict with elite-defined national interests, Trump chooses the former. In his view, only strategies with public support are sustainable and can avoid policy reversals due to changes in administration. Trump does not represent America’s ultimate value orientation; he merely temporarily caters to public choice. It is foreseeable that after the Trump era, the U.S. will eventually attempt to return to its traditional global leadership role and value-based mission, but it believes it must first traverse Trump’s “unconventional path”; there is no way around it.
In summary, the release of Trump’s new National Security Strategy marks the U.S. entry into a new stage in its China strategy, one emphasizing long-termism and sustainable suppression. The harm to China lies not in immediate, sharp confrontations but in the subtle, gradual erection of higher and more distant obstacles. Facing such an opponent, we must have both clear-eyed awareness and firm confidence. As long as we focus on our own development and manage our affairs well, we can remain invincible in this enduring contest.