Reinvigorating "African Aspiration" – How China is Driving Africa's Industrialization
Huang Qixuan On How Chinese Capital Fostering a Crowding-In Effect to Build Infrastructure, Strengthen State Capacity, and Accelerate Industrial Transfer
For a long time, I held two deep-seated worries about Africa’s economic future. First, I feared that China’s own rapidly advancing manufacturing sector—with its automation and comprehensive industrial capability—would create an insurmountable barrier, blocking Africa’s path to industrialization by outcompeting its nascent industries. Second, the lack of state capacity in many African nations, a legacy of past misguided reforms, would trigger another wave of political instability, rendering foreign investment futile as it was washed away by the tides of conflict.
This article, however, offers a compelling counterpoint. It argues that through long-term, state-backed “patient capital,” coupled with vibrant private investment and the transfer of a comprehensive manufacturing ecosystem, Chinese investment is creating the very conditions that earlier neoliberal reforms eroded. Chinese investment in Africa has not produced a “crowding-out effect”; on the contrary, it has generated a “crowding-in effect,” bringing more investment opportunities and making this process more sustainable. The author believes that this is not simple outsourcing or building of roads and railways, industrial parks, it’s about skilled workforces, telecom systems, and even public security—that is, enabling African industrialization to begin.
The author of this article is Professor Huang Qixuan黄琪轩, he is a Professor at the School of International and Public Affairs at Shanghai Jiao Tong University. He earned his Ph.D. in Public Administration, with a focus on Business-Government Relations, from Peking University (2006-2009). His doctoral studies were further enriched by a period as a Visiting Ph.D. Student in Political Economy at Cornell University (2007-2008). His international academic experience was later complemented by a role as a Visiting Scholar at the University of Chicago (2017-2018).
The article was first published at Beijing Cultural Review (they are on Substack now). Thanks to the author’s kind authorization, I can publish it here
Reinvigorating “African Aspiration” – How China is Driving Africa’s Industrialization
In May 2000, the cover story of The Economist was “Africa: The Hopeless Continent.” By 2011, the magazine’s cover story had changed to “Africa Rising.” In 2013, it became “Aspiring Africa.” Dependency theorist Samir Amin expressed deep concern for Africa’s future: with technological advancement and the continuous expansion of the capitalist system, African countries are sometimes referred to as the “Fourth World,” becoming increasingly marginalized in the new world order. As part of the Global South, African nations lag in economic development, technological level, state capacity, and ethnic integration, making them seemingly the “least likely” candidates for developing modern industries.
However, new transformations are currently underway in the Global South, including Latin America, Asia, and Africa, showing signs of reindustrialization. Particularly noteworthy is that in this round of industrialization, Africa, as a peripheral region, is no longer solely engaged in low-value-added production but has instead achieved varying degrees of industrial upgrading. Rwanda, which experienced civil war, actively promotes solar and wind power, vigorously develops the information and communication industry, and even produces smartphones. Countries like Nigeria, Uganda, and Ghana are actively developing local automotive manufacturing, assembling electric vehicles. From the perspective of economic and industrial structure, African countries show signs of “moving beyond the periphery.” This article attempts to demonstrate that as state capital and “comprehensive Chinese manufacturing” reach the Global South, state capacity from abroad has facilitated technological and industrial upgrading in African nations, bringing new hope for the development of the Global South.
Misguided Reforms and Lost Opportunities
The process of economic globalization that began in the 1980s seemingly offered development opportunities for the Global South, yet the outcomes of economic reforms in various countries often fell short of expectations. Guided by neoliberal ideas, the West provided a reform package of “structural adjustment” for the Global South, including Africa, arguing that underdeveloped governments intervened too much and needed to be weakened. The West offered aid to Global South countries implementing reforms, requiring recipient countries to deregulate their economies, promote trade liberalization, accelerate privatization of enterprises, reduce welfare spending, and cut public services.
The biggest problem with this reform path was that it further weakened the already fragile state capacity of African nations. In the early 1990s, government employees in developed countries accounted for 7.7% of the population, the highest in the world; while in African countries, this proportion was only 2%, the lowest globally. [1] Neoliberal reforms further reduced the number of government employees in Africa, leaving Global South states unable to provide social services, maintain political stability, or promote economic growth and industrial upgrading.
As neoliberal reforms progressed, anti-government protests, social unrest, and local insurgencies increased across Africa, accompanied by political instability and frequent civil wars. The economic and social rights, personal safety, and labor rights of the populace deteriorated. [2] After 1995, the number of African countries embroiled in civil war rose rapidly, with Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Sudan, Mozambique, Angola, and Burundi, among others, descending into conflict and civil war.
Another consequence of weakened state capacity was that, against the backdrop of trade liberalization, African countries were unable to cope with the challenges of foreign manufacturing, leading to worsening economic performance, increasingly aligning with the predictions of dependency theorists. In 1985, Senegal’s push for trade liberalization caused the loss of one-third of its manufacturing jobs. Under the impact of imported goods, Uganda’s manufacturing sector shrank by 22%. In the 1980s, per capita income in Sub-Saharan Africa not only failed to grow but declined by 1.2% annually; by the 1990s, the annual per capita income growth rate was a mere 0.2%. [3] Consequently, Africa’s manufacturing development stagnated, falling into “premature deindustrialization.” [4]
At a time when the Global South most needed to “bring the state back in,” the West’s neoliberal reform package was precisely weakening its state capacity. Analytical frameworks that only consider factors of production like land, capital, and labor overlook an important implicit prerequisite for economic development: the “order” essential for the smooth functioning of the “free market” is not innate. The basic conditions necessary for manufacturing development – the developmental environment urgently needed by the Global South, especially Africa – are almost all inextricably linked to state capacity.
The first condition is political order. Many in the Global South are mired in civil war and terrorism, lacking the stable order required for manufacturing development. The second condition is infrastructure. Developing manufacturing requires stable electricity and smooth transportation, yet many Global South members cannot provide these “public goods.” The third condition is complementary suppliers. Most Global South members have mono-structured economies, lacking complementary suppliers and industrial clusters, making it difficult to provide intermediate products for manufacturing. The fourth condition is skilled workers. Although the Global South has abundant labor resources, production lines lack skilled workers. One Chinese female worker can operate up to 32 looms simultaneously, while a Tanzanian female worker can only operate 8. [5]
Funding sources are another shortcoming for African manufacturing development. Development economist Paul Rosenstein-Rodan emphasized that late-developing countries need to mobilize large amounts of capital, using a “Big Push” of investment to drive industry and economic development. But the Global South not only lacks investment but, more importantly, lacks the strong state capacity for large-scale coordination to foster manufacturing development. For a long time, Global South countries, including those in Africa, even lacked basic data collection and information gathering capabilities. Policymakers, NGOs, and scholars had to draw vastly different conclusions based on disparate data. [6]
In an increasingly civilized international society, Africa cannot repeat Europe’s old path of shaping nationalism through prolonged external wars to enhance fiscal capacity and strengthen state capability. [7] Historically, peripheral regions also gained development opportunities with shifts in geopolitics. Increased foreign direct investment brought external “institutional enclaves” that drove the early development of high-tech industries like semiconductors in China. [8] Similarly, even in the absence of strong state capacity, certain socio-economic changes can be advanced in the Global South. For instance, in the DRC, where state capacity is weak, international organizations played a more active role in improving the situation regarding gender-based crimes. [9]
Not only can institutions come from abroad, but state capacity can also originate externally. When the Global South lacks the organizational capacity to coordinate and promote manufacturing development, the “state capacity from abroad” brought by China provides a new opportunity for the collective rise of the Global South, including Africa.
African Infrastructure and Order Driven by State Capital
China’s substantial investments in Africa have first brought the infrastructure and political order needed for manufacturing development. With the advancement of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has actively participated in building roads, railways, bridges, dams, power plants, ports, and other infrastructure projects in the Global South. As China’s overseas interests grow, its investment in overseas security has also increased. Chinese investment provides a beneficial supplement for Africa, which faces deficits in both infrastructure and public safety. Furthermore, unlike previous FDI dominated by private capital, a significant portion of outward investment from Global South countries like China and Brazil is state-owned capital. [10]
In the early stages of the BRI, most Chinese companies investing in Africa were state-owned enterprises (SOEs), with only a small fraction being private. Many worry about the “moral hazard” of state capital, where state backing leads investors to disregard risks, resulting in high-risk, low-efficiency investments. However, facing the Global South’s low state capacity and high investment risks, the entry of state capital can precisely compensate for the shortcomings of private capital. Stephen Kaplan calls Chinese investment in Latin America “patient capital”: possessing long-term vision and higher risk tolerance, thus more stable and more accommodating of host country development goals, distinctly different from private capital seeking short-term profits. [11] During the financial crisis, Chinese companies behaved very differently from Western private capital; Chinese investors in Zambia announced a “three no’s policy”: no layoffs, no production cuts, no salary reductions. [12]
In the Global South, including Africa, Chinese policy banks and SOEs actively invest in “leftover projects” that private capital rarely touches. These projects typically have long investment cycles and high risks but can yield long-term returns. Chinese investment, as state capital, has rebuilt infrastructure in Africa and helped maintain local public safety and order.
First, the state capital brings all-zone investment. Generally, private capital avoids zones of civil war and conflict, and periods of high economic risk – characteristics precisely common in the Global South. Western export credits primarily go to countries like the US, Russia, Turkey, the UK, UAE, and China; in contrast, Chinese policy banks mainly provide loans to developing countries. [13] Chinese investment is “all-zone” investment, willing to invest in politically disordered states, aiding the long-term development of the Global South, including Africa.
Chinese investment is also willing to enter during high-risk periods, making “all-weather” investments during economic adversity. In 1994, after the Rwandan genocide, with its economy on the brink of collapse and Western investment plummeting, Rwanda could only obtain limited aid and loans from the World Bank and IMF. During the 2008 financial crisis, when Western countries were unwilling to provide funds to crisis-stricken Rwanda, the Rwandan government turned to China for help. Similarly, after its civil war, Angola sought to rebuild its economy and applied for loans from institutions like the IMF but was refused. In 2002, the Angolan government turned to China for assistance. When Uganda faced economic recession, Western private capital withdrew on a large scale, while China moved in the opposite direction, continuously increasing investment and becoming a major investor in Uganda.
Second, state capital brings all-field, all-sector investment. Generally, private capital avoids the infrastructure sector and public security departments. During the 1980s and 1990s, Western countries and international financial institutions were unwilling to invest in Global South infrastructure, instead competing to engage in lower-cost economic reforms and governance. Weak infrastructure and inefficient transport logistics hindered African manufacturing development, raised production costs, increased trade uncertainty, delayed cargo delivery times, and made it difficult for global buyers to tolerate. Tanzanian investors complain about frequent power outages that damage machinery and equipment, and frequent water cuts that disrupt production. Nigerian entrepreneurs complain about “epileptic power supply” and dilapidated roads hindering production.
Former Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade publicly criticized Europe in 2008 for failing to deliver on its promise of $15 billion for African infrastructure made at the Millennium Summit. In contrast, the state capital brought by China actively invests in infrastructure, emphasizing its positive role in economic development. World Bank Managing Director and former Nigerian Finance Minister Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala once asked Chinese officials, “How can Nigeria achieve 10% economic growth like China?” The Chinese officials’ answer was: “Infrastructure – infrastructure and discipline.” [14]
Unlike Western private capital, Chinese companies are increasingly involved in the repair, construction, and even operation of African ports, railways, roads, bridges, airports, and pipelines, helping Africa build infrastructure rapidly, transfer technology, and provide training. Thanks to Chinese investment, Nigeria’s infrastructure has been significantly upgraded, with major projects like Lekki Port, Lagos International Airport, and the Blue Line light rail being realized. In Angola, where most transport facilities were destroyed by civil war, China helped repair and rebuild the Benguela Railway, connecting Tanzania and Angola.
China also contributes to the security and stability of the African continent. The Chinese government aided the construction of the African Union Conference Center in Ethiopia and the ECOWAS headquarters building in Nigeria, supporting African regional community building. At the 2024 FOCAC meeting, China listed the “Partnership Action for Common Security” among the “Ten Partnership Actions.” China actively participates in UN peacekeeping operations, supporting missions in Somalia and Darfur. China also trains military and police personnel for Africa, helping the Rwandan government establish an academy using Chinese military training systems. China and Africa continue to strengthen cooperation in public security, peacekeeping, piracy prevention, and counter-terrorism, enhancing joint exercises to improve Africa’s capacity to ensure public safety and maintain domestic order.
Moreover, large-scale outward investment has also brought Chinese investment security onto the agenda, making Chinese companies providers of the public good “security.” To ensure employee safety and investment security, Chinese companies rely on their own resources, hiring security firms for services, leading to the rapid development of China’s private security business in Africa. The security services purchased by Chinese companies provide safety and order for African special economic zones, industrial parks, and industrial zones. Chinese companies also help African countries establish emergency response systems and security warning platforms, assisting in addressing severe local public security issues. For example, China’s Cloudwalk cooperated with the Zimbabwean government to provide AI security systems for its public security and airports; ZTE participated in Zambia’s “Safe City Project,” improving urban security, and assisted Nigeria in building a national public security system; companies like Huawei and Hikvision participated in building base stations, intelligent transportation, and data centers in Kenya, reducing Nairobi’s high crime rate.
Comprehensive Chinese Manufacturing and African Manufacturing
In the new era, China has made significant breakthroughs in areas like artificial intelligence, large civil aircraft, and semiconductors. The industrialization of 1.4 billion people and China’s achievements in cutting-edge technologies have broken the technological monopoly of developed countries in the world political economy. By 2024, the scale of China’s manufacturing sector had ranked first globally for 14 consecutive years; simultaneously, China possesses a complete industrial system, being the only country with all industrial categories listed in the UN industrial classification. The question posed by “comprehensive Chinese manufacturing” to the world is: If a country can manufacture almost all industrial products, will it impact the industrialization of the Global South?
Indeed, Chinese textiles once brought immense competitive pressure to countries like Nigeria. [15] African manufacturers complained about the influx of cheap Chinese products squeezing local markets; to protect domestic industries, countries like South Africa implemented import quotas on Chinese textiles. The first-mover advantage of China and other East Asian economies meant African industrialization faced fiercer competition. However, unexpectedly for many, the recent round of African reindustrialization mentioned at the outset has precisely advanced against the backdrop of “comprehensive Chinese manufacturing” going global. In the process of Global South reindustrialization, beyond competition, Chinese enterprises are increasingly showing a new aspect of win-win cooperation. Chinese companies bring comprehensive manufacturing to the Global South, making substantial investments across various sectors needed by Africa, thereby fostering the growth of complementary suppliers and local skilled workers.
In 2007, the UN World Investment Report pointed out that in Sub-Saharan Africa, there were no major international projects directly investing in the manufacturing sector. Western private capital was even more concentrated in the resource sector. A Nigerian diplomat complained: “Western investment in Africa is all about oil, nothing else; while China is actively exploring all sectors in Africa.” In this context, Chinese investment acts as a “lone brave” advancing African manufacturing development. [16] In resource-scarce Ethiopia, about two-thirds of Chinese investment flows into manufacturing. [17]
Complementary suppliers often first appear in Africa’s economic development zones, industrial parks, and zones. As early as the 1970s, countries like Liberia, Mauritius, and Senegal launched special economic zone (SEZ) plans. By the early 2000s, Sub-Saharan African countries had all formulated SEZ plans. Except for Mauritius, most African SEZs failed to succeed, neither attracting investment nor promoting employment. Comprehensive Chinese manufacturing has brought new vitality to African economic development zones. China has established a series of industrial parks and economic zones in multiple African countries, such as the Eastern Industrial Zone in Ethiopia, and the Lekki Free Trade Zone and Ogun Guangdong Free Trade Zone in Nigeria. The two zones in Nigeria cover industries like building materials, ceramics, daily chemicals, furniture, hardware, food processing, agricultural product processing, packaging and printing materials, auto parts, electromechanical products, pharmaceuticals, and electronics. The number of entering enterprises increases yearly, and production categories diversify increasingly.
The “state capacity from abroad” from China conducts large-scale coordination for African manufacturing development, helping Africa achieve a broad-based, comprehensive “Big Push” in industry, forming industrial clusters that span all three technological revolutions, and cultivating complementary suppliers.
First, comprehensive Chinese manufacturing invests in light industries like garments and textiles in Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, etc., helping these countries achieve import substitution. Huajian Group began producing footwear in Ethiopia in 2011, moving various production stages like shoe materials and molds to Africa, attracting upstream and downstream enterprises in textiles, tanning, and packaging to follow.
Second, comprehensive Chinese manufacturing invests in petrochemicals, daily chemicals, and steel industries in Africa. Chinese companies like CNPC, Sinopec, and CNOOC have advanced numerous investment projects in Africa within a short time, helping improve the local industrial production system. For example, Nigeria, with oil and gas as its pillar industry, had underdeveloped downstream industries and insufficient refining capacity, relying on imported fuel and gasoline. The Dangote Refinery, built by China locally, became Africa’s largest refinery upon completion, helping Nigeria achieve energy independence. Similarly, driven by Chinese investment, South Sudan’s oil industry developed rapidly, forming a complete, technologically advanced integrated oil industrial system, ending its history of oil import dependency. China has also established daily chemical plants in Nigeria and Angola, invested in steel manufacturing plants in Egypt and Zimbabwe, and produces/assembles automobiles in Morocco, Kenya, Egypt, Algeria, and others.
Third, comprehensive Chinese manufacturing also invests in emerging industries represented by information technology. Huawei entered Kenya in 1998, and since then, together with ZTE, China Telecom, and others, has closely cooperated with African governments and local enterprises to build telecom infrastructure and networks. Chinese companies have laid submarine cables in Nigeria, Tunisia, Cameroon, and others. In 2021, with help from Chinese companies, Senegal built a new $18 million national data center. With the development of local ICT in Africa, many Chinese companies like Huawei have also established R&D centers in Africa. More and more Chinese tech companies are entering Africa, bringing emerging technologies, helping African countries bridge the “digital divide,” and move into the digital age.
Chinese investment also provides skill training for local employees, fostering the growth of African skilled workers. To overcome the shortage of skilled workers, Huajian Group recruited 86 workers from Ethiopia’s Eastern Industrial Zone for training in China in 2011. In early 2012, Huajian’s local production line employed 600 people; by year-end, it increased to 2000; and by the end of 2013, it further grew to 3500. [18] Huawei established a training center in Nairobi, offering courses to over 6000 local telecom trainees, and cooperated with local mobile company Safaricom, signing agreements with multiple universities to provide free training for Kenyan students. [19] In 2009, China launched vocational training programs in Ethiopia covering construction techniques, architecture, engineering, electronic engineering and electronics, computers, textiles, and garments, and established similar vocational training centers in Uganda, Angola, and elsewhere.
Comprehensive Chinese manufacturing also boosts local employment in Africa. Over time, the proportion of Chinese employees in overseas Chinese enterprises has gradually decreased, while local skilled workers have increased. In Tanzania, for every Chinese worker hired by a Chinese company, an average of nine local workers are employed. [20] Large-scale investment brings numerous job opportunities. From 2000 to 2019, as Chinese investment in Angola continuously expanded, the local unemployment rate showed a continuous downward trend. [21] Stable production platforms accompanied by stable employment provide the possibility for stable skill accumulation in Africa, allowing African workers to learn through manufacturing, imitation, and maintenance.
The “Crowding-In Effect” of Chinese Investment in Africa
The positive role of Chinese state capital in Africa’s economic development and industrialization is manifested not only through its own economic activities in Africa but also in its ability to leverage more private enterprises to follow suit and cultivate local African businesses. In other words, Chinese state capital investment in Africa has not brought a “crowding-out effect” but rather a “crowding-in effect.”
First, Chinese investment leveraged more Chinese private enterprises to follow. Because state capital outward investment has a longer-term vision and higher risk tolerance, numerous investment projects spur more follow-up investments. Under the demonstration effect of state capital, smaller SOEs and private enterprises enter Africa as subcontractors, seeking investment opportunities and assisting SOEs in completing smaller projects. For example, as large construction projects between China and Rwanda commenced, a large number of Chinese private enterprises flooded into Rwanda. China State Construction Engineering Corporation participated in the Rwandan international airport construction project, while the smaller company Zhongchen Construction won the bid for the Kigali International Airport expansion project. In telecommunications and emerging technologies, companies like Alibaba, Baidu, China Electronics Technology Group, China Mobile, China Telecom, China Unicom, Hikvision, and Tencent have entered Africa. Smaller private companies also perform remarkably: in 2021, Transsion, founded in Shenzhen, captured 47% of African smartphone sales, becoming Africa’s largest mobile phone supplier. [22]
Due to the influx of numerous enterprises, government departments even struggle to accurately estimate the number of Chinese investors in Africa. In 2011, when armed conflict broke out in Libya, the Chinese government organized a large-scale evacuation. About 6,000 Chinese workers were registered with the embassy, but ultimately 36,000 people participated in the evacuation. In 2018, China’s Ministry of Commerce registered approximately 3,500 Chinese-funded enterprises in Africa; however, some studies estimate the actual number might be four times the official count, most being smaller private enterprises. The number of Chinese citizens in Africa is even harder to estimate – before 2020, it was estimated to be up to 2 million. [23]
Second, Chinese investment spurred the growth of local African enterprises. In light industry, Chinese investment in Kenya has promoted the development of local spin-off enterprises. Some local employees who worked in Chinese enterprises in export processing zones left to use their acquired experience to establish small garment factories. The economic activities of Chinese enterprises in Africa also foster the growth of local entrepreneurs. In South Africa, engineers from local telecom company MTN collaborated with their Chinese counterparts at ZTE to tailor technical solutions for the local telecom market; and engaged in technical cooperation with Huawei to deploy advanced 5G networks in South Africa. As China’s local telecom business continuously expanded, in 2019, Rwanda established its first African-owned smartphone manufacturing plant, operated by Rwandan company Mara Group. As early as over a decade ago, Haier signed a joint venture agreement with Britain’s PZ Group to establish a joint venture factory in Nigeria, producing co-branded refrigerators, freezers, and air conditioners. In Ethiopia, ZTE partnered with local company Janora to produce mobile phones. Today, Chinese investment in these countries has significantly enhanced the development of local manufacturing. Nigeria now has multiple local refrigerator, air conditioner, and automobile manufacturers, and Ethiopia has also seen the emergence of several local mobile phone makers.
Relying on “state capacity from abroad,” Chinese investment has attracted more investment and fostered the growth of local African enterprises. Through cooperation with China, African countries have successfully upgraded roads, railways, and telecom networks, gradually transitioning from agriculture to manufacturing, and ambitiously advancing reindustrialization. Chinese investment in Africa has not produced a “crowding-out effect” but rather a “crowding-in effect,” bringing more investment opportunities and making this process more sustainable.
“State Capacity from Abroad” Fulfills the “Aspiring” Africa
African economist Dambisa Moyo points out that over the past sixty years, Western aid has not served Africa’s development goals; since the new century, no country can match the opportunities for economic growth and market expansion created by Chinese investment in Africa, nor the tremendous changes it has brought to Africa’s politics, economy, and society. [24] What China brings to Africa and the Global South is not only its own development experience but also infrastructure, political order, complementary suppliers, and skilled workers. All these rely on the large-scale coordination of technological development and industrial upgrading by “state capacity from abroad,” thereby realizing the Big Push for African economic development.
“State capacity from abroad” enables Africa to obtain “tangible investment,” building technological and industrial foundations and cultivating self-development capabilities. For a long time, the West has emphasized “intangible investment” in the Global South: the UN Millennium Development Goals focused on social areas like promoting gender equality; in 2021, the US Biden administration launched the “Build Back Better World” infrastructure plan, incorporating intangible investments like health, biodiversity, gender equality, and education, prioritizing good governance, accountability, transparency, and human rights. However, as early as 2007, Serge Mombouli, then Congolese (Brazzaville) ambassador to the US, told American media: “The Chinese are providing tangible things, while the West is providing intangible things; we cannot only talk about democracy, transparency, and good governance. We need both. People cannot eat democracy.” [25]
“State capacity from abroad” promotes the diversification of African manufacturing. Driven by China’s diverse range of investments, Africa has developed not only low-tech light industry but also heavy/chemical industries, electronics, and digital technologies, changing the mono-structural economy feared by dependency theory. Relying on its own state capacity, China established a broad manufacturing base; simultaneously, it has also helped the Global South, including Africa, build diversified economic structures, enhancing Africa’s self-development capacity to move beyond the periphery.
“State capacity from abroad” gives Africa the opportunity to grasp the development of emerging industries. In the early 2000s, the Chinese government proposed “using informatization to drive industrialization.” Today, Africa’s reindustrialization can similarly emulate China’s experience. Chinese investment in Africa, with its long-term perspective, does not simply transfer sunset industries based on the “product life cycle” but covers emerging technologies and invests in long-term development. For example, the Zimbabwean government seeks to develop big data, AI, cloud computing, software applications, smart cities, satellite launches, etc. Comprehensive Chinese manufacturing has both the willingness and the ability to help Zimbabwe achieve upgrades in emerging and strategic industries. Zimbabwean officials stated that Chinese companies played a key role in Zimbabwe’s industrial transformation.
Driven by “state capacity from abroad,” comprehensive Chinese manufacturing is going global to the Global South, not only bringing comprehensive manufacturing and development opportunities to economically backward countries but also providing a vast market for the Global South’s reindustrialization in the future. On one hand, China is steadily expanding the opening of its commodity markets, committing to zero-tariff treatment for 100% of tariff lines from all least developed countries having diplomatic relations with China; on the other hand, it actively promotes the role of exhibition platforms like the China International Import Expo (CIIE) and the Canton Fair, achieving “buying globally” through “selling globally.” In the new era, China is committed to building its ultra-large market into a world-shared market, injecting new momentum into global economic development, including the reindustrialization of the Global South.
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[3] Ha-Joon Chang, Why Developing Countries Need Tariffs? How WTO NAMA Negotiations Could Deny Developing Countries’Right to a Future, South Centre, 2005, p. 13, 72.
[4] Nicolas van de Walle, African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999, Cambridge University Press, p. 16.
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[8] Douglas Fuller, Paper Tigers, Hidden Dragons: Firms and the Political Economy of China’s Technological Development, Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 209.
[9] Milli Lake, Strong NGOs and Weak States: Pursuing Gender Justice in the Democratic Republic of Congo and South Africa, Cambridge University Press, 2018, p. 10.
[10] Milan Babić, The Rise of State Capital: Transforming Markets and International Politics, Agenda Publishing, 2023, pp. 1~14.
[11] Stephen Kaplan, Globalizing Patient Capital: The Political Economy of Chinese Finance in the Americas, Cambridge University Press, 2021, pp. 1~35.
[12] Ching Kwan Lee, The Specter of Global China: Politics, Labor, and Foreign Investment in Africa, University of Chicago Press, 2017, pp. 12~41.
[13] Muyang Chen, The Latecomer’s Rise: Policy Banks and the Globalization of China’s Development Finance, Cornell University Press, 2024, p. 109.
[14] Deborah Brautigam,“Chinese Loans and African Structural Transformation,”in Arkebe Oqubay and Justin Yifu Lin, eds., China-Africa and an Economic Transformation, Oxford University Press, 2019, pp. 137~138.
[15] Murtala Muhammada et al.,“The Impact of Chinese Textile Imperialism on Nigeria’s Textile Industry and Trade: 1960–2015,”Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 44, No. 154, 2017, pp. 673~682.
[17] Chris Alden and Lu Jiang,“Brave New World: Debt, Industrialization and Security in China-Africa Relations,”International Affairs, Vol. 95, No. 3, 2019, p. 651.
[18] Justin Yifu Lin and Jiajun Xu,“China’s Light Manufacturing and Africa’s Industrialization,”in Arkebe Oqubay and Justin Yifu Lin, eds., China-Africa and an Economic Transformation, Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 276.
[19] Bob Wekesa, China’s Footprint in East Africa: Pessimism versus Optimism, Palgrave Macmillan, 2023, p. 293.
[21] Alpha Furbell Lisimba, China’s Trade and Investment in Africa: Impact on Development, Employment Generation and Transfer of Technology, Palgrave Macmillan, 2020, p. 244.
[22] [23] Joshua Eisenman and David Shinn, China’s Relations with Africa: A New Era of Strategic Engagement, Columbia University Press, 2023, p. 310; pp. 180~196.
[24] Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid: Why Aid is not Working and How There is Another Way for Africa, Allen Lane, 2009, p. 100.