How Does GOP Platform Hint at Changes in Policy Towards China?
Researcher at Fudan University on Potential Policy Shifts in Trump's Approach to China During a Possible Second Term
The first term of Trump’s presidency has brought a major shift to the overall relationship between China and the US. Yet we still don’t know what will happen if there’s a second term. Unlike the situation in 2016, this year's draft election platform significantly reduces the articulation of policies toward China. The two candidates also seem to have notably decreased the intensity of their hype surrounding China-related issues. For today’s episode, I bring the article by Professor Meng Weizhan, which was originally published on the official WeChat account of "The Program to Promote China-US Friendship, Trust and Cooperation" (中美友好互信合作计划) at Fudan University. I am honored to have been granted permission by the author to translate and share this article with my audience.
Professor Meng is an assistant research professor at the Institute for Advanced Study in Social Sciences, Fudan University. He is currently a tutor at Zhide Academy of Fudan University. He obtained his PhD in Political Science at the University of Hong Kong. His main research areas are international relations theory, China’s foreign affairs, China’s national security affairs, and the domestic politics of the United States.
For the potential Tump’s second presidency, Professor Meng believes Trump will focus on domestic affairs and adopt an isolationist policy in foreign policy, avoiding conflicts with other major powers. He suggests that China should carefully distinguish between Trump's personal views and those of other Republican politicians, as well as between academic views and actual policies. Despite the fact that Trump will certainly adopt strict economic and trade policies toward China, these issues do not constitute the entirety of his China policy. While some of his statements on China policy are clearly exaggerated, the status of Chinese affairs in Trump's issue-framing structure has significantly decreased. In comparison, the U.S. Congress remains the center of anti-China forces, while the President and the executive branch are relatively pragmatic, a characteristic that may likely persist.
Source: https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/9smu2Zj_a4gP9yMndbIPAg
共和党党纲草案如何暗示对华政策的变化？
How does the draft Republican Party platform hint at changes in policy towards China?
The Latest Debate on China Policy in the U.S. Strategic Studies Community
The renowned American international relations journal "Foreign Affairs" published a series of articles in its fourth issue of 2024, discussing how the United States should respond to China's rise in the next step. The articles include the views of strategic scholars and the opinions of former officials and advisors from both parties. They argue fiercely with each other and can be divided into three factions: the "China engagement faction," the "China competition faction," and the "swift victory over China faction." Their debate is based on the consensus that the United States has reversed its unfavorable position and regained its advantage relative to China over the past four years. Their disagreement lies in what actions the United States should take against China based on its existing advantages.
In the 2016 and 2020 elections, the U.S. strategic academic community also engaged in prolonged debates, but there have been significant changes in relevant perceptions this year. From 2015 to 2016, the main content of their debate was whether the past 40 years of "engagement" policy towards China had failed and how the "engagement" policy should be revised and adjusted. By 2020, the two parties' arguments were the most intense, with the core topic being who, Biden or Trump, could better deal with China. These opposing views even escalated into internal debates within the respective intellectual communities of China and the United States. By 2024, the U.S. strategic academic community's discussions on China have taken a new turn, with mainstream views believing that the Biden administration's China policy over the past four years has been successful. However, the "engagement faction" believes that since the United States has regained its strategic advantage over China, it should re-adopt the "engagement" policy towards China based on this advantage to establish its dominant position in the international order. The "competition faction" believes that the United States should maintain its China policy for the past four years, consolidate the strategic advantages it has gained, and strive to promote the long-term goals of the Sino-U.S. competition. The "swift victory faction" believes that the United States should promote a "new Cold War" against China based on its strategic advantages and immediately adopt more comprehensive and severe suppression policies against China, causing China to follow in the footsteps of the Soviet Union.
Does "Swift Victory" Represent Trump's Personal Views?
The views of the "Swift Victory Faction" have attracted the most attention, with its representative figures including Robert O'Brien, the National Security Advisor during the Trump era; Matthew Pottinger, the Deputy National Security Advisor; and Mike Gallagher, the former Chairman of the House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party. They believe that the United States should not deny the existence of a "new Cold War" but should acknowledge its existence and strive to win this "Cold War." They support the tough policies Biden adopted toward China in the early stages of his administration but believe that Biden has not transformed the achievements already made into further victories. They oppose easing relations with China, arguing that "managing competition" will only lead to American complacency and sacrifice America's long-term interests.
However, it is worth noting that although Pottinger served in the Trump administration and Gallagher presided over the passage of numerous anti-China bills in the House of Representatives, it should be doubted whether their views will guide Trump's China policy in his second term. After expressing their views, they did not receive a response from Trump himself or his confidants, nor were their views reflected in the Republican Party's public documents. Therefore, their opinions may not be entirely consistent with the future of the Trump administration's China policy. Judging from their values, ideologies, and discourse systems, they are more like representatives of the liberal hardliners, which contradicts Trump's ideological system.
In fact, Pottinger was not truly valued during Trump's tenure and only played a role at the "tactical" level. He announced his resignation after the Capitol Hill riot in 2021, failing to withstand the political test at a critical moment. In 2022, he even threatened to testify at congressional hearings, completely betraying the Trump camp. More importantly, after the Capitol Hill riot in January 2021, Trump has been regarded by the mainstream elites of both parties in the United States as a trampler of American democracy, and the ideological foundation on which Pottinger's China policy relies no longer exists. Under such circumstances, Pottinger's efforts to mobilize the entire American society to engage in a comprehensive confrontation with China can only be a castle in the air.
Similarly, during his tenure in the House of Representatives, Gallagher had a very tense relationship with the dominant Trump faction within the Republican Party. He announced his "departure" before completing his current congressional term with the purpose of retaliating against the Trump faction. The various legislation he promoted in the House was actually intended to restrict and constrain Trump's China policy rather than support his line. Gallagher often expresses his views in the tone of a spokesperson for the Republican Party's China policy, but he is not on the same page as Trump.
In fact, although there are claims within the Democratic Party that advocate for a tougher policy towards China than Biden's, and there are also claims within the Republican Party that advocate for a tougher policy towards China than Trump's, they have not yet been accepted by the respective majority of the two parties. The "Swift Victory Faction" views require a high domestic cost and cannot gain public support. Those politicians who advocated for super-tough policies against China have been eliminated in the Republican primary. Trump is popular with the public now because he has shifted his policy focus to domestic issues, which is most prominently reflected in his recently announced campaign platform. Pottinger hopes to increase investment in competition with China, but this is only due to personal grievances. Trump has not yet expressed support and only cares about economic and trade issues. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether the influence of the "Swift Victory Faction" will increase in the future.
O'Brien is one of the very few hardline officials against China in Trump's cabinet who did not betray him. However, after reading O'Brien's article in "Foreign Affairs," one can feel that it is more like a policy declaration filled with his personal style, and Trump's "America First" political discourse is only used for embellishment. For example, Trump refuses to provide more help to allies, but O'Brien talks extensively about how Trump can better consolidate and expand relations with allies. Trump refuses to take a tough policy towards Russia, while O'Brien says that Trump will provide more lethal weapons to Ukraine and support the expansion of NATO's ground forces. Trump rarely cares about American ideology and human rights, but O'Brien retorts that the Biden administration ignores democratic values. Trump is most concerned about immigration restrictions and border security issues, but O'Brien does not mention them at all and instead advocates expanding the size of the military for foreign combat. These arguments are completely at odds with Trump's political philosophy and even completely opposite. It remains to be seen what role O'Brien and those with similar ideologies will play in Trump's second term.
Why does Trump avoid discussing China policy?
Many people may have noticed that an important feature of this election is that the candidates of both parties have not excessively hyped up the China issue, especially Trump himself, who has been avoiding relevant discussions.
First, since leaving office in January 2021, Trump has rarely directly expressed views on China, except for the well-known tariff and car import issues. We can see very few related statements in other aspects. During interviews, he was asked about the Taiwan issue twice but deliberately avoided it. In addition, there are some exaggerated and joking statements that can hardly be considered effective information.
Second, the two barely mentioned China in the first television debate between Biden and Trump. This is very similar to the situation during the 2008 presidential election, where the China issue was obviously marginalized.
Third, on July 8th, the Republican National Committee passed a 16-page draft platform titled "Make America Great Again." The draft mentioned the Republican Party's 20 policy goals, and surprisingly, only two sentences mentioned China, with no mention of the Taiwan region at all.
However, since the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States, the Republican Party has mentioned the Taiwan region on its platform every four years, indicating a significant change in the Republican Party's policy philosophy towards China. Therefore, the various views mentioned in the "Foreign Affairs" journal mentioned above highlight the color of elitism and are actually disconnected from Trump's future China policy. The relevant debate is limited to the internal elite of the academic circle, and none of the views can be considered to represent Trump himself. Trump is a populist who only considers catering to the demands of the public. He himself does not believe in any elites or any strategic think tanks. It is difficult for us to understand Trump's true China policy from academic journals or think tank reports, and we cannot glean clues from the statements of former government officials. We can only observe his own remarks and the official statements of the Republican Party.
It is evident that the China issue no longer attracts the two candidates, especially in Trump's issue framework structure, where the status of the China issue has significantly declined. Historically, similar phenomena have occurred several times, where the U.S. government needed to deal with more pressing issues, thus shelving China's policy discussion. In the 1970s, Nixon and Kissinger chose to open the door to Sino-U.S. relations to counter the Soviet Union. At the beginning of the 21st century, George W. Bush had already positioned China as a strategic competitor and adopted a relatively aggressive policy in the first few months of his presidency. However, after the 9/11 incident, he chose to improve relations with China due to the need for counter-terrorism efforts.
The draft platform of the Republican Party has a strong "America First" tone. In his second term, Trump will focus on domestic affairs and adopt an isolationist policy in foreign policy, avoiding conflicts with other major powers. Trump tried to carry out a series of reforms in his first term but encountered many obstacles and achieved little success. However, now Trump has gained two favorable conditions. First, Trump has completely taken control of the Republican Party and has a monopoly on power within the party. Trump's enemies are the most powerful political forces in the United States, such as financial conglomerates, the military-industrial complex, intelligence agencies, mainstream media, and most technology companies. He himself has few resources, and most of his supporters are disadvantaged civilians. In this case, the concentration of power itself is a political weapon that can increase organizational strength and fighting capacity. Second, a recent ruling by the Federal Supreme Court held that the U.S. President can enjoy broad immunity for all "official conduct" during his term of office. This means that the actual power boundaries of the president will expand. Once Trump becomes president, he can more resolutely and effectively promote the reform agenda.
Who will dominate the Trump administration's China policy?
In the political discourse during the U.S. presidential elections, the Republican Party has always led the main theme of a tough policy towards China, while the Democratic Party has only focused on human rights and values. However, in this election, the situation is completely different from before. The Republican Party is no longer considered to hold the anti-China banner high. Many people in the U.S. strategic academic community seem to believe that the Biden administration's China policy is more astute and more in line with U.S. national interests than Trump's. Scholars who originally supported either the Democratic Party or the Republican Party mostly expressed doubts about Trump's China policy.
For example, "The National Interest" magazine is generally considered to be the ideological position of American neoconservatism. Its editor-in-chief, Jacob Heilbrunn, believes that Pompeo and O'Brien's views on foreign policy contradict Trump's. During Trump's first term, they tried to guide Trump to take a tough stance on Iran, Russia, and China. However, in the second term, they will have to disguise their true views under the veneer of Trump's nationalism. Trump is a "revisionist" who is not interested in aiding Ukraine and refuses to commit to using force to prevent China from achieving national unification. Trump is skeptical of the U.S. alliances with Japan and South Korea, refuses to fulfill new security agreements, and this policy will lead to disaster for the United States.
There are also two very famous young scholars in the American conservative camp, namely Hal Brands, a professor at Johns Hopkins University, and Michael Beckley, an associate professor at Tufts University. They both work at the conservative think tank American Enterprise Institute and often collaborate on articles. Brands believe that Trump's "America First" policy reflects a narrow view of self-interest, which could be fatal to countries like Ukraine. In the long run, this policy will weaken America's global influence and may lead to greater international chaos and conflict. Beckley argues that America's three most powerful key weapons against China are liberal democratic values, the alliance system, and a team of specialized bureaucratic elites, but Trump is abandoning them.
There is another person whose views are more representative. James Mann, a veteran journalist in his eighties, is a well-known hardliner on China. He believes Boming's thinking on China is too idealistic and cannot be implemented. This is because Trump has never said he would provide more support to Asian allies. After taking office, he will definitely weaken relations with Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines and will interrupt bilateral cooperation with Vietnam. In addition, Trump cannot unite European countries to counter China in terms of trade, technology, and sanctions. He believes that "Trump is only tough in rhetoric but not in action." Trump's cabinet members will also demonstrate strategic resolve on major issues, but this commitment is obviously untrustworthy and lacks confidence.
Trump's China policy in his second term will be different from his first term. The policy propositions of two types of people in his cabinet are worth noting. One type is the "Jacksonians," such as Trump's confidant, Ohio Senator J.D. Vance, who believes that the United States should minimize strategic engagement with China, avoid war with China by reducing economic dependence on China, and reconsider forward military deployments in Asia. The second type is the "Hamiltonians," or the so-called "conservative realists," represented by Elbridge Colby, who may become the next National Security Advisor. He believes that the main goal of the U.S. grand strategy is to prevent China from dominating Asia, but the United States itself cannot gain a strategic advantage and must rely on the alliance system to counter China. Unlike the views of Boming, Gallagher, and Pompeo, Colby is not interested in ideological issues. China's economic strength is a real challenge for the United States.
Trump's rhetoric and the Republican Party's draft platform have defined America's real security threat as internal rather than external. The enemies defined by Trump are the Democratic Party and the establishment elites in the United States, not other countries. Since Trump has now built a team that is more loyal to himself, the influence of ideologically-oriented politicians such as Pompeo and O'Brien has been significantly diluted. Whether they will be used as a political bargaining chip in the future or whether their policy propositions will definitely be put into practice by Trump, there is great uncertainty, and it is difficult to draw a conclusion now.
In addition, although most of the elite from both parties recognize the achievements of the Biden administration's China policy over the past four years, and the Biden administration has united allies to slow down the pace of China's technological development, the economic cost of Biden's strategy is high and difficult to sustain in the long run. Both Biden and Trump have tried to carry out strategic contraction to reduce the burden on the American people, but Biden's strategic contraction is not resolute enough, and the degree of contraction is still insufficient. At least from the current poll numbers, the public is not satisfied with his economic policies, and inflation and high debt have offset the superficial economic achievements. Trump is popular with the public because his strategic contraction is more determined, which can bring more benefits to the American people. Only the isolationist line can save America's economic costs and increase public support.
Conclusion: Trend of U.S. China Policy
We can briefly envision Trump's China policy in the next four years, which may have two noteworthy features. First, Trump seems unwilling to see the U.S. involved in any wars. He will push for an end to the Russia-Ukraine conflict and carry out strategic contraction globally more firmly than in his first term. If a war occurs, Trump will rely on the original bureaucratic system, intelligence agencies, financial capital, and the military-industrial complex to solve the problem, which are all forces that Trump refers to as the "deep state." Trump is not abandoning U.S. hegemony but rather seeking to lay a solid economic foundation for it and then re-assume international responsibilities later. This process relies on a relatively peaceful international environment.
Second, after the Capitol Hill riot in 2021, the drastic changes in U.S. domestic politics have profoundly influenced foreign relations. Inciting hostility towards China can no longer help alleviate domestic conflicts. Trump believes that he is suffering from the Democratic Party's judicial "persecution" and has repeatedly threatened to retaliate against his political enemies. According to the Republican Party's draft platform, Trump will focus on implementing the "America First" policy in the precious next four years, concentrating on solving U.S. internal problems, overhauling the bureaucratic system, and reforming U.S. politics rather than being distracted by external affairs. Under these circumstances, his behavior will become more predictable rather than less.
For China, the following points should be noted. Although Trump will certainly adopt a harsh economic and trade policy towards China, economic and trade issues are not the entirety of Trump's China policy, and economic and trade conflicts between the U.S. and its allies will also intensify. Although some of his statements on China's policy are clearly exaggerated, the status of China's affairs in Trump's issue framework has significantly decreased. In comparison, Congress is the center of anti-China forces, while the President and executive agencies are relatively pragmatic, and this feature may continue.
We should carefully distinguish between Trump's views and those of other Republican politicians, as well as between academic views and actual policies. Some Republicans pretend to represent Trump's position, but it is currently difficult to see how much the two are actually related. There is no conclusion that one party is tougher on China than the other, nor is there a conclusion that liberals or conservatives have a tougher China policy. China should maintain close contact with various elite groups in the U.S. strategic academic community, especially engaging in more exchanges and dialogues with previously unfamiliar groups.
As President Xi said in 2017, we "have no reason to ruin China-U.S. relations." Regardless of who serves as the U.S. President in the future, China and the U.S. should continue to seek common ground while shelving differences and finding new common interests. Trump will change the content of "common ground" and "differences" in China-U.S. relations. The space for "common ground" is showing a decreasing trend, but the aspects of "differences" are also changing. Therefore, China and the U.S. should achieve a new form of seeking common ground while shelving differences and establishing a new stable foundation for bilateral relations.