Georgia Tech's Withdrawal from China Sends Chills Through Sino-Foreign Joint Education Programs

"Now the World Seems to Be Conspiring Against These Educational Partnerships"

In today's episode, I bring you a Chinese report about the mounting challenges facing joint education programs in China. Amid rising geopolitical tensions, participating institutions increasingly find themselves in a geopolitical no man's land.

As a graduate of one of these joint programs, I feel compelled to share this report, though I have different thoughts on some parts of the article. Take one, for example; the article draws parallels between the China Initiative and recent U.S. restrictions on joint education programs based on their similar motivation driven by anti-China impulsion in Congress; I believe these are different situations that deserve separate analysis. Nevertheless, I find the report's insights into the current challenges facing Sino-foreign educational partnerships worth sharing.

The report was authored by Zhang Tianqi (张天祁) and originally published by "The Intellectual" (知识分子), a new media platform founded by scholars Rao Yi, Lu Bai, and Xie Yu that focuses on science, humanities, and intellectual discourse.

Source: https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/DJH4jIoc3WkXxiSqKZnJcw

Below is the translation I made:

On September 6, 2024, the Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech) announced the termination of its participation in Georgia Tech Shenzhen Institute (GTSI). GTSI was a collaborative project between Georgia Tech and Tianjin University. In December 2016, Georgia Tech reached an agreement with Tianjin University and the Shenzhen municipal government to begin the institute's development in Shenzhen officially.

Image of Georgia Tech, Souce: official website

According to the Ministry of Education's Sino-foreign Cooperative Education Supervision Information Platform, the Georgia Tech Shenzhen Institute at Tianjin University had received official approval and was recognized by the Ministry of Education as a qualified Sino-foreign cooperative educational institution, with project validity extending to December 31, 2036.

In December 2020, the U.S. Department of Commerce placed Tianjin University on its Entity List, which identifies foreign organizations deemed to pose national security concerns for the United States. As a university receiving substantial funding from the U.S. Department of Defense, security issues were particularly sensitive for Georgia Tech. In response to scrutiny, Georgia Tech decided not to launch its planned doctoral programs and limited student enrollment to 10% of the original plan. However, Georgia Tech did not immediately withdraw and continued to monitor the situation.

According to Reuters, Georgia Tech spokesperson Abbigail Tumpey stated that since Tianjin University was placed on the Entity List, Georgia Tech had conducted internal reviews of the program and had been continuously evaluating its position in China. However, even this cautious approach could not avoid political criticism.

In May of this year, the new chairman of the U.S. House Select Committee on China began targeting Georgia Tech, sending a letter to the university's president demanding detailed explanations of all collaborations with Tianjin University.

The progress of the research between Tianjin University and Georgia Tech became a focal point of political attacks. In January this year, Georgia Tech scholar Walter de Heer, in collaboration with Tianjin University's International Research Center for Nanoparticles and Nanosystems, developed the world's first functional "graphene semiconductor."

The Select Committee claimed this technology could have quantum computing applications. They also cited media reports suggesting that this technology could help China overcome U.S. restrictions on advanced semiconductors.

The university administration explained that the Georgia Tech Shenzhen Institute focused on teaching rather than research. GTSI did not conduct any research work, facilitate technology transfers, or provide federal funding to China. Georgia Tech's Provost and Executive Vice President for Academic Affairs stated that Congressional inquiries were "entirely without merit."

However, given that Congress was considering new restrictions that would prohibit U.S. institutions from receiving federal funding if they maintained partnerships with companies on the Entity List, the school decided to terminate the relationship. "The situation has changed for us"

Joint Educational Programs Caught in the Middle

The Georgia Tech incident is just the beginning. On September 23, the Select Committee on China released a report accusing U.S.-China collaborative research of advancing China's progress in dual-use, critical, and emerging technologies, including hypersonic weapons, artificial intelligence, fourth-generation nuclear weapons, and semiconductor technology.

The report specifically criticized several Sino-American joint educational institutions, including the Tsinghua-Berkeley Shenzhen Institute (TBSI), Georgia Tech Shenzhen Institute (GTSI), and Sichuan University-Pittsburgh Institute (SCUPI).

The report claimed these collaborative programs had become significant channels for transferring critical U.S. technology and expertise to China. American scholars participating in these joint educational programs were scrutinized for visiting China for research collaboration, advising Chinese scholars, teaching and training Chinese graduate students, and cooperating with Chinese companies in their fields - all of which became reasons for suspecting knowledge transfer.

This echoes the now-terminated China Initiative. While both share similar suspicions about U.S.-funded scholars transferring knowledge and technology to China, the China Initiative primarily targeted Chinese-American scholars in the U.S., while this time, the focus is on U.S.-China joint institutions in China.

Both UC Berkeley and Georgia Tech disputed the report's findings. Berkeley stated in their response that, in principle, their research is open to the world, and they found no evidence of Berkeley faculty at TBSI conducting research for other purposes.

However, considering geopolitical sensitivities and committee pressure, UC Berkeley informed the committee that they "have begun divesting all ownership in TBSI" and are "in the early stages of dissolving the joint legal entity." Previously, Georgia Tech had already withdrawn from the GTSI project.

Meanwhile, the Entity List, which contains numerous Chinese universities, continues to expand. On May 9, 2024, the U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) announced amendments to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), adding 37 new entities to the list, including the University of Science and Technology of China.

The restrictions on the University of Science and Technology of China (USTC) are also related to "security." The BIS justified this action by claiming that USTC had acquired and attempted to acquire U.S.-origin items to support China's quantum technology capabilities.

On the Chinese side, the pace of introducing new Sino-foreign educational cooperation programs has also slowed. In this year's updated list of Sino-foreign cooperative education programs by the Ministry of Education, only six new projects received approval. This is significantly fewer compared to 59 programs launched in 2023 and 66 in 2022.

This decline partly stems from quality requirements. By 2022, China had over 1,300 cooperative education programs at or above the undergraduate level, indicating no shortage in quantity. In 2018 and 2019, the Ministry of Education legally approved the termination of 286 Sino-foreign cooperative educational institutions and programs. Statistically, China's double first-class universities' international cooperation programs concentrate on STEM and business management fields. With STEM international cooperation becoming increasingly sensitive, these relatively high-quality programs may face cooperation obstacles.

Additionally, shifting political climates affect the survival of these joint programs and institutions beyond just U.S.-China relations. When China-Australia relations hit a low point, the impact was evident. Before 2019, Australia had established over 100 joint educational programs in China, but few new programs have been approved since, even after relations improved in 2022.

Among numerous Sino-foreign cooperation projects, 12 joint universities have independent legal status, with the City University of Hong Kong (Dongguan), approved this year, being the newest member.

Compared to other cooperative programs, institutes, or centers, joint universities with independent legal status enjoy relatively higher autonomy. They operate under self-selected and self-appointed management leadership and have the authority to sign legally binding agreements. They possess the privilege of conducting independent admissions alongside the national unified enrollment system. Some joint universities grant both domestic and foreign degrees, requiring accreditation from relevant foreign associations, thus experiencing less academic and administrative intervention from the Chinese side.

However, this autonomy varies among institutions. According to Inside Higher Ed, although foreign partners often insist they maintain complete academic control, they may lack the resources and willingness to maintain administrative equality, allowing Chinese partners to dominate management. This resembles a McDonald 's-style franchise model, combining foreign materials and technology with Chinese operations.

Due to the significant public relations risks involved, prestigious universities like NYU and Duke won't relinquish control over their educational programs or overseas operations. However, many non-prestigious universities operate closer to the franchise model.

Some faculty members believe academic freedom faces challenges under this management model. A lecturer at one Sino-foreign university noted that American teachers are accustomed to having a voice in institutional management, but Chinese managers operate in a paternalistic style, with no place for faculty in the school's management structure. Another lecturer mentioned being reprimanded by Chinese administrative personnel for classroom comments.

In 2018-2019, the number of American students studying in China exceeded 10,000 but dropped to 382 in 2020-2021, showing little recovery even after the pandemic. The same applies to faculty members. "Many foreign teaching and research staff who worked at joint institutions have delayed returning to China after the pandemic for various reasons, and some have resigned outright," a researcher told The Intellectual.

Denis Simon, former Executive Vice Chancellor of Duke Kunshan University, discussed the challenges facing Sino-foreign universities in 2021. As U.S.-China tensions escalated, some suspected the American side would close campuses, while others thought the Chinese side might do so - no one could say for certain. Campus operations remained caught between China and the U.S., shrouded in uncertainty.

Last November, Duke University President Vincent Price stated that Duke's leadership "must remain clear-eyed" when considering whether to renew its contract with the local partner institution in 2027. Under geopolitical pressures, establishing and operating Sino-foreign universities has become increasingly challenging.

"Now, the world seems to be conspiring to make these kinds of projects extremely difficult."