Dr.Wu Xinbo's Insights on China-US Relations Following His US Visit
Regardless of Election Outcome, China-US Relations Face Challenges in the Coming Four Years, Top Chinese Scholars on US Studies Said
Professor Xinbo Wu recently led a delegation of experts and scholars to the US for Track 2 diplomacy. He met with US think tanks, officers, and media in NY and DC to get a more comprehensive view of the political and economic situation in the United States and China-US relations during the election year. After his trip, he did an interview with Guancha Net (probably the only private-owned internet news media in China, and I worked there before) to share his observations.
Professor Wu is the dean of the Institute of International Studies and director of the Center for American Studies at Fudan University. His research focuses on China's foreign and security policy, Sino-U.S. relations, and U.S. Asia-Pacific policy. The interview is particularly noteworthy because Professor Wu and many scholars who accompanied him on this visit serve as consultants to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). Their perspectives can reflect the general understanding and views of Chinese MOFA officials and scholars regarding the United States. It is my honor to present his observations after receiving his authorization.
In the interview, Professor Wu believes that with the efforts of both sides over the past year, China-US relations have been in a small cycle of easing and improvement since last year.
However, the major framework of US policy toward China has not changed. It still operates under the larger framework of the US, treating China as its main strategic competitor and continuing to contain China. The US wants China to consider its concerns and respond, while, on the other hand, it lacks sufficient response to many of China's important concerns. At the same time, measures to contain China are continuing to advance, especially in the context of the US election year.
On the Taiwan issue, he believes the US is trying to do two things simultaneously, focusing more on the second part.
The US is trying to manage the Taiwan Strait issue; it is very worried that Lai Ching-te will cross the bottom line, leading to a conflict in the Strait. Professor Wu believes that the Biden administration does not want to see major turbulence because they have to deal with the Russia-Ukraine and the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts already and are busy with the election. They don't have the energy to handle another conflict.
The US is intensifying political support for Taiwan, especially militarily, by arming Taiwan and enhancing its combat capabilities.
Regarding the overcapacity of Chinese EVs and tariffs, Wu said most American experts candidly admit that hyping up the "overcapacity" of China's new energy vehicles and photovoltaic products, as well as the recent announcement by the Biden administration to impose additional tariffs, is more due to the needs of U.S. domestic politics and election politics. We are in the early stages of the U.S. election, and the above measures are for swing states, such as Michigan's votes.
His observation confirmed what I mentioned in May when Biden issued the new tariffs on Chinese EVs: “Some Chinese experts believe that Biden's new tariffs are merely an attempt to bolster his electoral prospects in swing states, particularly in Rust Belt states like Michigan, which is a key hub for automotive production in the U.S. According to FiveThirtyEight, Biden has been trailing in Michigan since March.“
Regarding trade and taxes
In the United States now, neither the Democratic Party nor the Republican Party talks about free trade anymore. Free trade is already a term of the past. Today's America is no longer the America that advocated for free trade back then.
Regarding the general election and its impact on China-US relations
Wu believes that regardless of whether Biden or Trump is elected, the overall framework of future US policy toward China will not fundamentally change. Both will view China as the main strategic competitor and adopt containment and suppression measures. However, there are differences in specific operations between the two:
Biden may focus more on technology suppression, adjust tariffs, exert pressure through allies while trying to manage bilateral relations, avoid escalation of conflicts, and maintain a positive stance in areas such as people-to-people exchanges.
Trump, on the other hand, may significantly increase tariffs on China, revoke China's trade status, appoint hawks to take a hard line against China and challenge China on issues such as Taiwan and the South China Sea. His unpredictability may lead to a loss of control in relations.
Overall, Biden's China policy is relatively more manageable, while Trump's uncertainty is greater and may bring more risks to the relationship. Wu believes that bilateral relations will be very difficult no matter who is in power.
About media communications:
Professor Wu also had a meeting with journalists and editors from The Wall Street Journal, which was responsible for reporting on China. After the communications, Wu thinks WSJ is relatively well-informed about the situation in China and does not lack information. However, because the journalists responsible for reporting on China cannot return to China and engage with various Chinese circles on the front line and can only report on China from the United States, the problem arises: after seeing a large amount of information about China, how do they judge this information? Is this information authentic and representative? Are these individual cases, or do they have universality? These issues lead to difficulties in ensuring accuracy and balance when writing reports. This is a common problem for journalists responsible for reporting on China.
I have also attached the full translation of his interview here.
Source: https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/7FzasK01JNFCLxrwcejYUQ?scene=25#wechat_redirect
Guancha Net: From June 7-15, you led a delegation of experts and scholars from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on a visit to the United States. Given the current state of China-U.S. relations, exchanges and communication between the two countries are particularly important. Could you please introduce the main agenda of this trip to the U.S.?
Wu Xinbo: This was my fourth visit to the U.S. since November 2022, and the longest one with the broadest range of contacts.
Within a week, we participated in nearly 20 events in Washington D.C. and New York. We exchanged views not only with think tanks, but also with U.S. government agencies such as the State Department and Congress. We engaged with the business community and the media. In addition to communicating with U.S. experts, officials, and journalists, we also exchanged opinions with frontline diplomats at our embassy in the U.S. Therefore, this visit to the U.S. had a very rich agenda and was quite fruitful.
Guancha Net: I noticed that you visited many institutions during this trip, covering the political, business, and academic circles in the U.S. What aspects of China are these various U.S. sectors most interested in right now? What questions were you asked the most by U.S. representatives?
Wu Xinbo: I think they are most interested in two aspects:
First, China's diplomacy, including China-Russia, China-Europe, China-Japan, and China-India relations. Of course, the focus is still on China-U.S. relations.
Second, the relevant situation of China's domestic economic development and scientific and technological progress. They have noticed that since the beginning of this year, China's economic growth momentum has been improving, and China has made progress in new production forces such as the new energy industry and photovoltaic industry.
Almost all U.S. think tanks, businesses, media, and government asked one question: What important reform signals will the upcoming Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee release? What does this mean for the U.S. business community and China's future foreign economic and trade relations?
Guancha Net: During your time in Washington, you visited the U.S. State Department's China House, a relatively new institution established in December 2022 under the leadership of Blinken. The first head of this institution, Daniel Kritenbrink, had a very wonderful dialogue with you at the Center for American Studies at Fudan University a few days ago, which left a deep impression on me. In your view, what are the main functions of the China House at the U.S. State Department? To what extent can it influence U.S. policy toward China?
Wu Xinbo: I believe that by using "China House" to replace the previous "China Desk," the U.S. State Department's starting point is to consider U.S. policy toward China within the framework of global competition with China.
Previously, the focus of the "China Desk" was on China-U.S. bilateral relations. Now the U.S. feels that strategic competition with China is not only at the bilateral level, but increasingly at the regional, multilateral, and global levels. Therefore, their institutions need to make corresponding adjustments and bring together U.S. officials in charge of China-related affairs at the regional, multilateral, and global levels into the newly established "China House." According to their statements, the goal is to handle relations with China in a more comprehensive and integrated manner.
As for the role of the "China House" in China policy, I believe it mainly provides decision-making support at the tactical level, routinely providing information and analysis on China-related issues and China-U.S. relations, handling some individual cases, etc., rather than directly participating in the decision-making process. Decisions are made at higher levels, such as the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and the Deputy Secretary of State.
Guancha Net: In addition to the China House at the U.S. State Department, the U.S. has also established the House Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, the Department of Defense's China Task Force, and the CIA's China Mission Center. What is the purpose of the U.S. setting up these "China-related" institutions in important departments? What is the perception or attitude of the personnel in these institutions toward China?
Wu Xinbo: The purpose is simple: to strengthen containment, suppression, and competition against China. Based on the information released from the activities of these institutions since their establishment, the goal is to hype up the China threat and challenge, exaggerate the threat posed by China to U.S. interests, and then design policies toward China from their respective perspectives, including intelligence analysis and strategic assessments of China, while strengthening communication among them.
Overall, these institutions have a negative, even extremely negative perception of China, and their attitude toward China is tough, even super tough.
Guancha Net: You visited many think tanks during this trip. What is the general attitude of U.S. experts on China toward China-U.S. relations now? Has there been any change compared to before? Were there any experts whose views left a deep impression on you?
Wu Xinbo: First, they feel quite relieved about the easing of China-U.S. relations since last year, especially since the meeting between the Chinese and U.S. heads of state in Bali.
Second, they have also noticed that China has responded positively to some of the U.S. concerns during this period. For example, China-U.S. cooperation on drug control, the resumption of exchanges between the Chinese and U.S. militaries, and the China-U.S. government-to-government dialogue on artificial intelligence (AI).
They are also dissatisfied with the current state of China-U.S. relations, feeling that there could actually be more progress and the two sides could do more. But now there is still a big gap with everyone's expectations. Most importantly, everyone has strong uncertainty about the future direction of China-U.S. relations. And this uncertainty is largely related to the upcoming U.S. presidential election. Depending on who takes office as the next U.S. president, the policy toward China will also differ, and the state of China-U.S. relations will also change.
A U.S. expert who has studied China for decades said that he is a bit uncomfortable with the huge changes in China-U.S. relations. I joked that this is the "new normal." He said, "I don't like this new normal at all, I really miss the good old days."
I think a considerable number of experts in U.S. think tanks who have long been engaged in China-U.S. exchanges and research still miss the stage when China-U.S. relations were relatively good. Of course, reason tells them that that stage has ended and cannot reappear. What needs to be faced is the current reality: China-U.S. relations are facing not only the issue of how to improve, but also the issue of how to prevent them from getting worse.
Guancha Net: Based on your observations, U.S. experts on China are not very satisfied with the current state of China-U.S. relations. As a Chinese expert on the U.S., do you have any new insights on China-U.S. relations after this trip?
Wu Xinbo: I believe that since last year, China-U.S. relations have been in a small cycle of easing and improvement. Within this small cycle, we have indeed seen an improvement in the atmosphere and some loosening, including some progress that has been made and will be made on some specific issues. These are all the results of the efforts of both sides over the past year or so.
But overall, the broad framework of the U.S. policy toward China has not changed. It is still under the framework of the U.S. treating China as its main strategic competitor and continuing to contain and suppress China.
Therefore, we can see that on the one hand, the U.S. wants China to consider its concerns and respond to them. On the other hand, it lacks sufficient response to many of China's important concerns. In other words, it wants us to help, but it doesn't help with the things we care about. Secondly, measures to contain and suppress China continue to advance, especially in the context of the U.S. election year.
So at present, China-U.S. relations are still in a stage of low-level fluctuations, and the future direction is uncertain. Overall, I don't think China-U.S. relations are optimistic.
Guancha Net: As you said, the U.S. has not given sufficient response to many of China's important concerns. The Taiwan issue has always been the most important and sensitive issue in China-U.S. relations. We have seen that in talks with China, the U.S. side almost always states that "the U.S. does not support Taiwan independence." But after Lai Ching-te took office, the U.S. Congress quickly sent a delegation to Taiwan, and recently approved two batches of arms sales plans to Taiwan totaling about $360 million. What do you think is the current U.S. strategy on the Taiwan issue? How might it play the "Taiwan card" in the next few years?
Wu Xinbo: Since the beginning of this year, the U.S. policy toward Taiwan has been "two intensifications":
First, it has intensified the so-called "management of the Taiwan Strait issue," especially after Lai Ching-te took office. The U.S. is very worried that he will cross the line, leading to a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. I believe that under the current situation, the Biden administration does not want major turbulence in the Taiwan Strait situation, because it has to deal with the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the Palestine-Israel conflict, and is busy with elections, so it has no energy to deal with another conflict.
Second, it has intensified political and especially military support for Taiwan, arming Taiwan and enhancing its combat capabilities.
The U.S. is taking both hands, but the focus is still on the second "intensification."
In the next few years, in addition to the routines we are familiar with, including upgrading "U.S.-Taiwan relations" and increasing military support to Taiwan, the U.S. may increasingly promote the internationalization of the Taiwan issue. Because the U.S. feels that in its bilateral interaction with China, it can't gain much advantage on the Taiwan issue and finds it difficult to restrain our Taiwan policy. So the U.S. is more considering pulling in allies and partners and encouraging other countries to pay attention to or even intervene in the Taiwan issue. This is to increase international pressure on us and restrain the mainland's Taiwan policy. This is a trend we need to pay attention to.
Guancha Net: If the U.S. promotes the internationalization of the Taiwan issue, what impact will it have on cross-strait relations? What preparations does China need to make?
Wu Xinbo: The direct impact is the internationalization of the Taiwan issue. Originally, the Taiwan issue was China's internal affair. Later, due to U.S. intervention, there was an international factor, namely the U.S. factor. Now the U.S. wants more countries to intervene, such as Japan, Australia, South Korea, India, etc., to create greater pressure on China.
We still need to firmly grasp the initiative and dominance over the Taiwan Strait issue and further implement and promote the established policy and guidelines toward Taiwan. Since Lai Ching-te took office on May 20, we can see that our Taiwan policy is still committed to shaping dominance and initiative over the Taiwan Strait.
In addition, in the face of the trend of further internationalization of the Taiwan issue, we must consider how to better articulate the historical, realistic, and international legal basis of "One China" and that Taiwan is a part of China at the multilateral and international levels.
Guancha Net: I noticed that a topic of recent concern is that the Biden administration recently announced high tariffs on multiple Chinese products exported to the U.S., including electric vehicles and solar cells, and some politicians have hyped up the so-called theory of China's new energy "overcapacity." During this visit to the U.S., did you discuss this topic with some U.S. institutions? What were their views or attitudes?
Wu Xinbo: When U.S. experts mentioned "overcapacity," they immediately laughed and said, "I know you don't like this word." Because they are well aware that this is just an excuse.
Most U.S. experts frankly admit that hyping up China's new energy vehicles and photovoltaic products' "overcapacity," as well as the recent Biden administration's announcement of tariff increases, are more for the needs of U.S. domestic politics and election politics. We are now in the early stages of the U.S. election, and the above measures are for swing states, such as Michigan votes.
Some experts also stated that from the perspective of U.S. economic and industrial development, what Biden has taken is also a preventive measure. Because the U.S. is now indeed lagging behind China in these areas and cannot compete with China. But Biden believes that these industries are very important in the long run, and he hopes to develop U.S. capabilities in this regard. If the market is open and Chinese products enter, these U.S. industries will not be able to develop in the future, so the Biden administration's approach is to try to protect these industries. But I think U.S. experts are quite skeptical about whether tariff increases can achieve the purpose, including protecting the competitiveness of U.S. industries.
Guancha Net: The U.S. protecting backward production capacity through taxation is actually contrary to their so-called free trade. Do you think taxation can allow the U.S. to achieve its goals?
Wu Xinbo: Neither the Democratic Party nor the Republican Party in the U.S. talks about free trade anymore. Free trade is a word of the past. The U.S. is no longer the country that advocated for free trade in the past.
From the perspective of industrial competitiveness, it is impossible to truly enhance the competitiveness of U.S. industries through protectionism and high tariffs.
Some American friends said that a new energy vehicle sold from China to the U.S. is about $10,000. If you buy a U.S.-made new energy vehicle, it costs $50,000. Why should I spend so much more money?
U.S.-made cars are not necessarily better than Chinese-made ones in performance, but they are more expensive. Asking consumers to spend so much more money makes no sense. So from the perspective of market operation, this policy is not sustainable and cannot achieve the goal of enhancing U.S. competitiveness in the new energy industry.
Guancha Net: This year is a U.S. election year. Generally speaking, both parties will hold high the "be tough on China card." What impact will this have on China-U.S. relations going forward? What are your predictions?
Wu Xinbo: Obviously, the two candidates in this year's U.S. election - Biden and Trump - are the most unpopular candidates. This is the first time in decades that the U.S. has had this situation, but it is also the reality of current U.S. politics, the result of factors such as political polarization and partisan strife.
The two candidates have no major differences in their China policies. They both see China as the main strategic competitor and want to contain and suppress China, but there are differences at the operational level.
If Biden is re-elected, first, his crackdown focus may be on technology suppression, not a "small yard, high wall," but a "big yard, high wall," because he feels this is critical to ensuring U.S. military priority and economic competitiveness.
Second, in terms of tariffs, I believe that without the political pressure of re-election in his second term, Biden may adjust some of Trump's tariffs, because he feels that some are low- and mid-end products that don't need to be restricted. And after the tariff increase, 90% of it is still paid for by the American people, with consumers spending more money and also pushing up inflation.
Again, he will also continue to rally allies to pressure China from a multilateral and regional perspective, including the so-called "Indo-Pacific Strategy" and the Australia-UK-U.S. trilateral security partnership "AUKUS."
Finally, Biden will also try to manage China-U.S. relations and does not want China and the U.S. to move toward a major conflict. For example, on the Taiwan issue, on the one hand, he supports Taiwan, and on the other hand, he wants to manage Lai Ching-te and not let his words and actions go too far and cause trouble for the U.S. In the area of people-to-people and local exchanges between China and the U.S., he will still generally take a relatively positive attitude. This is of positive significance for China-U.S. relations and for the exchanges between the two societies and peoples.
If Trump is in power, first, I am very concerned about the entire China-U.S. economic and trade relationship. Because now, whether it is Trump himself or his main advisers, the wind they are releasing is to impose 100% or even 200% tariffs on Chinese products exported to the U.S. and claim to cancel China's permanent normal trade relations treatment. If this is done, China-U.S. economic and trade relations will be severed, and the most important link connecting China and the U.S. now will be gone.
Second, from the experience of Trump's first term in office, his security team uses some China hawks, even super hawks. These people will challenge China on important issues involving China's core interests, such as Taiwan and the South China Sea.
Trump does not have the awareness of managing China-U.S. relations like Biden does, and may not even have the ability to do so. Trump is unpredictable. You don't know what he will do tomorrow after doing one thing today, whether he has a sense of proportion in handling issues, and whether he knows what is important and what is not.
This means that if Trump takes office, China-U.S. relations may see a situation like the one in the latter half of 2020 during Trump's first term, which was out of control. This is also a concern for many people.
Guancha Net: After four years, Biden and Trump will face off for the second time in the election. What is your assessment of these two candidates? You exchanged views with U.S. experts and scholars during this trip. What are their assessments of the two? Is there any consensus?
Wu Xinbo: Many think tank people I met with generally expressed concern about the possibility of Trump's return. But recently, Trump's momentum is still rising, which also puts a lot of pressure on many people.
As for Biden, they are also worried, especially about Biden's physical condition, whether he can successfully complete the campaign, and if re-elected, whether he can successfully complete these four years. These are all things that some U.S. people are very worried about.
Therefore, no matter who is in power in the next four years, it will definitely be very difficult. So many Americans pin their real hopes on the performance of the next generation of American politicians in 2028.
Guancha Net: Indeed, the U.S. will still be in a state of gerontocracy for the next four years. I am interested in one stop on your itinerary in New York. You went to The Wall Street Journal and held a seminar with the reporters and editors responsible for China coverage. Do you think the reporters and editors at The Wall Street Journal who are responsible for China coverage have an accurate understanding of China? What is their level?
Wu Xinbo: Our seminar lasted over an hour, with a wide range of topics and in-depth exchanges. Overall, they are quite knowledgeable about the situation in China and do not lack information. However, because the reporters responsible for covering China at the newspaper cannot return to China now and cannot communicate with various sectors in China on the front line, they can only report on China from the U.S. The problem this creates is that after they see a large amount of information about China, how do they judge this information? Is this information authentic and representative? Is it a case or does it have universal significance? These issues lead to difficulties in accurately and objectively grasping the facts when they write reports. For reporters at the newspaper responsible for covering China, this is a common problem.
One reporter who participated in the exchange with us this time previously was stationed in Shanghai and was responsible for reporting on economic and trade issues. He said he lived in Shanghai for 18 years. For a reporter who has lived in Shanghai for 18 years, reporting on the Chinese economy and China-U.S. economic and trade relations would be very easy for him. But in recent years, he has been staying in New York, so there is a great sense of detachment when writing reports on China's economy again.