Chinese Reactions to Sullivan's First Day in Beijing
Strategic communication channels remain open, but could there be tangible outcomes?
On August 27, Sullivan arrived in Beijing, beginning his 3-day visit. It’s a return visit following Wang Yi's visit to Washington last year. It was the first visit to China by a White House National Security Advisor since 2016.
Ahead of his visit, Beijing set the tone. The talks will mostly revolve around the Taiwan question, development rights, and China's strategic security.
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Yang Tao, Director General of North American and Oceanian Affairs from Chinese MFA, and US Ambassador Nicholas Burns greeted Sullivan at the airport. After that, Sullivan met with Chinese top diplomat Wang Yi. Here I attache the official translated Chinese readout of this meeting:
https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/gjldrhd_674881/202408/t20240827_11480115.shtml
China and the US Begin a New Round of Strategic Communication in Beijing
On August 27, 2024, Wang Yi, member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Director of the Office of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission, began a new round of strategic communication with Jake Sullivan, U.S. National Security Advisor to the President, in Beijing.
Wang Yi said he welcomes Assistant Sullivan's visit to China and his first strategic communication with China here. China-U.S. relations are crucial to both countries and affect the world. Over the past few years, our relationship has experienced many twists and turns. Under the strategic guidance of President Xi Jinping and President Biden, we have managed to return to Bali and move towards San Francisco. The experiences gained are worth summarizing, and lessons need to be learned. The key is to anchor our direction in mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation."
Wang Yi stated that Implementing the consensus reached by the two heads of state at the San Francisco meeting is the common responsibility of both China and the U.S., and it is also the main task of this strategic communication. We look forward to in-depth communication on this over the next two days. We hope that this communication will be strategic and substantive as always, while being more constructive, pushing China-U.S. relations to overcome interference and obstacles towards the San Francisco vision, truly achieving stable, healthy, and sustainable development.'
Sullivan said This is his first visit to China as the President's National Security Advisor. He appreciates China's thoughtful arrangements. President Biden is committed to responsibly managing U.S.-China relations, avoiding competition from evolving into conflict and cooperating in areas of common interest. He looks forward to having productive dialogues with China on a wide range of issues through this strategic communication and implementing the consensus reached by the two heads of state.
So far, the readout has expressed a positive momentum. Such moods are also kept in Chinese media.
Lu Cen(陆岑) published his opinion on China-US Focus(中美聚焦)- a Chinese platform website sharing opinions and thoughts on bilateral relations. The opinion praised Sullivan’s visit as “The most valuable visit for China diplomacy during Biden's tenure.”
I’ve found it interesting and attached a translation of his opinion here.
Sullivan's Beijing trip: A preview of Harris's pragmatic diplomacy
On the afternoon of August 27, White House National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan arrived in Beijing for a three-day visit. This is Sullivan's "return visit" following Wang Yi's visit to Washington last year, an arrangement set during the high-level U.S.-China summit in California last November, and the first visit to China by a White House National Security Advisor in 8 years. The main purpose of his trip is to implement the Biden administration's diplomatic approach of "responsibly managing and stabilizing relations with China," but compared to figures like Blinken, Sullivan's role is more flexible. For both China and the U.S., this trip is the most valuable visit for China diplomacy during Biden's tenure. Sullivan is the "strategist" of Biden's foreign policy. He advocates for a "middle-class foreign policy" and criticizes globalization and free trade. He has led projects such as "small yard, high fence," chip alliances, and the AUKUS agreement, while pushing for government investment and subsidies, strengthening external alliances to accumulate "advantageous positions" for U.S. competition with China. As a Ph.D. in international politics, Sullivan has been trusted and heavily relied upon by both Hillary Clinton and Biden, making him one of the most influential national security advisors in decades.
The last time a U.S. National Security Advisor visited China was in 2016, also an election year. Susan Rice, then National Security Advisor in the Obama administration, visited China to pave the way for Obama's G20 trip to Hangzhou. At that time, U.S.-China relations were tense due to issues like cybersecurity, regional discourse power, and disputes over the South China Sea and Diaoyu Islands. Nevertheless, Rice still valued strategic opportunities and cooperation with China in the Asia-Pacific region, "wisely" managing differences. However, after Trump's and Biden's terms, U.S.-China relations have shifted from cooperation to comprehensive competition and confrontation. Now, both Republican presidential candidate Trump and Democratic presidential candidate Harris are likely to continue the path of competition and confrontation.
Reviewing Biden's diplomatic engagement with China since taking office, it's clear that the purpose, importance, and "tacit understanding" with China of Sullivan's visit surpass those of other Biden administration cabinet members or cabinet-level officials. Previous visits by Blinken, Yellen, and Raimondo achieved limited results, with cooperation confined to asking China to combat drug trade and address the U.S. fentanyl crisis. Blinken's first visit to China was not only delayed for two years but further postponed due to the "balloon incident." His April visit this year also carried an attitude of pressuring and warning China on the Russia-Ukraine issue, lacking sincerity. His work focus has been entirely on the Middle East and Eastern Europe. Yellen and Raimondo's visits to China also continued to promote "de-risking" and "preventing decoupling," but subsequent actions still increased technological pressure on China and supported the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative in imposing additional tariffs on China.
According to information released by the U.S. side, Sullivan's trip will discuss the Taiwan issue, military communication and dialogue, the fentanyl crisis, the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and tensions in the South China Sea, North Korea, the Middle East, and Myanmar. Although Sullivan will likely express some diplomatic rhetoric in Beijing on disputes or conflicts such as the South China Sea, Russia-Ukraine, and Israel-Palestine issues, he is unlikely to pressure and persuade China to change course like Blinken did.
Another difference from the visits of Blinken, Yellen, and others is that Sullivan's trip will inevitably signal or "clarify" the direction of the next phase of U.S. foreign policy, especially as the international community is focused on how the U.S. election and power transition will affect U.S. foreign policy. Judging from the timing, Sullivan's choice to visit China after the Democratic National Convention might hint to China that if Harris is elected, the management and stability of U.S.-China relations would continue. Moreover, Biden sending Sullivan to China for face-to-face dialogue on the eve of the U.S. election helps both sides reduce misjudgments and misunderstandings, avoiding competition sliding into conflict. This is also crucial for the Democratic Party seeking continued governance.
Both China and the U.S. have positioned Sullivan's visit as "strategic communication." Strategic communication covers a wide range of topics, focusing on direct and in-depth communication on bilateral, regional, and global issues. From China's perspective, this kind of strategic communication is also valuable. Sullivan has previously held four meetings with former Director Yang Jiechi, and this Beijing trip is his fourth meeting with Director Wang in 18 months, with the meeting location shifting from third-party locations (Vienna, Malta, Bangkok) to mainland China. China's reception of Sullivan's visit also demonstrates a positive willingness to effectively manage bilateral differences, reflecting the responsibility of a major power. On August 25, the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated that the strategic communication between Director Wang Yi and Sullivan has been "substantial and constructive," achieving positive results.
The White House also mentioned on the 23rd that this strategic communication channel has played an important role in responsibly managing U.S.-China competition and tensions. Each meeting through the Wang Yi-Sullivan channel lasts for two days, nearly 10 to 12 hours, discussing bilateral and global issues (such as the Russia-Ukraine conflict, AI challenges) as well as cross-strait issues. This will also be the dialogue model for Sullivan's Beijing trip.
Regarding managing and stabilizing bilateral relations, Sullivan's trip will inevitably involve China's core interests, primarily Taiwan. Last week, the Biden administration allowed two high-ranking officials from the Lai Ching-te administration to visit the U.S. China will undoubtedly confront Sullivan face-to-face about this, demanding that the U.S. continue to curb Taiwan independence. After Taiwan, the issues involving management and stability are the South China Sea dispute and the U.S.'s recent continuous technological pressure on China. China will likely present demands to Sullivan from the perspectives of development rights, regional security, and strategic levels. Only on the basis of stability and continuous management can the next high-level summit be prepared and realized, which is the main task of Sullivan's trip. This year's G20 Summit and APEC Summit are both held after the U.S. election day in November, in Brazil and Peru respectively.
Lastly, it's worth noting that in the briefing on Sullivan's visit to China, the White House mentioned that China and the U.S. have found some important areas where they can cooperate while competing, and have found constructive ways to work together to address challenges that neither side can solve unilaterally. So, compared to Blinken and others who previously avoided discussing cooperation, Sullivan's trip may involve talks with China about cooperation in areas such as drug control, climate change response, and AI challenges. This could also be a preview of U.S. diplomacy transitioning from Biden's era of "limited cooperation" to a "more pragmatic diplomacy" under a potential Harris administration.
If Harris is elected, Sullivan might take a position in the new administration, such as Secretary of State, or he might return to academia to continue deepening U.S. strategy. Given Harris's personality, she might also bring in other people, but regarding China relations, she would likely broadly continue the Biden diplomatic line that Sullivan has been pushing.
However, as the White House emphasized, the current diplomacy and communication of Biden sending Sullivan to China does not signify a change in U.S. policy towards China. U.S.-China relations remain highly competitive, with the U.S. still committed to increasing investment, strengthening alliances, and coordinating actions on technology and national security issues. Harris also emphasized at last week's party convention that if elected, she would ensure that the U.S., not China, wins the competition of the 21st century. This means the overall direction of competition and confrontation will not change.
Nevertheless, compared to Biden's term, which excluded or was cautious about cooperation with China, while Harris maintains a line of confrontation and "competitive winning," there might be slightly more room for pragmatic cooperation with China in the future.
For now, we still don’t know whether there will be any kind of tangible outcome of this three-day visit. But like one of my predecessors told me before: “Only if the avenue of communication remains open, it is always better when you talk to each other than when you do not talk to each other.”