Chinese Expert Forecasts Middle East's Geopolitical Landscape in 2025
Professor Fan Hongda believes Assad's sudden fall might be the final straw forcing Tehran to reform. The Middle East situation may see a period of easing in 2025
Happy New Year, my readers. For the first episode of 2025, I bring Professor Fan Hongda’s prediction of the geopolitical landscape in the Middle East in 2025.
Professor Fan is a distinguished scholar at the Middle East Studies Institute of Shanghai International Studies University, specializing in Chinese policy in the Middle East. He is currently serving as a visiting scholar at the University of California, Berkeley. Prior to joining SISU, he spent 16 years as a faculty member in the Department of Political Science at Xiamen University. His rich international experience includes visiting scholarships at various academic institutions throughout Israel, Palestine, and Turkey. He has also participated in the U.S. Department of State's prestigious International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP).
It was originally an interview conducted by Guancha Net in late 2024. During the interview, Professor Fan provides several key assessments:
On Hamas: The organization faces severe challenges after suffering massive military losses, with its political influence in the region significantly diminished. Professor Fan sees little prospect for Hamas's revival under current conditions.
On Israel: Israel's greatest threats lie in its increasingly severe internal divisions, which generate instability. As Israel holds a clear advantage, the investigation of Netanyahu has limited impact on its conflict with Hamas.
On Palestinian-Israeli Relations: The two-state solution appears increasingly unlikely. Israel's control over both Gaza and the West Bank is expected to intensify, though tensions may ease under a potential Trump administration.
On Turkey's Role: Turkey emerges as a major beneficiary of Syria's power shift, though it faces significant challenges in managing Syria's reconstruction and navigating relationships with Kurdish forces and international stakeholders.
On Iran's "Axis of Resistance": The rapid collapse of Assad's regime has disrupted Iran's regional strategy, potentially becoming a catalyst for internal reforms in Tehran. Support for the resistance axis is likely to weaken amid growing domestic pressure.
Generally speaking, Professor Fan believes that the region approaching a turning point. As Hamas gradually bleeds out and external powers face increasing domestic challenges, tensions show signs of de-escalation after a period of intense military confrontation.
Below is the original text:
Q: The Middle East has seen continuous conflicts this year, from Palestinian-Israeli to Lebanese-Israeli to Syrian conflicts, with increasingly uncertain developments. Let's start with Hamas, the flashpoint of this round of war. With Hamas's years of accumulated strength largely destroyed, former Hamas leaders Sinwar and Haniyeh killed by Israel, and Syria experiencing upheaval while Iran may be too preoccupied to support Hamas, what is Hamas's future? Will they abandon the Axis of Resistance and seek renewed cooperation with the Muslim Brotherhood?
Fan Hongda: The October 7, 2023 incident was a massive blow to Hamas. I predicted then that the organization would be completely destroyed. Over the past year, Hamas's military forces have been almost entirely decimated, leading to a significant decline in their political influence. Recovery will be extremely difficult.
Israel's operational goal is clearly to completely destroy Hamas and prevent them from conducting guerrilla warfare in Gaza. Israel hopes to eliminate both Hamas's military threat and political influence. I believe Israel will attempt to build a Gaza Strip without Hamas. Moreover, other Palestinian political factions, especially Fatah, fear Hamas's revival would threaten their dominance in Palestine. Therefore, other Palestinian political forces are unlikely to support Hamas's revival and may even support Israel's actions to weaken or destroy Hamas thoroughly.
Regarding cooperation with the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt's Sisi regime strongly opposes the Brotherhood and views it as a threat. Given Egypt's hard-line stance and negative attitude toward Hamas, despite past connections between Hamas and the Brotherhood, rebuilding relations is almost impossible under current political circumstances.
As a political and military organization, Hamas faces severe challenges, and unless circumstances change drastically, its future outlook remains bleak.
Q: Under these changes, will the Palestinian-Israeli conflict end temporarily? Besides building a separation wall in Gaza, Israel continues to occupy the West Bank. How will Israel treat these two regions after this round of ceasefire?
Fan Hongda: In fact, Israel's policies toward Gaza and the West Bank are increasingly aligned. Before October 7 last year, Gaza under Hamas control maintained some autonomy and was largely free from direct Israeli control. However, after more than a year of developments, the situation has completely changed.
Meanwhile, Israel's control over the West Bank has always been very strict. Over a decade ago, I conducted a month-long research in the West Bank, and Israel's control measures were already very tight then. Although Palestine is widely recognized internationally, in reality, it severely lacks sovereignty and other basic elements of statehood. The West Bank is largely controlled by the Israeli Defense Forces and settlements, with Israel becoming the de facto master of the region's fate. It's foreseeable that Israel will implement similar policies in Gaza.
Although none of us want to see this situation, and while the international community hopes for Palestinian independence, for which the Palestinian people have paid an enormous price - with over 40,000 deaths in Gaza in just the past year - regrettably, I believe the possibility of implementing a two-state solution is now extremely slim.
The most intense phase of the conflict seems to have passed. Hamas, the strongest force of violent resistance, has essentially lost its combat capability, while other Palestinian political factions either lack the ability to continue resistance or lack the will to do so. Therefore, tensions will gradually ease. After Trump takes office, the situation may see relative improvement.
Q: Returning to Israel's domestic situation, Netanyahu's cases are being reopened in court. How do you think this will affect Israeli politics? After the judicial reform controversy, could this trigger new domestic turmoil in Israel, and what impact might it have on the war situation?
Fan Hongda: In Israel, high-ranking officials being investigated or facing court proceedings isn't uncommon. Netanyahu's case isn't sudden but has been ongoing for years. Therefore, Israeli public reaction to his current trial is relatively muted.
The impact of Netanyahu's current trial cannot be compared to the previous judicial reform controversy. While last year's judicial reform crisis caused significant social upheaval, it was merely a trigger. Before the judicial reform, Israel already faced many deep-rooted conflicts, including tensions between Jewish and non-Jewish populations and between Orthodox and non-Orthodox Jews.
Therefore, as I pointed out several years ago, Israel's greatest threats lie not only in external conflicts but also in its increasingly severe internal divisions. If these divisions cannot be properly resolved, political instability in Israel will be inevitable.
As for Netanyahu's motives for pursuing war, there are two aspects: First, domestic radical forces are attempting to construct a so-called national security doctrine; second, judicial investigations into Netanyahu are often suspended when the country is in a state of war. Now, with Israel holding a clear advantage on the battlefield and war threats diminishing, the impact of Netanyahu's investigation on the military situation is quite limited.
Q: Trump is about to take office, and some believe that given his conservative stance and relationship with Netanyahu, he might suspend or even end this round of Palestinian-Israeli conflict. How do you view the American factor's influence on the Palestinian-Israeli situation going forward?
Fan Hongda: Trump's second term might promote a Palestinian-Israeli ceasefire, with details potentially following his first term's Palestinian solution proposal. Looking at broader trends, America's geopolitical position in the Middle East is gradually declining, and Trump shows less interest in the two-state solution compared to the Biden administration. Therefore, I don't hold high expectations for the two-state solution's implementation. The key to achieving a two-state solution lies in Israel withdrawing from occupied territories, which seems almost impossible given Israel's domestic political environment. Without Israeli cooperation, any two-state solution cannot succeed.
Therefore, I believe the resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli issue is more likely to come at the cost of weakening Palestinian statehood. In other words, Palestine might improve its economic conditions, but achieving full sovereign statehood is almost impossible. Washington's willingness to support a fully sovereign Palestinian state won't be strong either.
In recent years, the U.S. has increasingly focused on great power competition and seeks to reduce direct intervention in the Middle East, particularly avoiding involvement in large-scale regional conflicts. Even Trump's team hasn't paid much attention to the Syrian situation. The U.S. might rely on countries like France to lead regional developments rather than directly controlling regional changes as it has done for decades.
Q: Looking at Syria, Israel has occupied Mount Hermon and is expanding the buffer zone near the Golan Heights. Where do you think Israel's military advance will stop? Will they establish a puppet government like they did in South Lebanon? If the Lebanese-Israeli war resumes, could Israel try to expand the buffer zone northward and attack Hezbollah from the east?
Fan Hongda: Israel's buffer zone roughly follows the 1974 demarcation line, making Israel one of the biggest beneficiaries of Syria's current situation.
However, I don't believe Israel has a strong desire to control Syrian territory. Instead, Israel prefers to see a relatively fragmented but not violently conflicted, weak Syria. Currently, Syria no longer poses a direct threat to Israel. With the buffer zone expanded beyond Israel's previous control area, this provides stronger protection for Israel's Galilee water sources.
Therefore, I believe Israel won't conduct large-scale territory-oriented breakthrough military operations but rather only strike potential threats, especially significant ammunition depots and military facilities, to ensure Syria cannot pose a military threat to Israel in the future.
Similarly, Israel won't establish a puppet regime in Syria like in South Lebanon. Such action would inevitably create conflicts with countries, including Turkey, and might intensify conflicts with the Julani’s faction (now renamed as Ahmed al-Sharaa).
If the situation escalates again, Israel could use its buffer zone in Syria and its own territory to attack Hezbollah in southern Lebanon from both eastern and southern directions, creating a more advantageous military position. Considering the Lebanese-Israeli war and changes in Syria, Hezbollah likely has no desire to engage in another war with Israel. Although Iran hasn't completely stopped supporting Hezbollah, with increasing controversy over external intervention within Iran, this support's continuity is uncertain. Therefore, Hezbollah will likely actively avoid high-intensity confrontations with Israel.
Israel is unlikely to launch proactive strikes against Hezbollah. Israel has two main ways to disarm Hezbollah: either militarily destroy it or encourage the Lebanese government forces to take over Hezbollah's arms, removing its independent military capability. If Hezbollah refuses to disarm, it will inevitably make enemies of other Lebanese factions.
Therefore, how Hezbollah cooperates with the Lebanese government and local political factions in the future will be a topic worth watching closely.
Q: Looking at Syria, Israel has occupied Mount Hermon and is expanding the buffer zone near the Golan Heights. Where do you think Israel's military advance will stop? Will they establish a puppet government like they did in South Lebanon? If the Lebanese-Israeli war resumes, could Israel try to expand the buffer zone northward and attack Hezbollah from the east?
Fan Hongda: Israel's buffer zone roughly follows the 1974 demarcation line, making Israel one of the biggest beneficiaries of Syria's current situation.
However, I don't believe Israel has a strong desire to control Syrian territory. Instead, Israel prefers to see a relatively fragmented but not violently conflicted, weak Syria. Current Syria no longer poses a direct threat to Israel. With the buffer zone expanded beyond Israel's previous control area, this provides stronger protection for Israel's Galilee water sources.
Therefore, I believe Israel won't conduct large-scale territory-oriented breakthrough military operations, but rather only strike potential threats, especially significant ammunition depots and military facilities, to ensure Syria cannot pose a military threat to Israel in the future.
Similarly, Israel won't establish a puppet regime in Syria like in South Lebanon. Such action would inevitably create conflicts with countries including Turkey and might intensify conflicts with the Jolani faction (now renamed as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham).
If the situation escalates again, Israel could use its buffer zone in Syria and its own territory to attack Hezbollah in southern Lebanon from both eastern and southern directions, creating a more advantageous military position. Considering the Lebanese-Israeli war and changes in Syria, Hezbollah likely has no desire to engage in another war with Israel. Although Iran hasn't completely stopped supporting Hezbollah, with increasing controversy over external intervention within Iran, this support's continuity is uncertain. Therefore, Hezbollah will likely actively avoid high-intensity confrontations with Israel, and Israel is unlikely to launch proactive strikes against Hezbollah. Israel has two main ways to disarm Hezbollah: either militarily destroy it or encourage the Lebanese government forces to take over Hezbollah's arms, removing its independent military capability. If Hezbollah refuses to disarm, it will inevitably make enemies of other Lebanese factions.
Therefore, how Hezbollah cooperates with the Lebanese government and local political factions in the future will be a topic worth watching closely.
Q: Syria's changes have brought Turkey significant benefits but also the burden of supporting nearly 20 million Syrian people's survival. How do you think Turkey, the "Syrian National Army," and the "Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham"(HTS) will act next? Will they launch a full-scale offensive against Kurdish regions to seize oil fields and grain fields?
Fan Hongda: Turkey is undoubtedly one of the biggest beneficiaries of Syria's current situation. Whether through social media, conversations with Turkish and Syrian transitional government officials, or private discussions with Turkish friends, I can clearly sense Turkish people's pride.
I've received several related messages. For example, a Turkish friend mentioned that the foreign minister of the Syrian transitional government received his master's degree in sociology from a Turkish private university in 2022 and is currently pursuing a doctorate there. Another official in charge of women's affairs holds dual Syrian-Turkish citizenship. These indicate that Turks see themselves as the biggest beneficiaries of current changes.
However, as you mentioned, Turkey now faces certain risks. On one hand, Syria was already divided during Bashar al-Assad's late rule. Besides Russian and Iranian forces, the Syrian Democratic Forces（SDF） (U.S.-backed Kurdish forces) also play an important role.
To this day, the Syrian transitional government leadership still claims they want all factions to disarm and form a unified national army, but the U.S.-backed SDF hasn't responded and has effectively rejected HTS's policies. This has led to ongoing small-scale conflicts between the Turkey-backed "Syrian National Army" and HTS with the Kurdish SDF. Whether Syria can achieve unity is a huge challenge for Turkey.
On the other hand, after Assad's removal, Turkey became the primary external party responsible for Syria's livelihood. However, Turkey's economic situation isn't ideal, and it lacks sufficient funds for Syrian reconstruction. Turkey must rely on international cooperation for post-war reconstruction, which is another major challenge. If Turkey hopes to promote Syrian unity, establish a new Syria, and gain access to Kurdish oil and grain fields to restore the local economy, it will inevitably conflict directly with U.S. interests in Syria.
Currently, Turkey shows great confidence in Syria's development. Recent statements by Turkey's foreign minister even carried a somewhat mocking tone toward Iran and Russia. This isn't a good sign. Although Russia is busy with the Ukraine war and Iran's resistance axis has suffered setbacks, weakening both countries' influence in Syria, we cannot ignore their deep influence there. If Turkey ignores these countries' roles, it may face serious consequences.
The future development of the Syrian situation still needs time to observe. I personally believe Turkey and its supported HTS and transitional government will continue to face challenges. Nevertheless, I also think a full-scale conflict between Turkey and the Kurds is unlikely. Since the SDF can't militarily match Turkey and its supported forces, they're likely to face complete military defeat. As the Syrian transitional government shows strong political unity desires, the Kurds might accept formal national unity under certain conditions.
However, whether these negotiations can satisfy Kurdish conditions and meet Turkish expectations remains to be seen. If both sides can compromise, Syria's unity might be achieved peacefully; if not, the Kurds may be forced to pay the price and be forcibly unified by Turkey and its supported forces.
Q: Syria's rapid change has undoubtedly disrupted the geographical connection of Iran's "Axis of Resistance." How will Iran support Hezbollah in the future? Previously, Iraq's Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani resisted U.S. pressure and refused to dissolve Shiite militias. Against this background, what strategic adjustments will Iran make? Will they focus entirely on the Iraq-Iran region? Will Israel choose to continue military strikes against Iran, especially against Iranian nuclear facilities? Additionally, what impact will this have on the situation in Yemen?
Fan Hongda: Clearly, as Resistance Axis members face successive setbacks, Iran faces increasing pressure and negative impacts. For example, with the collapse of Assad's government in Syria, Iran's aid route to Hezbollah has been cut off, requiring future aid to take detours, which is obviously less convenient than before.
Moreover, debates within Tehran about maintaining the Resistance Axis strategy are intensifying. This isn't new - these discussions have existed for years. However, with Resistance Axis members suffering heavy losses over the past year, this debate has gained more attention.
I believe internal Iranian support for the Resistance Axis is gradually weakening. This trend is evident both within the government and among the public. During my visits to Iran, I consistently hear public complaints about the country spending precious foreign exchange on supporting the Resistance Axis while under international sanctions and foreign exchange shortages. Many question the practical value of this approach and whether it's worth continuing.
Therefore, even though Iraq's Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani refuses to dissolve militias, I believe Iran's future support and willingness to back the Resistance Axis will weaken. Moreover, if Iran hopes to maintain and enhance its regional position, it must change its current foreign strategy, or its prospects will become increasingly concerning.
The changes in the Resistance Axis, especially Assad's sudden fall, might be the final straw forcing Tehran to reform. If Iran chooses to continue confronting the U.S. and refusing to recognize Israel, it will face severe internal and external pressure.
I believe some forces within Iran are testing public opinion, with some even suggesting Khamenei's son as the next Supreme Leader, which I see as an attempt to pave the way for future political changes.
For years, Israel has tried to convince the U.S. to jointly destroy Iran's nuclear facilities, but the U.S. hasn't responded. With U.S. cooperation, Israel and Iran would inevitably engage in a full-scale war, not just the current performative strikes. Both sides have enough capability to cause lethal damage, so such a war could extend beyond just a few Middle Eastern countries to broader conflict, which is why the U.S. has been reluctant to help Israel destroy Iran's nuclear facilities.
The Houthis currently maintain their offensive stance against Israel, but the Middle East Resistance Axis needs unity to exert greater pressure on Israel. As Hezbollah and Hamas's battlefields calm down, Resistance Axis forces are fighting individually, and the Houthis' challenge to Israel will gradually diminish. If the Houthis maintain their offensive stance, they might face joint U.S.-UK-Israeli action or even destructive strikes.
Q: Finally, please summarize whether the Middle East situation is escalating or de-escalating. In the long term, will there be another round of regional power struggles following the "Arab Spring"?
Fan Hongda: I believe after more than a year of high-intensity military confrontation, the current Middle East situation is showing signs of cooling down and approaching a turning point.
Based on current information, the possibility of major powers like Iran, Israel, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia initiating a new round of war in the Middle East is very low. Considering the heavy losses suffered by local resistance organizations like Hamas and the challenges faced by external powers, the possibility of large-scale chaos in the Middle East is small, and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is unlikely to become a flashpoint in the short term. Overall, the Middle East situation may see a period of easing.
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I don’t see why “internal reform” in Iran implies recognising Israel.