China's MOFCOM Fires Back over US Restrictions
China Hits Back with Drone Export Curbs, Printer Probe, and Entity List Additions, What's next?
China’s Ministry of Commerce today issued four announcements retaliating against a series of recent restrictive measures imposed on China by the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
Tightening export controls on drones, their key components, and related technology to the United States, subjecting them to strict case-by-case review.
Launching a 12-month national security investigation into foreign trade regarding imported printing and copying office equipment installed with foreign system software.
Placing Compliance Testing LLC—which assisted the FCC in restricting Chinese companies—on the countermeasures list, pursuant to the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law
Placing 6 US entities, which assisted US “forced labor” sanctions related to Xinjiang, on the countermeasures list, prohibiting organizations and individuals within China from engaging in transactions or cooperation with them.
Geopolitechs covers the companies in detail, and I highly recommend it.
In addition, the Certification and Accreditation Administration of China (CNCA) issued a notice suspending the practice whereby CCC-designated certification bodies commission US-based certification agencies to carry out post-certification factory follow-up inspections in the United States.
CCC certification, short for China Compulsory Certification, is the mandatory safety certification that specific products sold in China (electrical appliances, toys, wires and cables, etc.) must pass. It’s similar to the US UL certification, but functions as a mandatory market-access system. If US-based factories producing CCC-catalog products such as power supplies, motors, and household appliances want to enter the Chinese market, they need this certification. Previously, domestic CCC-issuing bodies would commission local US agencies to conduct on-site annual inspections nearby, avoiding the need to send Chinese inspectors all the way to the US. Now that this channel has been closed, in theory Chinese certification bodies can still send their own inspectors directly to the US, but the process for imported products has become more cumbersome. Overall, this can be understood as a kind of “half closed door” countermeasure.
The tone of the Commerce Ministry’s response was similarly measured, emphasizing that:
China’s countermeasures are on the whole restrained. China values the hard-won stability of China-US economic and trade relations. We hope the US side can meet China halfway.
Overall, I think this resembles the pattern seen before last year’s phone call between the two leaders: the US finds some pretext to expand sanctions on China, and China responds at key moments with a relatively restrained but precise countermeasure. The two sides then escalate against each other in different areas, before things are eventually resolved through several rounds of in-person negotiations and a meeting between the leaders. Last year, the focal points of escalation between the two sides were TikTok and rare earths. This year, so far, what can be observed (Thanks to the brilliant Reuters reporting) is that the US has focused its restrictions on core components of the chip industry, such as optical modules.
Chinese media outlet The Paper (澎湃新闻), citing industry insiders, analyzed that at this stage, the build-out of US AI infrastructure cannot do without Chinese optical modules. Among the world’s top ten optical module manufacturers, seven are Chinese companies, accounting for as much as 70% of global shipments, while US domestic manufacturers lag behind in both production capacity and technological sophistication. If they cannot obtain Chinese products, the AI infrastructure buildout of major US cloud providers — currently in an acceleration phase — would be severely affected. So the probability of the US rolling out a strict ban is considered low.
Besides, those restrictive policies lack coordination with its domestic industrial promotion policies. Manufacturers like Coherent do have ambitions for “Made-in-USA,” but they cannot achieve domestic manufacturing on their own. This has already been demonstrated in the case of the Biosecure Act. Moreover, China seems to have taken a liking to restricting critical raw materials as a way of countering US countermeasures.
If this pattern holds, I would expect several rounds of phone calls between the two countries’ commerce secretaries or trade representatives, followed by in-person consultations, and finally a meeting between the two leaders to reach a new consensus on a temporary truce.
Below is the full text of the Chinese countermeasures I made with the help of AI:
MOFCOM Announcement No. 33 of 2026: Announcement on the Initiation of a National Security Investigation into Foreign Trade Regarding Imported Printing and Copying Office Equipment
[Issuing Unit] Bureau of Trade Remedy and Investigation
[Document No.] MOFCOM Announcement No. 33 of 2026
[Date] August 5, 2026
Pursuant to Article 41 of the Foreign Trade Law of the People’s Republic of China, in order to safeguard order in foreign trade, the Ministry of Commerce may, on its own or jointly with other relevant departments of the State Council, conduct investigations into matters concerning national security interests in foreign trade.
Preliminary information indicates that imported printing and copying office equipment installed with foreign system software may affect national security interests in foreign trade, meeting the circumstances specified under Article 41 of the Foreign Trade Law of the People’s Republic of China.
Pursuant to Articles 41 and 42 of the Foreign Trade Law of the People’s Republic of China, the Ministry of Commerce has decided to launch an investigation, effective August 5, 2026, into matters concerning national security interests in foreign trade. The relevant matters are hereby announced as follows:
I. Subject and Scope of Investigation
(1) Subject of Investigation
The subject of this investigation is imported office equipment with printing and copying functions that is installed with foreign system software.
Foreign system software refers to driver software and embedded software developed, tested, or maintained by foreign individuals or entities.
(2) Scope of Investigation
To assess the impact of goods, technology, and services in foreign trade on China’s national security interests, the investigating authority may investigate the following matters:
(1) The import situation of the subject products;
(2) The impact of the imported products, technology, or services on national security interests;
(3) Domestic demand in relevant fields and dependence on foreign goods, technology, or services;
(4) The current state of development of relevant domestic industries in China and the impact of imports thereon;
(5) The capacity and level of relevant domestic industries in China to meet domestic demand and national security interests;
(6) The impact of relevant foreign government policies and measures on China’s national security interests;
(7) Other matters affecting national security interests in foreign trade.
II. Investigation Procedures
Pursuant to Article 42 of the Foreign Trade Law of the People’s Republic of China, the investigation may be conducted by means of written questionnaires, hearings, on-site investigations, commissioned investigations, etc. Based on the investigation results, the Ministry of Commerce will produce an investigation report or make a disposition ruling, and issue an announcement.
III. Investigation Period
This investigation shall be concluded within 12 months from the date of the announcement of the decision to initiate the case, which may be extended under special circumstances.
IV. Access to Public Information
During the investigation, interested parties may access public information on the case via the sub-website of the Bureau of Trade Remedy and Investigation on the MOFCOM website, or visit the MOFCOM Trade Remedy Public Information Reading Room (Tel: 0086-10-65197878) to search for, read, transcribe, and photocopy public information on the case.
V. Submission of Comments
Interested parties may submit written comments regarding the initiation and investigation procedures to the Bureau of Trade Remedy and Investigation of the Ministry of Commerce within 30 days from the date of publication of this announcement.
VI. Submission and Handling of Information
Interested parties submitting comments, questionnaire responses, etc. during the investigation shall submit electronic versions via the “Trade Remedy Investigation Information Platform” (
https://etrb.mofcom.gov.cn
), and shall also submit written versions as required by the Ministry of Commerce. The content of the electronic and written versions shall be identical, and the format shall be consistent.
If an interested party believes that the disclosure of information it provides would cause serious adverse effects, it may apply to the Ministry of Commerce for the information to be treated as confidential, stating the reasons. If the Ministry of Commerce approves the request, the interested party applying for confidentiality shall simultaneously provide a non-confidential summary of the confidential information. The non-confidential summary shall contain sufficient, meaningful information to allow other interested parties a reasonable understanding of the confidential information. If a non-confidential summary cannot be provided, reasons shall be given. If an interested party submits information without indicating that confidentiality is required, the Ministry of Commerce will treat the information as public.
VII. Contact Information
Address: No. 2 Dongchang’an Street, Beijing
Postal Code: 100731
Bureau of Trade Remedy and Investigation, Ministry of Commerce
Tel: 0086-10-65198474, 65198194
Fax: 0086-10-65198172
Website:
https://trb.mofcom.gov.cn
Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China
August 5, 2026
[Issuing Unit] Bureau of Security and Control
[Document No.] MOFCOM Order No. 2 of 2026
[Date] August 5, 2026
Order of the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China
No. 2 of 2026
With the approval of the National Coordination Mechanism for Countering Foreign Sanctions Work, the “Decision on Countermeasures Against 6 U.S. Entities Including Applied DNA Sciences, Inc.” is hereby promulgated and shall take effect on August 5, 2026.
Minister: Wang Wentao
August 5, 2026
Decision on Countermeasures Against 6 U.S. Entities Including Applied DNA Sciences, Inc.
Recently, the United States has sanctioned Chinese enterprises under the pretext of so-called “forced labor,” which seriously violates international law and the basic norms governing international relations, and seriously infringes upon China’s sovereignty, security, and development interests. Applied DNA Sciences, Inc. and 5 other U.S. entities have assisted and supported illegal U.S. sanctions related to Xinjiang, and the nature of their conduct is egregious.
Pursuant to Articles 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, and 15 of the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law of the People’s Republic of China, and Articles 3, 5, 8, and 10 of the Provisions on Implementing the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law of the People’s Republic of China, China has decided to place 6 U.S. entities, including Applied DNA Sciences, Inc., on the countermeasures list, and to adopt the following countermeasures: prohibiting organizations and individuals within the territory of China from engaging in relevant transactions, cooperation, and other activities with them.
Attachment: Countermeasures List (August 5, 2026)
Attachment
Countermeasures List
(August 5, 2026)
Applied DNA Sciences, Inc.
Address: 50 Health Sciences Drive, Stony Brook, NY 11790, USA
Postal Code: 11790
Common Name: Applied DNA SciencesStratum Reservoir, LLC.
Address: 5200 North Sam Houston Pkwy W #500, Houston, TX 77086, USA
Postal Code: 77086
Common Name: Stratum ReservoirAltana Technologies, Inc.
Address: 25 Kent Ave Ste 501, Brooklyn, NY 11249, USA
Postal Code: 11249
Common Name: Altana Technologies, AltanaResponsible Business Alliance
Address: 1725 Duke Street Suite 300, Alexandria, VA 22314, USA
Postal Code: 22314
Common Name: RBAVerite Group, Inc.
Address: Business Ct, Suite 200, Sterling, VA 20166, USA
Postal Code: 20166
Common Name: Verite Group, VeriteHuman Rights in China
Address: 85 Broad Street, FL 17, NY 10004, USA
Postal Code: 10004
Common Name: HRIC
[Issuing Unit] Bureau of Security and Control
[Document No.] MOFCOM Order No. 3 of 2026
[Date] August 5, 2026
Order of the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China
No. 3 of 2026
With the approval of the National Coordination Mechanism for Countering Foreign Sanctions Work, the “Decision on Countermeasures Against Compliance Testing LLC (USA)” is hereby promulgated and shall take effect on August 5, 2026.
Minister: Wang Wentao
August 5, 2026
Decision on Countermeasures Against Compliance Testing LLC (USA)
Recently, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has intensively rolled out negative measures targeting China, seriously infringing upon the legitimate and lawful rights and interests of Chinese enterprises. Compliance Testing LLC has assisted and supported the FCC in adopting such measures, endangering China’s sovereignty, security, and development interests.
Pursuant to Articles 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, and 15 of the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law of the People’s Republic of China, and Articles 3, 5, 8, and 10 of the Provisions on Implementing the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law of the People’s Republic of China, China has decided to place Compliance Testing LLC (USA) on the countermeasures list, and to adopt the following countermeasures: prohibiting organizations and individuals within the territory of China from engaging in relevant transactions, cooperation, and other activities with it.
Attachment: Countermeasures List (August 5, 2026)
Attachment
Countermeasures List
(August 5, 2026)
Compliance Testing LLC
Address: 1724 S Nevada Way, Mesa, Arizona, 85204, USA
Postal Code: 85204
Common Name: Compliance Testing, CT
[Issuing Unit] Bureau of Security and Control
[Document No.] MOFCOM Announcement No. 34 of 2026
[Date] August 5, 2026
In accordance with the Export Control Law of the People’s Republic of China, the Regulations on the Export Control of Dual-Use Items of the People’s Republic of China, and other relevant laws and regulations, and in order to safeguard national security and interests and fulfill international obligations such as non-proliferation, it has been decided to strengthen export controls on drone-related dual-use items to the United States. The relevant matters are hereby announced as follows:
For exports to the United States of drones and their key components, as well as related technology listed in the Export Control List of Dual-Use Items of the People’s Republic of China, case-by-case strict review shall be applied, and licensing facilitation measures shall not apply.
This announcement shall take effect from the date of publication.
Ministry of Commerce
August 5, 2026
Xinhua News Agency: China’s Designated Compulsory Product Certification Bodies Suspend Commissioning of U.S. Certification Agencies to Conduct Factory Follow-Up Inspections
The Certification and Accreditation Administration of China (CNCA) has decided that, effective immediately, China’s designated Compulsory Product Certification (CCC) bodies will suspend the practice of commissioning U.S.-based certification agencies to carry out post-certification factory follow-up inspections.
Q: Today, the Ministry of Commerce and other relevant departments announced countermeasures against a series of negative China-related measures by the U.S. Federal Communications Commission and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. What are the considerations behind this?
A: Since the Busan summit between the Chinese and U.S. heads of state, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission has, in disregard of China’s strong opposition and the strong calls from industries in both countries, continued to broaden the concept of national security and has repeatedly rolled out restrictive measures targeting China, covering multiple fields such as telecommunications operations, testing laboratories, drones, consumer-grade routers, and submarine optical cables, and has recently adopted import restrictions on advanced robotics equipment and power inverters.
In particular, disregarding China’s repeated representations, the U.S. side, following the video call between the China-U.S. economic and trade leads on July 30, went on to place more than 40 Chinese entities on the so-called “Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act Entity List” on July 31. China is strongly dissatisfied with and firmly opposed to this.
The relevant measures by the U.S. Federal Communications Commission and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s action of placing relevant entities on the so-called “Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act Entity List” seriously violate the important consensus reached by the two heads of state, and seriously undermine China’s legitimate rights and interests. China has no choice but to take necessary countermeasures in response, including: strengthening export controls on drones and their key components and technology to the United States; suspending factory follow-up inspections commissioned by China’s designated Compulsory Product Certification bodies to U.S. certification agencies; placing Compliance Testing LLC (USA) on the countermeasures list; launching a national security investigation into foreign trade regarding imported printing and copying office equipment; and placing 6 U.S. entities on the countermeasures list, among other measures.
I would like to emphasize that China’s countermeasures are on the whole restrained. China values the hard-won stability of China-U.S. economic and trade relations. We hope the U.S. side can meet China halfway. China demands that the U.S. side immediately revoke the relevant measures, stop its erroneous practices, return to the correct path of resolving differences through friendly consultation and cooperation, and work together to safeguard a constructive and strategically stable China-U.S. relationship. If the U.S. side insists on introducing new restrictive measures against China, China will take further countermeasures.
 | A guest post by
|