Beijing signals anti-discrimination and supply chain security investigations as its countermeasures, with EU cosmetics, wine, meat, and luxury exports as the likely targets
To my mind, the whole "overcapacity" debate really shouldn't be turned into an EU-vs-China battlefield. My instinct is always to shrink a conflict rather than blow it up — so let's instead zero in on one of the people who's so fond of the word "overcapacity": Stéphane Séjourné. As a French left-wing politician, he wants to use "overcapacity" as an all-purpose tool to pull off two things at once — protectionism at home, and meddling abroad dressed up as "supply diversification." The first is aimed at the domestic economy; the second is a way of declaring that the EU stands independent of both China and the US.
On paper, it's a lovely idea.
But personally, I can't stand watching political elites wrap themselves in the flag to push reckless trade-protection measures just to feed a domestic political appetite. Turning diplomacy and trade into a stage for political theater back home is a classic piece of European-politician foolishness. During Séjourné's stint as an adviser to the economy minister, I never once saw him put forward an effective policy to actually revive the French economy. All this "overcapacity" and "subsidy-screening" talk looks less like strategy and more like currying favor with France's big incumbents — steel and autos, for example.
And this is the broader sadness of Europe's left-wing politicians: their political narrative is "borrowed" from America. When it comes to political ideas and models of social governance, Europe doesn't really have a homegrown bureaucratic class of its own — even concepts like "overcapacity" and "subsidy screening" have to be imported from the US. For all that Europe keeps insisting on its political and industrial independence, in spirit it's a vassal of either the US Democrats or the Republicans. And I don't say that as a Chinese person hurling insults or curses — I say it with genuine sympathy, even pity. I honestly rarely see anything local or pragmatic in the bureaucrats of France, Germany, or the Netherlands. Spain and Hungary, oddly enough, come across as a bit more normal.
(Historically, French left-wing politicians do seem to enjoy nitpicking anything China-related, as a way of proving they're standing on the "democratic" side of the international community. Some of the right-wing ones, by contrast, come off as more pragmatic.)
To head off any misreading, let me be clear about one thing. I have no objection whatsoever to any country running anti-dumping investigations into Chinese-made goods or slapping on protectionist tariffs — that's just the normal texture of international trade. My point is narrower: Europe's current handling of trade policy looks amateurish, with none of the poise you'd expect from seasoned political operators. Honestly, it's gotten to the point where I'm starting to miss Chirac and Schröder.
These rapidly intensifying inter-imperialist trade wars and conflicts will eventually become shooting wars.
That's because the deepening crisis of stagnating world capitalism cannot “lift all boats,” thus forcing increasing competition within a zero-sum framework.
What's “good” for China is bad for EU and US, and what's “good” for them is bad for China.
Europe needs to understand one thing: China still has many tools it has not yet used. If Europe continues to politicize and weaponize economic relations, it is not as if China lacks symmetrical response options. EVs, wind turbines, solar, medical devices, agricultural products, luxury goods, aircraft orders, government procurement, critical minerals, market access, anti-subsidy investigations, and anti-dumping measures are all areas where China could respond. The question has never been whether China has cards to play, but who can sustain a prolonged contest at a higher cost. Europe already faces high industrial costs, energy vulnerabilities, limited fiscal space, and a green transition deeply dependent on low-cost equipment. If Europe chooses to treat China as a systemic rival in economic terms, China can respond systemically as well. The real question Europe needs to answer is whether it is defending strategic autonomy—or absorbing industrial costs on behalf of a U.S.-led containment strategy.
The EU is actually adopting the "overcapacity" lie begun by Biden/Yellen as part of US economic war on China, and also as part of militarization: to build domestic manufacturing capabilities for war.
Note that the EU actually signed a memorandum of understanding with NATO that it would, int its arena, adopt and implement policies from NATO. That agreement was signed when Stoltenberg was NATO secretary general.
To my mind, the whole "overcapacity" debate really shouldn't be turned into an EU-vs-China battlefield. My instinct is always to shrink a conflict rather than blow it up — so let's instead zero in on one of the people who's so fond of the word "overcapacity": Stéphane Séjourné. As a French left-wing politician, he wants to use "overcapacity" as an all-purpose tool to pull off two things at once — protectionism at home, and meddling abroad dressed up as "supply diversification." The first is aimed at the domestic economy; the second is a way of declaring that the EU stands independent of both China and the US.
On paper, it's a lovely idea.
But personally, I can't stand watching political elites wrap themselves in the flag to push reckless trade-protection measures just to feed a domestic political appetite. Turning diplomacy and trade into a stage for political theater back home is a classic piece of European-politician foolishness. During Séjourné's stint as an adviser to the economy minister, I never once saw him put forward an effective policy to actually revive the French economy. All this "overcapacity" and "subsidy-screening" talk looks less like strategy and more like currying favor with France's big incumbents — steel and autos, for example.
And this is the broader sadness of Europe's left-wing politicians: their political narrative is "borrowed" from America. When it comes to political ideas and models of social governance, Europe doesn't really have a homegrown bureaucratic class of its own — even concepts like "overcapacity" and "subsidy screening" have to be imported from the US. For all that Europe keeps insisting on its political and industrial independence, in spirit it's a vassal of either the US Democrats or the Republicans. And I don't say that as a Chinese person hurling insults or curses — I say it with genuine sympathy, even pity. I honestly rarely see anything local or pragmatic in the bureaucrats of France, Germany, or the Netherlands. Spain and Hungary, oddly enough, come across as a bit more normal.
(Historically, French left-wing politicians do seem to enjoy nitpicking anything China-related, as a way of proving they're standing on the "democratic" side of the international community. Some of the right-wing ones, by contrast, come off as more pragmatic.)
To head off any misreading, let me be clear about one thing. I have no objection whatsoever to any country running anti-dumping investigations into Chinese-made goods or slapping on protectionist tariffs — that's just the normal texture of international trade. My point is narrower: Europe's current handling of trade policy looks amateurish, with none of the poise you'd expect from seasoned political operators. Honestly, it's gotten to the point where I'm starting to miss Chirac and Schröder.
These rapidly intensifying inter-imperialist trade wars and conflicts will eventually become shooting wars.
That's because the deepening crisis of stagnating world capitalism cannot “lift all boats,” thus forcing increasing competition within a zero-sum framework.
What's “good” for China is bad for EU and US, and what's “good” for them is bad for China.
War is coming. First trade, then bullets.
https://substack.com/@aaronruby/note/p-188961420?r=7jhui4
https://substack.com/@aaronruby/note/p-188961420?r=7jhui4
Europe needs to understand one thing: China still has many tools it has not yet used. If Europe continues to politicize and weaponize economic relations, it is not as if China lacks symmetrical response options. EVs, wind turbines, solar, medical devices, agricultural products, luxury goods, aircraft orders, government procurement, critical minerals, market access, anti-subsidy investigations, and anti-dumping measures are all areas where China could respond. The question has never been whether China has cards to play, but who can sustain a prolonged contest at a higher cost. Europe already faces high industrial costs, energy vulnerabilities, limited fiscal space, and a green transition deeply dependent on low-cost equipment. If Europe chooses to treat China as a systemic rival in economic terms, China can respond systemically as well. The real question Europe needs to answer is whether it is defending strategic autonomy—or absorbing industrial costs on behalf of a U.S.-led containment strategy.
The EU is actually adopting the "overcapacity" lie begun by Biden/Yellen as part of US economic war on China, and also as part of militarization: to build domestic manufacturing capabilities for war.
Note that the EU actually signed a memorandum of understanding with NATO that it would, int its arena, adopt and implement policies from NATO. That agreement was signed when Stoltenberg was NATO secretary general.