China-Russia Relations amid Ukraine Crisis

Zhao Huasheng on China's Approach to the Russia-Ukraine Conflict and the Future of Sino-Russian Relations

Today, I'd like to share a prolonged but very well-written article by Professor Zhao Huasheng 赵华胜, explaining China's position during the Ukraine Crisis and the rationale behind it.

Zhao is a former Director of the Center for Russia and Central Asia Studies at Fudan University's Institute of International Studies and a former Director of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Research Center. From 1989 to 1990, he studied at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) under the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. From April to August 2011, he was a visiting scholar at CSIS in the United States.

Zhao Huasheng at the Valdai Discussion Club

Professor Zhao’s analysis challenges the notion that China maintains a position of "neutrality" and instead frames its approach as "constructive engagement." He carefully unpacks misconceptions surrounding the "cooperation without limits" statement that has drawn so much attention and examines the complex historical context of China-Russia relations.

What I find particularly valuable about this piece is how it acknowledges the debates within China while presenting a nuanced view of the strategic calculations at play. Professor Zhao doesn't shy away from addressing the tensions and tradeoffs in China's position, explaining why maintaining stable relations with Russia serves China's long-term interests without necessarily endorsing all of Russia's actions.

For those seeking to understand the complexity of China's foreign policy decisions during this crisis, I believe it is definitely worth reading. I hope you find it as illuminating as I did.

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China's Policy Choices and China-Russia Relations in the Context of the Ukraine Crisis

One unexpected spillover effect of the Ukraine crisis has been pushing China-Russia relations into the spotlight of international politics. Although China is not a party to the Ukraine crisis, the conflict's outbreak has nothing to do with China, and its resolution does not depend on China, China-Russia relations remain a major variable in the international environment surrounding the Ukraine crisis, with a critical impact on the strategic balance between Russia and the US-Europe bloc. Therefore, China-Russia relations have been placed under the spotlight of world public opinion, with China's policy receiving particular attention. Under the established circumstances of the Ukraine crisis, China's policy choices are the main factor driving changes in China-Russia relations, or in other words, how China-Russia relations will evolve depends primarily on China. In this sense, China is the largest, if not the only, outside force capable of changing the international balance of power. China's choices not only determine the direction of China-Russia relations but also influence which way the international power balance tilts. If China were to move closer to the US and Europe while distancing itself from Russia, even if only at political and economic levels, Russia's strategic position would severely deteriorate, and the international strategic structure would become extremely unbalanced, further exacerbating Russia's vulnerable position. Conversely, if China were to join hands with Russia, the weight would shift toward Russia, and the two major countries would inevitably form a powerful force, significantly strengthening Russia's ability to counter the US and Europe. Meanwhile, this would also promote the formation of two major camps, giving the Ukraine crisis an undertone of bloc confrontation. Therefore, China's policy choices are crucial, requiring it to determine the most appropriate position under conditions of very narrow maneuvering space. Within this context, policy toward Russia is core, because policy toward Russia determines China-Russia relations, which in turn affect the strategic landscape and balance of power that are so important to the Ukraine crisis.

I. Neutrality and Constructive Engagement

Many scholars and some Chinese diplomatic officials have described China's position in the Ukraine crisis as neutral, which is a habitual and easily understood expression, but strictly speaking, it is inaccurate or incorrect. China is neither a permanently neutral country, nor has it signed relevant bilateral agreements with Russia or Ukraine, nor has it declared a neutral position on the Ukraine crisis. Therefore, in terms of international law, China is not a neutral country in the Ukraine crisis and has not declared a neutral position. Even in terms of policy rather than international law, China's policy is not neutral. A neutral policy does not depend on the nature of the actions of either party, makes no judgment on right or wrong, and takes no position, whereas China's principle regarding the Ukraine crisis is to make judgments based on the merits of the matter itself and to independently determine its position. The merits of the matter itself naturally include the behaviors of both parties, which logically means that China's position also depends on the behaviors of both parties, rather than making no judgment on their actions. This principle was established on February 25, 2022, the day after the Ukraine crisis erupted, and has not changed since. This means that China has a sense of right and wrong regarding the Ukraine crisis, distinguishes between right and wrong, and determines its position accordingly, which is clearly not neutrality. China does not stand with one side against the other in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, but this is not based on a neutral position but on China's constructive approach and objectives. Support is not limited to military support; political, economic, diplomatic, and moral support also fall within the scope of support. From this perspective, China does provide support and opposition on the Ukraine crisis issue, rather than doing nothing. China's behavior at the United Nations clearly reflects this. If it were to maintain a neutral stance, it would typically abstain from voting on proposals from both sides to demonstrate impartiality, but China has supported, opposed, and abstained in relevant resolution votes since the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis. China's voting is based on its judgment of the nature of the issues, not on a neutral stance.

Regarding the causes of the Ukraine crisis, there are two explanatory perspectives: one is a static and direct perspective, addressing facts without involving other factors, which is the perspective adopted by the US and Europe; the other is a macro-historical perspective, emphasizing causes and consequences, which is the perspective adopted by Russia. This has led to two opposing explanations: one is that Russia's military action against Ukraine is the direct cause of the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, which is the explanation given by the US and Europe; the other is that NATO's five eastward expansions after the end of the Cold War and the strategic pressure on Russia are the root causes of the conflict, which is Russia's explanation. China has never denied the static and direct explanation, believing that the basic principles of international relations should be observed, but China understands the complexity of the causes of the Ukraine crisis. It adopts a more comprehensive approach, seeing both the direct causes of the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis and, from a macro-historical perspective, understanding the causes of the Ukraine crisis from the entire development process of European security since the end of the Cold War—what Chinese officials often refer to as "complex historical context." In other words, China not only makes judgments from a static cross-section but also observes it in the dynamic process in which the problem occurs. Objectively, China has not opposed the US and European statements, but it also understands Russia's explanation. China believes this is a more objective method of understanding, but this is out of objectivity and fairness, not from a neutral stance.

The Ukraine crisis is not only a war between Russia and Ukraine but also a conflict between the West and Russia. The US and Europe continuously supply Ukraine with huge amounts of funds, weapons, and ammunition, and impose blockades and encirclements on Russia in various fields, including political, military, economic, energy, financial, cyber, media, transportation, and even culture and sports. This has already become a proxy war between the West and Russia, with Russia's real opponents being the West. In fact, both Russia and Ukraine believe that this is no longer a proxy war but a war between Russia and the US-led NATO. If we say that China's policy is neutral, then it is not only neutral between Russia and Ukraine but also between Russia and the West. However, if the West and Russia are viewed as the two sides of the conflict, China's assessment of the nature of the Ukraine crisis would be very different. China believes that an important source of the conflict is NATO's eastward expansion, the outbreak of the conflict is due to US instigation, the continuation of the conflict is due to Western military aid, and the goal of the conflict for the US is to maintain its hegemony. China opposes both US and European sanctions against Russia and US and European arms supplies to Ukraine, and has resisted US proposals in international forums such as the United Nations. Although China is not directly involved in the conflict, viewing this as maintaining neutrality between Russia and the West does not conform to the facts.

A more accurate characterization of China's policy in the Ukraine crisis should be constructive engagement, that is, actively participating in a constructive manner with constructive goals, playing a constructive role, actively helping to solve problems, and promoting the situation to develop in a constructive direction. Of course, on complex issues like the Ukraine crisis, different countries will have different and even opposing understandings of what is constructive. In theory and practice, constructive engagement is a more appropriate concept and a better policy than neutrality. The purpose of constructive engagement is to solve problems and has a proactive nature; neutrality is to stay away from problems and has a passive nature. Constructive engagement is a willingness to take responsibility, while neutrality is not prepared to take responsibility, so constructive engagement embodies a higher value of thought and a higher position than neutrality. From a policy perspective, a neutral policy is rigid, fixing its policy boundaries with little room for policy adjustment, while constructive engagement is flexible, with greater room for policy maneuver and the ability to adjust policies more flexibly according to changing situations. China insists on not taking sides in the Ukraine crisis, not being partial, and not adding fuel to the fire—these are all constructive approaches and goals, not neutrality.

Neutrality does not align with China's international positioning and diplomatic thinking. Chinese diplomacy is undergoing a transformation; it positions itself as a responsible major power, seeking to play a greater role in international affairs and take on greater responsibilities. In international events and disputes between other countries, China has shifted from being accustomed to being a bystander to actively engaging, from being accustomed to passively accepting any changes in situations to actively shaping situations, all of which are fundamentally different from the concept of neutrality. Neutrality not only implies non-intervention and detachment but also, in a sense, an unwillingness to bear any responsibility, which is not the international image and role that China desires.

The Ukraine crisis is the most serious international conflict since the end of the Cold War. It involves China's strategic environment, relates to the development of the international situation, and affects the security and stability of the entire world. Facing such a major event, it is neither realistic nor appropriate for China to completely refrain from involvement and remain detached. In fact, since the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, China has attempted to promote negotiations, achieve a ceasefire, prevent escalation of the war, and resolve the issue through peaceful means. China has been advocating for this with both Russia and Ukraine, and will continue these efforts in the future. In fact, Chinese diplomacy has been exploring constructive engagement in hot spot conflict issues in recent years, with the official term being "constructive participation," and has begun to put it into practice. In his speech at the UN General Assembly in September 2022, then-Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that as a responsible major power, China constructively participates in the resolution of hot spot issues while adhering to the principle of non-interference in internal affairs. Although this policy is not specifically targeted at the Ukraine crisis, it is applicable to it.

II. Non-alignment and "Cooperation Without Limits"

Since the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, the "cooperation without limits" announced by China and Russia caused a sensation internationally, with Western media generally viewing this as evidence that China had foreknowledge of Russia's military action and supported it. The basic premise of this inference is the timeline. On February 4, 2022, Putin visited China. This visit had two important outcomes: first, Putin attended the opening ceremony of the Winter Olympics held in China; second, China and Russia issued the "Joint Statement on International Relations Entering a New Era and Global Sustainable Development," from which the phrase "cooperation without limits" originated. Judging from the sequence of events, the Western media's inference seems logical. Putin arrived in Beijing on February 4, and China and Russia announced "cooperation without limits," a phrase appearing for the first time in a China-Russia joint statement; Putin departed hurriedly, returning to Russia the same day, appearing very urgent; 20 days later, Russia's special military operation began. Western media speculated that Putin came to Beijing to inform China, received China's support, then hurriedly returned to Moscow and launched the military action. In other words, China had prior knowledge of Russia's plans and provided backing.

However, the key missing element in this story is factual evidence. It is merely speculation based on timing without specific evidence, with content that is purely imagined, making it inherently unreliable. In fact, this speculation is incorrect and inconsistent with the real situation. Chinese officials have clarified this multiple times, and Putin has explicitly denied it. A more logical conclusion can be drawn from analyzing China's behavior. The day after the Ukraine crisis broke out, on February 25, President Xi Jinping called President Putin to express China's basic position, which included respecting national sovereignty and territorial integrity and hoping to resolve the issue through peaceful negotiations. This naturally implies respect for Ukraine's territorial integrity and disapproval of war. These two principles have also become essential components of China's basic policy on the Ukraine crisis, which Chinese officials reiterate in every statement. If China had prior knowledge of and supported Russia's military action, China would not have made such statements, which would be self-contradictory, especially just 20 days after making a commitment. It is hard to imagine a major country acting in such a manner. From Russia's perspective, if China were to do this, it would not only be a betrayal of trust but would also be like setting a trap for Russia, and Russia would not have failed to react strongly. Therefore, the belief that China had prior knowledge and supported Russia's military action is neither logical nor reasonable.

More fundamentally, territorial integrity and opposition to war are not special policies of China toward the Ukraine crisis, but basic principles and positions of China's foreign policy. In the past few decades, territorial division issues have appeared many times in the world, and wars and armed conflicts have occurred frequently. China's policy has invariably been to support the maintenance of territorial integrity of all countries and advocate for peace.

"Cooperation without limits" did not first appear in the China-Russia joint statement in February 2022; it had already entered the vocabulary of China's relations with Russia for more than a year prior and had appeared multiple times in official discourse. Its initial expression was "China-Russia strategic cooperation has no end, no forbidden areas, and no upper limit," which was later concretized as "China-Russia friendship has no end, cooperation has no forbidden areas, and mutual trust has no upper limit." This indicates that the appearance of this expression had nothing to do with the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, let alone with China's support for Russia's special military operation. It was merely a literary reinforcement of China's desire to continue developing China-Russia relations. For more than a year after its appearance, few people except scholars specializing in China-Russia relations paid attention to this phrase or gave it special significance; if not for the Ukraine crisis, it would not have received special attention.

"Cooperation without limits" should not be understood narrowly, interpreted only from the perspective of the Ukraine crisis, or linked to specific policies. China understands cooperation in a broad sense, not limited to specific occasions or referring to specific policies. China has frequently used this expression for more than a year, but its basic policy has not changed, indicating that it is a general expression rather than a reference to a specific policy. Moreover, it was impossible to know at that time that the Ukraine crisis would occur.

Does "cooperation without limits" mean that the door to alliance has been opened? Or does it mean that an alliance is also a possible option? In China's understanding, it clearly does not have this meaning. Non-alignment, non-confrontation, and not targeting third parties are the basic principles of China's approach to China-Russia relations, which have been written into the formal documents of the two countries since 2001, thus having the significance of common norms. These principles have not been abandoned for more than 20 years and have not changed due to "cooperation without limits." It can be understood this way: in the relationship between non-alignment and "cooperation without limits," non-alignment is the basic principle, while "cooperation without limits" is an attitude; or non-alignment is superior, and "cooperation without limits" is subordinate. "Cooperation without limits" refers to "no forbidden areas" within the framework of non-alignment, non-confrontation, and not targeting third parties.

In fact, this is also the meaning expressed in the China-Russia joint statement. The complete expression in the joint statement is as follows: "The new type of interstate relations between China and Russia surpasses the military-political alliance model of the Cold War era. The two countries' friendship has no end, cooperation has no forbidden areas, strengthening strategic coordination does not target third countries, and is not affected by the changing international situation or third countries." From this, it can be clearly seen that the "cooperation without limits" mentioned here does not go beyond the principle of non-alignment and does not target third countries. Many interpreters do not understand this sentence in its entirety but extract it from its context, listing "cooperation without limits" separately. Whether intentional or not, this conveys incorrect information, leading to misunderstandings and misinterpretations.

It is necessary to point out that non-alignment is China's autonomous policy choice based on political principles, but it is not an obligation to third countries, especially not an obligation to allied countries. After the end of the Cold War, many countries not only maintained military groups but expanded them, and even formed new military alliances. This primarily refers to the United States, where alliances are one of the pillars of its foreign policy. Therefore, if other countries form alliances, the US and Europe should not find it incomprehensible, let alone demand that other countries not align, because the existence of their military alliances itself is a factor stimulating the formation of new alignments. China adheres to the principle of non-alignment, but this does not mean it does not have the same political rights as other countries. From this perspective, even if "cooperation without limits" included the meaning of alliance—although it does not—this would not exceed the practices of other countries. Alliance not only has value connotations but also has instrumental functions. In cases where the purpose is just and necessary, it is also a possible tool option, and there is no need to mechanically view it as an absolutely negative concept.

Generally speaking, a defensive alliance does not mean that one party must provide support whenever the other is at war, but only when an ally is invaded by a third country. In this Ukraine crisis, except for Belarus providing limited assistance, other Collective Security Treaty Organization member states did not support Russia's military action, let alone provide military support. This is because they considered that the conditions for fulfilling the alliance were not met, and Russia did not make such requests. This function of the alliance was not activated. Of course, this is just a theoretical discussion of the alliance issue and does not advocate for a China-Russia alliance.

How to understand the concept of China-Russia cooperation is also an important issue. It can be felt that in US and European comments on China-Russia cooperation, there is a subtle underlying presumption, namely, to paint China-Russia cooperation in negative colors, to treat it as a negative phenomenon in international politics, even making people feel that China-Russia cooperation itself is wrong and not an aboveboard matter. This is equivalent to placing the concept of China-Russia cooperation in a negative narrative. From China's perspective, China-Russia cooperation is undoubtedly positive, its effect is also positive, and China's proposal of "cooperation without limits" is also based on this intention. China-Russia cooperation includes various aspects such as politics, economy, security, energy, science and technology, transportation, and people-to-people exchanges, and there is nothing abnormal about trying to expand cooperation. China-Russia cooperation is not only beneficial to the two countries but also beneficial to the region. The cooperation between the two countries in their common periphery is crucial for maintaining the security and stability of this region, and the two countries are indispensable important forces for promoting regional cooperation.

The most internationally concerned aspect is China-Russia international cooperation. In this regard, the effect of China-Russia cooperation is also positive. Before the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, the core of China-Russia international cooperation was to form a multipolar international structure, maintain the international system with the United Nations at its core, and promote the construction of a just and reasonable international order. China-Russia cooperation helps maintain the international strategic balance, thereby enhancing its stability. China's cooperation with Russia does not seek but strives to avoid the formation of group confrontation.

In the Ukraine crisis, the role of China-Russia relations is also positive. China-Russia relations are not the cause of the Ukraine crisis. After the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, China-Russia relations are not a factor stimulating the deterioration of the situation. Although China is the largest outside force capable of leveraging the balance of power, China has not taken any action to intensify the crisis escalation. China not only calls on the West and Ukraine to restore peace but also consistently advises Russia to negotiate in bilateral exchanges with Russia, to resolve conflicts peacefully, clearly expressing opposition to the escalation of war and resolutely opposing the use of nuclear weapons. Therefore, China-Russia relations are a stabilizing force for the Ukraine crisis, although they cannot solve the Ukraine problem.

It must also be pointed out that from the perspective of linguistic accuracy, "cooperation without limits" has a certain ambiguity. Purely from a literal standpoint, it contradicts non-alignment, and without context, it can easily lead to misunderstandings and ambiguities. Literary language differs from diplomatic language; literary language is vivid and imaginative, but mostly "qualitative," with great openness in semantics. Therefore, when defining concepts of foreign policy, this point needs to be noted when using literary language. In fact, perhaps considering this point, Chinese officials have now adjusted their wording, using more explicit expressions like "China-Russia relations based on non-alignment, non-confrontation, and not targeting third parties."

III. Leaning Toward Russia Versus Leaning Toward Ukraine

The Ukraine crisis has sparked debate among Chinese academics and the public, with divergent views on China-Russia relations and polarized comments on the event. Some argue that China should explicitly oppose Russia and advocate for putting the brakes on China-Russia relations. Others believe that China-Russia relations bring more disadvantages than advantages to China. Their main arguments are threefold: first, it brings negative impacts to China's moral image; second, it pushes China-US relations toward confrontation; and third, it puts Chinese enterprises at risk of sanctions. The author of this article has a different view on this issue.

On the Ukraine crisis, there is not only no unified moral judgment but also sharp opposition, with completely different understandings of justice and morality. But undoubtedly, Chinese diplomacy should have value principles and respect international law. The issue lies in expressing these in the most appropriate manner. Policy and strategy form an integral whole; correct policies without appropriate strategies not only fail to achieve the desired results but may even be counterproductive. Using the damage or even destruction of an entire country's relations as a means is clearly undesirable and cannot achieve the goal of value pursuit. While idealism is necessary, countries ultimately live in a world of realism, and interstate relations and national interests have broader and more enduring content.

The Ukraine crisis has damaged China's moral image in Western society, especially in Europe. As long as China does not condemn Russia, this situation is difficult to avoid, and even mere condemnation may not satisfy the West. However, China will not determine its Russia policy according to Western demands, will not be controlled by other countries' coercion, and especially will not join the Western camp in sanctioning Russia.

It should also be recognized that, in a sense, the Ukraine crisis can be understood as two intertwined wars: one between Russia and Ukraine, and another proxy war between Russia and the US. Their natures differ greatly, and from different perspectives, the roles of each party also differ and cannot be equated. From the perspective of the Russia-Ukraine war, the roles of Russia and Ukraine are of one nature; from the perspective of the US-Russia proxy war, the roles of the US and Russia take on another nature. Moreover, in the US-Russia proxy war, even denying the legitimacy of Russia's "special military operation" does not automatically affirm that the other side is just and legitimate. Therefore, not joining the US sanctions against Russia does not necessarily mean being politically wrong, especially when this approach does not make the problem easier to solve.

It is an exaggeration to claim that China has been dragged into confrontation with the United States by Russia. Russia lacks this capability, China is not that naive, and the US is not that foolish. The development of China-US relations to date is mainly due to its own logic, not because of China-Russia relations. In the 30-year trajectory of China-US relations after the end of the Cold War, it is almost impossible to find examples of deterioration due to China-Russia relations. The Ukraine crisis has created new problems for China-US relations, but these are secondary and serve as new stimuli rather than the root cause of China-US contradictions. The biggest sticking point in China-US relations is the Taiwan issue. Undoubtedly, regardless of what China does on the Ukraine crisis, the contradictions between China and the US on the Taiwan issue will not disappear.

Chinese enterprises do indeed face the possibility of secondary sanctions, which pose a serious threat to China's commercial interests. However, any country that has cooperative relations with Russia in areas subject to US sanctions will incur sanctions, which is not directly related to whether China and Russia are strategic partners. This is caused by US sanction policies; China-Russia economic cooperation is not the cause. Economic cooperation is normal exchange; it is not wrong in itself. US and European sanctions against Russia have not only struck the Russian economy but have also brought economic losses to themselves and hijacked all innocent other countries, severely damaging their interests, which is unreasonable. Chinese enterprises can only try to avoid risks, reduce losses, and seek relatively safe cooperation methods to adapt to the new situation.

Opinions in favor of continuing to develop China-Russia relations are mainstream, although the arguments differ. Broadly speaking, two points are most prominent: first, based on another understanding of the principle of justice, Russia is seen as being forced to counterattack, fighting against hegemony, which has legitimacy, and China should support Russia; second, from the perspective of realistic interests, even if China were to condemn Russia and join sanctions against Russia, the US would not change its policy toward China, and the US would still deal with China with full force.

The issue of the justice of Russia's actions need not be elaborated; opinions differ on this issue, and there is no unified view. However, upon closer examination, one can see another logic behind this argument. Its real focus is not entirely on morality, nor on Russia, but on the United States. In other words, the US is the core of the problem, and China-US competition is the starting point of this view, which means that regardless of which country it is, as long as it is fighting against the US, it should be supported—the Ukraine crisis is, in a sense, also a war between Russia and the US. Naturally, China should support Russia. Thus, support for Russia is more about targeting the US than for Russia's sake. This is not to affirm or deny this view, but merely to point out its essence.

Among the various arguments supporting China-Russia relations, the realistic interest argument is most representative. Since China's opposition to Russia cannot possibly change the US policy of containing China, the final result of China doing so would only be "losing both the woman and the troops," neither truly reversing China-US relations while sacrificing China-Russia relations. China cannot make such a foolish move, and under the US policy of "dual containment," with the US viewing China as its main strategic competitor, helping the US weaken Russia is tantamount to self-weakening in disguise, while supporting Russia is indirectly supporting oneself. Obviously, this is a realist argument. This argument is most powerful and most pragmatic. Whether one agrees or not, the reality of international politics is that interstate relations are still largely governed by realist thinking, and China is no exception.

An interesting phenomenon is that, despite opposing views on the Russia issue, these two viewpoints share a commonality: the formation of their views is not entirely due to the Ukraine crisis but mainly due to their pre-existing positions. In other words, their pre-existing positions determined their starting points, and the Ukraine crisis merely made their views more pronounced and their opposition more acute.

IV. Positive Versus Negative Asset

After the Ukraine crisis, some have suggested that China-Russia relations have become a negative asset for Chinese diplomacy, primarily manifesting in the aforementioned damage to China's interests. China has indeed suffered some damage to its interests, though not simply because of China-Russia relations. Looking at the full picture, China-Russia relations remain a positive asset for China. This is from a static perspective. From a dynamic perspective, positive and negative assets are in a dialectical relationship, depending on how they are utilized.

China-Russia relations are of significant interest to China. Views that China-Russia relations are not very beneficial to China are mainly judged from a trade perspective. From this angle, compared to the US, EU, and ASEAN, China-Russia trade volume is relatively small. In 2021, before the Ukraine crisis, ASEAN was China's largest trading partner, with a trade volume of 5.674 trillion yuan, accounting for 14.51% of China's total foreign trade. The EU ranked second, with a trade volume of 5.351 trillion yuan, accounting for 13.69% of China's total foreign trade. The US ranked third, though the US is China's largest single trading country, with a trade volume of 4.882 trillion yuan, accounting for 12.49% of China's total foreign trade. The US and EU together account for over 26% of China's total foreign trade. Russia ranked eleventh among China's trading partners, with a 2021 trade volume of 948.67 billion yuan, accounting for 2.43% of China's total foreign trade. The near-term goal for China-Russia trade is to reach 200 billion US dollars, which would still be far less than that with the US and EU. Additionally, China's trade surplus mainly comes from the US and EU. In 2021, China's trade surplus with the US was approximately 400 billion US dollars, and with Europe about 200 billion US dollars. Due to the trade structure, China has a trade deficit with Russia, which was about 10 billion US dollars in 2021. Besides trade volume, in areas such as investment, finance, and technology, the importance of the US and EU to China's interests is incomparable to that of Russia.

Nevertheless, even economically, although China-Russia trade volume is relatively small compared to China's trade with the US and EU, it is not unimportant. China-Russia trade has its strengths, especially in the energy sector. Energy security is a major national interest for China and has crucial strategic significance. Russia has consistently ranked first or second among China's oil source countries. From January to October 2022, Russia exported 72 million tons of oil to China, slightly less than Saudi Arabia's 73.8 million tons, ranking second. Russia is also China's second-largest natural gas pipeline source country. In 2022, China imported 15.5 billion cubic meters of pipeline natural gas from Russia. Russia provides relatively less liquefied gas, ranking fourth among China's liquefied gas suppliers. Additionally, Russia is the second-largest country exporting coal to China. In the future, there is significant room for growth in Russia's oil and natural gas supplies to China. Thus, Russia is extremely important for China's energy security, which cannot be measured simply by trade volume, and China places energy cooperation with Russia in a particularly important position. Simultaneously, there are many areas in China-Russia economic cooperation that can be developed and deepened, with great development potential.

China's economic interactions with different countries are parallel and additive relationships, not substitutive or exclusionary ones. That is, despite differences in size, the importance of one country cannot substitute for or exclude the importance of another. The benefits of economic cooperation with one country cannot replace or exclude the benefits of economic cooperation with another. Relatively smaller does not mean unimportant or meaningless; they are all components of China's foreign economic cooperation and cannot be abandoned by China. Foreign economic cooperation is about inclusiveness and comprehensive development, not about abandoning the small for the large, let alone choosing one over the other.

In interstate relations, it is generally believed that economic relations play a foundational role, being the most basic factor determining interstate relations. Undoubtedly, economic interests are crucial for countries, but in modern politics, the habitual understanding that economics determines everything has been repeatedly broken. The role of economic interests in interstate relations is complex and variable; it is not always coordinated and synchronized with political relations, nor does it always have an absolute decisive effect on political relations. There are numerous such cases, and China's relations with the US, EU, Japan, and Russia are obvious examples. China has the closest economic relations with the US, EU, and Japan, but this has not guaranteed close political relations. China-Russia relations are the opposite; despite the relatively thin economic relations between China and Russia, which can hardly match those with the US and EU, political relations are much better than with the US and EU. The same situation has occurred in Russia's relations with Europe and Ukraine. Before the Ukraine crisis, Russia was Ukraine's most important trading partner and Europe's largest natural gas supplier. The economic relations between the parties were undeniably close, and economic interests were undeniably significant, but now they are in a state of war and quasi-war.

National interests encompass a wide range of content, with economic interests being just one aspect. Beyond economic interests, China-Russia relations hold other importance for China, some of which are unique and irreplaceable. China-Russia relations have a special position in China's peripheral security. Russia is China's largest neighbor and strongest neighbor, with a long boundary line. It is the most important link in China's border security, and the state of China-Russia relations is crucial for the security of China's border regions, a point that is well-known and needs no elaboration. The significance of China-Russia relations for China's peripheral security is not only in the border regions between the two countries but also plays an important role in the overall security of China's northern periphery, including Mongolia, Central Asia, Afghanistan, and even the Korean Peninsula and South Asia, which are part of the common periphery of China and Russia. The two countries each have their influence in these regions, and their friendship and cooperation are also important factors in maintaining stability and security in China's greater periphery.

It should also be noted that if problems with smaller neighboring countries have only local significance, then problems with a major power like Russia could potentially have global and strategic impacts on China, which is also a special aspect of China-Russia relations. Against the backdrop of China's greatest strategic pressure coming from the sea, good China-Russia relations can ensure a relatively stable Eurasian continent during normal times and a relatively stable strategic rear for China when facing major strategic crises, which has enormous strategic benefits for China. This significance is implicit in normal periods and may not seem significant, but when China faces major external changes, its strategic significance for China will become apparent.

China-Russia relations hold a special position in China's strategic landscape. Whether one likes it or not, or acknowledges it or not, the interactive relationships between major powers objectively exist and have a significant shaping effect on the international landscape. In the composition of major power relations, China, Russia, the US, Europe, India, and Japan are the basic elements. They can form multiple trilateral or quadrilateral interactive relationships, and even pentagonal or hexagonal frameworks. However, among all major powers, China-Russia-US relations are undoubtedly the most prominent. They are the three most independent pivots in today's international politics. Europe and Japan have alliance relationships with the US, with the US as the alliance leader, and Europe and Japan still have a certain dependence. Although India pursues an independent foreign policy, it is more often an object of wooing and is not yet sufficient to be an independent center with strong centripetal force.

It is commonly believed that the China-US-Russia grand triangle has gone and will not return. Indeed, a grand triangle identical to that of the Cold War era will not reappear, but this does not mean that triangular patterns will not return. Vertical and horizontal alliances, coalitions, and alignments in interstate relations have existed since ancient times and continue to this day. The China-US-Russia grand triangle is just one manifestation, but it is not an exceptional form of interstate relations. In other words, as a normal rather than exceptional form of major power relations, triangular relationships are repeatable. The question is only whether the conditions for its emergence are met. If the conditions are met, the reappearance of a new grand triangle is not an unfounded imagination. Of course, the form of the grand triangle can be repeated, but the specific content will not be the same. If a new triangular relationship emerges, its hostile nature, degree of opposition, and scope of influence will all be different compared to the grand triangle of the Cold War era.

The prerequisite for the formation of a new triangle is mutual opposition among China, Russia, and the US. China has no intention of engaging in traditional geopolitical games, neither preparing to ally with Russia nor hoping to confront the US. However, given that the US has already made China its primary strategic competitor, if China-Russia relations were to reverse, the conditions for mutual opposition among the three countries would be met, and a new triangular relationship could emerge. In the new triangular relationship, the roles and positions of China and Russia would change, with China and the US being the strongest two poles, and Russia being the relatively weaker party. It is necessary to explain that the meaning of "two poles" mentioned here differs from the US-Soviet bipolarity; it refers to the special status of China and the US having comprehensive national strength far exceeding other major powers within the framework of a multipolar world structure, which could be termed "two superpowers among multiple strong powers." This is the objective state of today's international structure but does not mean that China and the US each represent half of the world. It is also not a policy pursuit and does not contradict the multipolarization process and China's multipolarization policy.

The US has made China the main target of containment, placing Russia in a position secondary to China. Considering the special political and geographical conditions between China and Russia, complex border and historical issues, rapidly widening power gap, and China's rapidly growing influence in regions such as Central Asia and the Caucasus, when bilateral relations turn negative, Russia is more likely to view China as the main source of pressure. Thus, a situation would arise where both the US and Russia view China as their main strategic challenge. Of course, this is a worst-case assumption, but if China-Russia relations are mishandled, it would undoubtedly create conditions for this assumption to become reality.

Currently, Russia is in sharp opposition to the US and Europe, with no possibility of fundamental improvement in bilateral relations in the foreseeable future. However, in today's unpredictable world, where "black swans" frequently appear, once times change, the international environment will also change. Only by considering both the partial and the overall, the short-term and the long-term, can one stand on undefeated ground.

V. Long-term Stability Versus Major Fluctuations

China-Russia relations should remain stable, although the reasons and perspectives here differ somewhat from the aforementioned "maintenance faction." It is not based on being pro-American or anti-American, nor on being pro-Russian or anti-Russian, but takes interstate relations as its starting point and endpoint. Interstate relations are a complex system driven by multiple factors, with their own inertia and patterns, and a certain independence. Maintaining normal interstate relations does not necessarily mean supporting or opposing a party to an event. Simply put, they are not necessarily linked.

The Ukraine crisis has plunged the world into intense turmoil, and international politics seems to have undergone earth-shaking changes. However, upon careful observation, one can find that the basic pattern of interstate relations has not changed significantly. It has been adjusted but not completely disrupted and reorganized—countries that were originally friendly with Russia still maintain normal relations, although some countries have policy fluctuations or estrangement for certain reasons. Few non-Western countries have dramatically changed their positions to stand firmly against Russia. The Global South basically continues to maintain relations with Russia and does not join sanctions against Russia. Those resolutely opposed to Russia are basically Western countries or countries with closer political relations to the West, and no Western country has switched sides to stand with Russia.

This is not accidental; similar situations are common in international politics, indicating that interstate relations are influenced by various internal and external factors, but the state of bilateral relations is most fundamental. Between friendly countries, when external circumstances change or crises arise, in the absence of direct major conflicts of interest, countries typically tend to maintain normal relations rather than actively destroying them due to certain problems. Good interstate relations are the accumulation of years or even generations, carrying multifaceted and long-term national interests. The impetus to maintain interstate relations is often stronger than the impact of temporary external issues, giving friendly interstate relations a self-orienting and inertial tendency toward stability. Interstate relations are long-term; they are not relations with a regime, nor are they the needs of a certain period. Regimes will change, times will pass, but interstate relations will continue to exist. Mature interstate relations policies should also be stable, continuous, and predictable, rather than erratic and expedient lacking continuity.

China-Russia relations are normal interstate relations. As interstate relations, they are influenced by complex domestic and international factors, with bilateral factors being particularly important. External factors not directly related to China, such as the state of the Russian regime, whether its domestic development is good or bad, whether it wins or loses in the Ukraine crisis, whether its relations with other countries improve or deteriorate—all of these have some impact on China-Russia relations, but they are not key conditions determining China's policy toward Russia. China develops relations with various types of countries, including those with different religions, political cultures, and policies toward China. Naturally, there is no reason not to develop relations with Russia. Moreover, China pursues an independent foreign policy and is not subject to coercion by other countries in its foreign relations. From this perspective, China's policy in the Ukraine crisis is not special; it does not differ significantly from the behavioral patterns of other countries and conforms to the general patterns of interstate relations.

Over the past century, China-Russia relations have been alternately good and bad, often experiencing major ups and downs, with no record of maintaining long-term close friendly cooperation. Counting from 1996 when the two countries declared themselves strategic partners, the current friendly cooperative relationship has lasted for 27 years, which is unprecedented not only in the past century but also in the 400-year history of China-Russia relations, being the longest period of continuous cooperation. This result comes from both countries learning from painful lessons of the past. China-Russia/Soviet relations were extraordinarily warm in the 1950s but quickly fell into an ice pit in the 1960s, changing from the closest friends to enemies, leading to border military conflicts and the brink of full-scale war. It took 25 years until 1989 for bilateral relations to normalize from complete rupture, and another 7 years until 1996 to elevate bilateral relations to the level of strategic cooperation.

China and Russia have very friendly relations, which need no elaboration; both sides believe that bilateral relations are at their best in history. Although the Ukraine crisis is intense, it is not directed at China, which can be said to be an outsider, not directly involved. In this situation, maintaining normal relations with Russia is a natural choice—not only with Russia but also with Ukraine and the US and Europe. Of course, this is not to say that China does not have its own position.

Maintaining China-Russia relations not only serves the interests of China and Russia but also contributes to international and regional stability. With Europe and Russia already in intense confrontation, the deterioration of China-Russia relations would plunge the entire Eurasian continent into turmoil and uncertainty. Good China-Russia relations can at least ensure the basic stability of half of the Eurasian continent and maintain normal order in that half. This aligns with China's security and economic interests.

China adopts a non-alignment policy, does not advocate confrontation with the US and Europe, does not wish to form two major blocs, and does not seek to destroy the international order. China's policies and ideas are also reflected in China-Russia relations and influence them. Therefore, China-Russia cooperation will not accelerate the collapse of the international order, will not strengthen confrontation with the US and Europe, and will not deepen the division of the international community.

It particularly needs to be re-emphasized that maintaining cooperative relations does not mean supporting all the behaviors and policies of the other party, which is natural in interstate relations. In terms of the Ukraine crisis, maintaining China-Russia cooperation does not mean fully supporting Russia's policy. China has not supported Russia's special military operation, has not recognized the incorporation of Crimea, Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson into Russia, advocates maintaining Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and also believes that the legitimate security interests of all parties should be respected and properly addressed. This has clearly expressed the meaning of China's policy, which is based on international law, not unconditionally supporting all actions of any party.

Viewing the maintenance of China-Russia relations as supporting Russia's military action against Ukraine, or believing that disagreeing with some of Russia's policies means standing in opposition to Russia, is an oversimplified mindset. Even from the perspective of problem-solving, its effect would only be worse, not better. Friendly relations are an important resource and channel. Under conditions of maintaining friendship, China can more easily communicate with Russia, make suggestions to Russia, and is more likely to mediate, cooling down and extinguishing fires in moments of crisis. If bilateral relations cool, communication between China and Russia will become difficult, and the possibility of participating in opinions will be reduced. Some wars initiated by the United States often do not gain the approval of some of its European allies, but this has not escalated to the level of their interstate relations.

Maintaining China-Russia relations is not an exceptional policy toward Russia; it applies to all of China's bilateral relations, meaning that relations with other countries should be the same. Meanwhile, maintaining China-Russia relations is not directed against the West and does not mean not developing relations with the US and Europe. Facing various challenges, efforts should be made to maintain and develop relations between countries; this should be the basic policy for handling interstate relations. In fact, this is what China does. When the United States launched the Iraq War on false grounds, even without historical context, China did not halt its relations with the United States, and this did not mean supporting the United States' initiation of war. Today, the United States implements containment and sanctions against China, pressing step by step on issues involving China's core interests, while Europe follows behind the United States. Even so, China still hopes to improve relations with the US and Europe, trying to return bilateral relations to normal, and China's efforts in this regard are no less than in any other direction. Russia has not harmed China's core interests, so why actively destroy a friendly relationship? After destruction, enormous efforts would inevitably be needed to repair it—wouldn't this be seeking trouble for oneself?

VI. Conclusion

For China's positioning in the Ukraine crisis, a more accurate definition is constructive engagement rather than neutrality. Unlike the United States and the West, China's policy is not based on choosing one side, but is oriented toward constructive outcomes. At the current stage, what China understands as constructive can be summarized in its 12-point peace plan for Ukraine proposed in February 2023. In China's view, the Ukraine crisis has great complexity in terms of causes, participants, and pursuit of interests. It is not only a war between Russia and Ukraine but also a proxy war or quasi-war between Russia and the United States and NATO. Between Russia and Ukraine, China has never had any objections to Ukraine, but between Russia and the United States and NATO, China believes the latter bears important responsibility for both the outbreak and continuation of the war, and suspects that some countries are using the Ukraine crisis to achieve geopolitical goals. From this perspective, China is not neutral. Constructive engagement is a flexible policy with room for specific policy adjustments based on the situation, not fixed in one position.

"Cooperation without limits" has been widely used by Western public opinion as evidence that China supports Russia's military action and might form an alliance with Russia. This is a misunderstanding or misinterpretation. Putin did not inform China of the planned military action, and naturally, there could not have been Chinese support for Russia. "Cooperation without limits" also has no connection with alliance formation. China and Russia established the principle of non-alignment in 2001, and this principle has never changed. Looking at the full paragraph of the China-Russia joint statement, one can see that "cooperation without limits" is within the framework of "non-alignment, non-confrontation, not targeting third parties."

There are two diametrically opposed views in Chinese academic circles on the Ukraine crisis: one supporting Ukraine and the other supporting Russia. Support for Russia is mainstream, with the main argument being that the United States and NATO bear important responsibility for the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, and that after defeating Russia, the United States will be free to deal with China with full force. Therefore, China should not help the United States strike Russia.

China will continue to maintain normal state relations with Russia. China-Russia relations have extensive important interests for China, especially in border region security, peripheral region stability, regional cooperation, energy cooperation, and other aspects. These interests are long-term and require good state relations as a guarantee. Maintaining normal relations does not mean supporting all policies of the other party, but China cannot abandon all these important national interests because of this. This conforms to the general pattern of interstate relations, namely, in the absence of direct major conflicts of interest, two countries will usually maintain normal relations with each other rather than actively destroying them. The fact that most countries in the world have not joined sanctions against Russia also confirms this pattern.

China is willing to maintain good relations with all parties, including the US and Europe. But the West, especially the United States, still adheres to the creed of "if you're not with me, you're against me," giving China no space, and viewing not opposing Russia as supporting Russia. The consequences of this approach are obvious; its natural result is to push China and Russia closer together, deepening the trend of global division and bloc confrontation. The US "black or white" policy is also selective. China's policy on the Ukraine crisis does not differ in principle from that of many countries in the world, including all Shanghai Cooperation Organization countries, including India, which hold positions similar to China's, but the United States directs its spearhead at China. This is certainly because the China factor is more important, but it is also driven by certain geopolitical needs.

The Ukraine crisis is still ongoing, and currently, neither the final outcome of the war nor its end is in sight. As long as the war continues, various accidents and loss of control could suddenly occur, subverting the entire situation. The future situation is not optimistic, and China's policy, China-Russia relations, and China's relations with the West may face new tests and challenges.